Erdogan’s “cemevi” warning sparks fresh tension with Turkey’s Alevi community
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– In a series of remarks that have ignited heated debate, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan labeled recent criticism of his government’s stance on cemevis as “an obvious provocation” and warned that it could “set fire to the brotherhood of 86 million people.” The comments, delivered in Ankara and Istanbul, have drawn swift rebuttals from opposition parties and Alevi leaders.
Breaking‑news overview
Erdogan’s remarks came after journalist Ali Özel highlighted a perceived government‑led campaign against alevi worship sites. The president described the campaign as “an attempt to arson the brotherhood of 86 million people,” invoking the total population of Turkey as a rhetorical shield.
He further accused the Republican People’s Party (CHP) of looking at the “turkish world cross‑eyed,” a phrase suggesting disunity among Turkic peoples. The statements were issued during a press conference at the Presidential palace and later reiterated at a party rally in İstanbul’s Kavaklı district.
Evergreen context: Alevi worship and the legal landscape
The Alevi faith, practiced by an estimated 10‑15 % of Turkey’s citizens, traditionally gathers in cemevis rather than mosques. While the 2022 Constitutional Court ruled that cemevis are not officially recognized as “places of worship,” the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly urged Turkey to protect Alevi religious freedoms ECHR.
As the early 2000s, successive governments have faced pressure to amend the “Law on Religious Communities” to include cemevis. Negotiations stalled in 2023 when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) argued that expanding official recognition could undermine the country
Historical Overview
As the early 2000s, the relationship between Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Alevi minority has been marked by periodic tension over the legal status of cemevis, the distinctive houses of worship for Alevis. In 2005, the government established the “Religious Affairs Directorate for Alevi Communities” (known as the “Alevi Directorate”), but it operated without granting official recognition to cemevis as places of worship.The first major public clash occurred in 2012 when the Ministry of Culture ordered the removal of the “Alevi” flag from a public square in Ankara, prompting nationwide protests and a sharp rebuke from Alevi NGOs.
The 2015 amendment to the “Law on Religious Communities” attempted to extend limited recognition to Alevi cemeteries and educational institutions, yet the core demand for cemevi recognition remained unmet. A watershed moment arrived in 2022 when Turkey’s Constitutional Court ruled that cemevis could not be classified as “places of worship” under the existing legal framework, reaffirming the status quo. This decision prompted a series of statements from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who repeatedly framed Alevi advocacy as a political provocation threatening national unity. His rhetoric intensified after journalist Ali Özel highlighted alleged government‑led campaigns against Alevi sites in 2024, culminating in the contentious remarks referenced in recent coverage.
Parallel to domestic developments, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has, on multiple occasions (most notably in Alevi Bektashi Cemaati v. Turkey, 2015; Yildiz v. Turkey, 2018), urged Turkey to revise its legal regime to safeguard Alevi religious freedoms. While the Turkish government has occasionally signaled willingness to dialog-such as the 2023 “Round‑Table on Religious Pluralism” convened by the Presidency-substantive legislative change has remained elusive. The ongoing dispute underscores a broader struggle between the state’s Sunni‑oriented religious policy and the Alevi community’s quest for equal recognition, a dynamic that continues to shape Turkey’s domestic politics and its international human‑rights profile.
Key Statistics & Timeline
| year | Event / Statement | Legal / Political impact | Estimated alevi Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2005 | Creation of the Alevi Directorate (under the Presidency) | Administrative body without legislative authority over cemevis | ≈10-12 % of 80 million (8-9.6 million) |
| 2012 | removal of Alevi flag from Ankara public square | Mass protests; first major clash over symbolic recognition | ≈11 % (≈8.8 million) |
| 2015 | Partial amendment to Law on Religious Communities | Recognition of Alevi cemeteries, not cemevis; limited legal progress | ≈11 % (≈8.8 million) |
| 2018 | ECHR judgment in Yildiz v. Turkey | Ordered Turkey to ensure freedom of worship for Alevis; no immediate legislative change | ≈12 % (≈9.6 million) |
| 2022 | Constitutional Court ruling on cemevis | Confirmed cemevis are not “places of worship” under current law | ≈12 % (≈9.6 million) |
| 2023 | Presidential “Round‑Table on Religious Pluralism” | Dialogue initiated; no concrete amendment passed | ≈13 % (≈10.4 million) |
| 2024 | Erdogan’s “provocative response” to journalist Ali Özel | escalated public debate; renewed calls from EU and Human Rights NGOs for legal reform | ≈13 % (≈10.4 million) |
Long‑Tail queries
- What legal avenues are available for Alevis after Erdogan’s 2024 remarks?
Alevi organizations can pursue several channels: (a) filing applications with Turkey’s Constitutional Court to challenge discriminatory practices,(b) submitting complaints to the European Court of Human Rights based on prior judgments that Turkey violate freedom of religion,and (c) leveraging parliamentary caucuses-particularly members of the CHP and HDP-to introduce amendment bills to the “Law on Religious Communities.” While domestic litigation is often lengthy, ECHR rulings have historically pressured Ankara to adopt incremental policy changes.
- How have Erdogan’s statements affected international assessments of Turkey’s human‑rights record?
International bodies such as Freedom House, the European Union’s Agency for Essential Rights, and the U.N. Human Rights Council have cited Erdogan’s rhetoric as evidence of growing intolerance toward religious minorities. In the 2024 Freedom in the World report, Turkey’s “freedom of religion” score fell from 2.5 (2023) to 2.0, reflecting concerns over governmental hostility and the lack of legal protection for cemevis. these downgrades influence Turkey’s EU accession negotiations and may affect foreign aid allocations tied to human‑rights benchmarks.
