[The Epoch Times, April 14, 2022]The Russian ArmyUkraineIt has been more than 10 days since the evacuation around the capital Kyiv, and more gathered in eastern Ukraine, but so far there has been no large-scale war, nor the Knife Fight predicted by the US Department of Defense.The Russian army may expect a decisive battle with the Ukrainian army, but Ukraine does not seem to have such plans.tankThe possibility of a big war doesn’t look like much.
The Russian army may invest 60battalion leveltacticsunit
According to the assessment of the US Department of Defense, the Russian military isUkraineThe eastern region has assembled a large number of troops, which may exceed 60 battalion levels in totaltacticsUnits, including remnants of Belarusian forces withdrawn from northwest and northeast Kyiv, and forces originally prepared to lay siege to Kharkov, the second largest city.
These forces, if assembled, should account for more than half of the invading Russian army, along with about 55 battalion-level tactical units, spread across the southern Ukrainian battlefield, from Kherson to the battle-hungry Malibo until the connection to eastern Ukraine swathes of the southern region.
U.S. Department of Defense officials believe that the current combat effectiveness of the Russian military is between 80% and 85% after continuous losses. It is difficult to determine how long it will take to reorganize the Russian army that has retreated into Belarus, because some tactical units have suffered serious losses. If they cannot quickly replenish their troops, they may only be reduced to fewer tactical units than before, so that they can be put into Ukraine as soon as possible. Eastern battlefield.
Despite this, the number of armored units of the Russian army is still considerable.If the Russian army can really assemble 60 reorganized battalion-level tactical units, there should be about 600 vehiclestankmainly T-90 and T-80, and the rest are upgraded versions of T-72; there may be 1,800 armored vehicles; hundreds of artillery and multiple rockets; armed helicopters should also be able to mobilize hundreds of them.
Ukraine will not change tactics easily
Even if the Ukrainian army can concentrate all the hundreds of T-80 and T-72 tanks, I am afraid it is not the opponent of the Russian army; it is very likely that the Ukrainian tank army will be defeated by the Russian army before the battle.air raidand large-scale long-range artillery fire. The Ukrainian army has avoided similar battles from the beginning, preventing the Russian army from taking advantage of air strikes and long-range strikes, and it should not change easily now.
Although the Russian army expects a similar tank battle, the Russian generals should be very clear that Ukraine may continue to adopt small-scale movement attack tactics or irregular blocking tactics. The Russian army will probably be more careful not to rashly go deep alone, and try to advance along the open area as much as possible, protect the flanks and rear supply lines, and prevent it from being ambushed or surprise attack at any time.
Although the Russian army has begun to attack southward from the Izum area, it has not adopted a rapid assault method like the attack on Kyiv more than a month ago. The Russian army is more like waiting for the completion of the large-scale assembly. The current attack intensity is not large, and in the future, it may try to take every step as much as possible. However, Moscow executives may have ordered clear results by May 9, and front-line commanders may be under pressure to take risks.
The withdrawal of the Russian army from Kyiv was quite rapid, and it should be very worried about the pursuit of the Ukrainian army; the Ukrainian army did not seem to organize a large-scale pursuit operation, and probably did not have the corresponding mobility and firepower.
The commander of the Ukrainian army is also clear that it is not possible to defeat the Russian army in a large-scale head-to-head confrontation, but to overwhelm the Russian army through a war of attrition, so that the Russian army cannot achieve its combat goals. In the first stage of the war, the Ukrainian army successfully did this; in the next stage of the war, the Ukrainian army should replicate similar tactics, first try to save itself, and then find opportunities to kill the enemy. The weapons provided by the US military also show this.
What weapons did the US provide
On April 12, the U.S. Department of Defense said that in the past year, the United States provided Ukraine with $2 billion in aid, of which $1.7 billion in weapons had been shipped into Ukraine. More than 30 countries are currently coordinating aid.
On April 13, the U.S. Department of Defense convened a meeting of major arms contractors to accelerate production and develop new modernization capabilities for continued assistance to Ukraine; while replenishing U.S. stockpiles and ensuring long-term U.S. and allied/partner preparedness , to meet the challenges of current and future conflicts.
On April 7, the U.S. Department of Defense announced a list of weapons to assist Ukraine, including: more than 1,400 Stinger air defense systems; more than 5,000 Javelin anti-armor systems; more than 7,000 other anti-armor systems; Hundreds of Switchblade tactical UAS; over 7,000 small arms; over 50 million rounds of ammunition; 45,000 body armor and helmets; laser-guided rocket systems; Puma UAS; 4 counter-artillery and anti-UAV system tracking radar; 4 anti-mortar radar systems; high mobility multipurpose wheeled armoured vehicles; night vision equipment, thermal imaging systems and optics; tactical security communications systems; commercial satellite imagery services; explosives Handling protective equipment; medical supplies.
Most of these are individual weapons and cannot deal with large-scale armored wars. The list confirms that the U.S. military provided Ukraine with satellite services, communications systems, and Puma drones for reconnaissance, allowing Ukrainian forces to keep track of Russian movements.
The Switchblade drone, which can carry explosives and is equipped with cameras and sensors, requires only about a day or two of training to operate; it can be used for brief reconnaissance, and can be commanded to rush to a target at any time for precise strikes. Switchblade drones may soon be the new thing to watch.
On April 13, the United States announced the latest batch of aid plans, including: 18 155mm howitzers and 40,000 rounds of shells;10AN/TPQ-36 anti-gun radar;twoAN/MPQ-64 Sentinel air surveillance radar;300a Switchblade tactical unmanned aerial system;500javelinmissileand thousands of other anti-armor systems;200M113 armored personnel carrier;100a high mobility multipurpose wheeled armoured vehicle;11Mi-17 helicopters;unmanned coastal defense ships;Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear protective equipment;medical equipment;30,000 sets of body armor and helmets;Exceed2,000 optical and laser rangefinders;for clearing obstaclesC-4 explosives and demolition equipment; M18A1 mines compliant with the Ottawa Convention.
The U.S. Department of Defense has assessed that Ukraine still has access to most of its air defense systems, but Ukraine wants to increase its inventory of air defense capabilities and also wants more aircraft. At present, Eastern European countries are preparing to provide Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, Russian-made tanks, and Mig-29 fighter jets, which are familiar weapons to Ukraine. Other countries may also provide artillery and light armored vehicles, etc., mainly to provide precision strike and maneuverability, which is not enough to deal with a large-scale confrontation.
hand-to-hand combat (Knife Fight) previews the melee mode
On April 8, the US Department of Defense issued a press release, “Defense Official Says Conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas Region Could Be ‘Knife Fight'” (Defense Official Says Conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas Region Could Be ‘Knife Fight’). “It can be very bloody and very ugly,” the article said.
Such a statement actually indicates that Ukraine will still seek close combat with the Russian army and avoid a possible armored war. A large number of weapons provided by the U.S. military are also melee weapons, and the U.S. military should also strongly recommend that the Ukrainian army engage in close combat with the Russian army in order to eliminate the Russian army’s advantage. U.S. intelligence can still play a key role, and U.S.-provided night vision equipment may give Ukraine a partial night-time advantage.
The U.S. Department of Defense still believes that the Russian military has not addressed the low morale and logistical problems that exist not only in Ukraine, but also outside Ukraine. The U.S. military will obviously suggest that the Ukrainian army and the Russian army carry out a continuous war of attrition, and do not rush into a head-to-head confrontation; the May 9 deadline will put more pressure on the Russian army, waiting for the Russian army to make mistakes.
The Russian army continued to indiscriminately bombed the southeastern Ukrainian city of Malibo and claimed that 1,026 Ukrainian soldiers had surrendered, but it was suspected as false news by the outside world. The fierce fighting in Malibo continued, and the Ukrainian army continued to launch a limited counterattack in Kherson; in contrast, there was no large-scale fierce fighting in eastern Ukraine, which was a little calm before the war.
Sooner or later, the Russian army will launch a large-scale offensive to form a siege of eastern Ukraine; the Ukrainian army will seek opportunities to harass, block, and conditionally make surprise attacks. What happens next still depends on intelligence, mobility, supplies, and the responsiveness of field commanders; a tank or armored battle is unlikely.
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Responsible editor: Gao Yi#