2023-12-17 14:30:00

December 17, 2023 22:30 PM

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Negotiations for Ukraine’s accession to the EU begin, Zelenskiy’s “major victory” may just be self-consolation

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On the 14th local time, European Council President Michel issued a statement to the media on the launch of EU accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova.

Although some attention has been taken away by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Ukraine crisis remains the core issue of the EU’s 2023 finale summit. In addition to the Ukraine crisis itself dominating the agenda, other topics such as “expansion and reform,” “medium- and long-term budget assessment,” and “security and defense” are also closely related to the Ukraine crisis.
More than a month before the summit, the European Commission proposed to start EU accession negotiations with Ukraine within the year and made a lot of noise for this. However, it was opposed to varying degrees by Hungary, Austria, Slovakia and other countries. Eighteen months following Ukraine became a “candidate country” for EU membership, whether EU leaders can reach a consensus on “opening EU accession negotiations with Ukraine” has become the most suspenseful and the focus of attention during this summit.
In order to obtain the political asylum of becoming an EU member state as soon as possible and the economic and security benefits that come with it, Ukraine formally applied for EU membership on the fourth day following the conflict broke out, and requested to follow “special procedures.” Since then, Ukraine has continued to exert “moral” and diplomatic pressure on the EU, and tried to control the pace of EU accession. It obtained the status of a “candidate country” four months following submitting its application, and then requested to start EU accession negotiations within 2023. This The extraordinary “efficiency” reflects the “particularity” of Ukraine’s entry into the European Union.
However, the EU’s acceptance of Ukraine is a dynamic process in which the interests of all parties compete. In the early days of Ukraine’s application to join the European Union, the most active driving force within the EU was the Central and Eastern European countries that were geographically adjacent and psychologically shared the same hatred. However, following the issue of agricultural exports caused “discord” between Ukraine and some Central and Eastern European countries, at the critical moment of launching EU accession negotiations, Western European countries have held a more consistent supportive stance.
Against the backdrop of the current intensifying changes in the crisis in Ukraine, starting EU accession negotiations as soon as possible has become a product for the EU and Ukraine to get what they need. There are three main factors affecting Ukraine’s EU accession process:
First, there is the interconnection between the overall situation of the Ukraine crisis and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Currently, Ukraine is in trouble on the battlefield and U.S. and European aid to Ukraine is at a low point. Ukraine’s political need to “turn positive” in the EU is even more urgent. For the EU, since it cannot meet Ukraine’s aid needs, providing symbolic political support can also have a comforting effect and is also an opportunity to collectively show a tough stance once morest Russia.
The second is the balance between the “special procedures” that Ukraine wants to obtain for joining the EU, the EU’s original rules and procedures, and the interests of other candidate countries. The “speciality” of Ukraine’s entry into the European Union is reflected in the fact that as a country in a state of war, its political, economic and legal status are difficult to meet the EU entry standards. This is the main reason for Hungary’s public opposition to the opening of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. A few days ago, Zelenskiy asked Hungarian Prime Minister Orban, who has always opposed Ukraine’s entry into the European Union, to give reasons for his opposition, and believed that Orban had no reason to oppose, and “special procedures” were Orban’s reason. If the so-called “special procedure” is used to grant preferential treatment to Ukraine, it will undermine the principle of fairness in joining the European Union. It will be especially unfair to countries that have been waiting for many years and have not yet obtained the right to negotiate. This is also the main reason for opposition by Austria and other countries.
The third is the entanglement between the EU’s original internal conflicts and Ukraine’s accession to the EU. In order to “respond to geopolitical challenges”, it is becoming a consensus within the EU to complete further large-scale expansion before 2030. However, in the specific process of enlargement, issues such as which direction takes priority, which countries come first, and which standards are applicable all involve conflicts of interest within the EU. Some EU countries will also take the opportunity to use the expansion issue to meet their own needs.
After some infighting and bargaining, the EU summit finally voted with 26 votes in favor and 1 abstention, and approved the opening of EU accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, granting Georgia the status of a candidate country, and promised to start negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries as soon as possible once the conditions are met. A package of resolutions for EU accession negotiations.
This seems to be a result that all parties want and are satisfied with – Ukraine has achieved the diplomatic goal it wanted, which Zelensky called a “major victory”, which obviously has a certain impact on the morale of its people. Encouraging effect. The EU has fulfilled its “political commitment” to Ukraine and maintained its external image of general unity. Hungary benefited from the EU’s unfreezing of some financial allocations before the summit, although both sides denied that there was any connection between this move and Hungary’s eventual waiver of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations.
However, Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations, which were blended in this “each takes what he needs” approach, are not without costs and consequences.
One of the costs is that the bargaining chips between the EU and its member states have been exhausted. In the subsequent discussion on providing 50 billion euros in aid to Ukraine in the next four years, the EU failed to reach an agreement and might only wait for another game in the coming year.
The second price is that although Hungary’s abstention has maintained the unity and dignity of the EU, the backroom deal with Hungary has obviously undermined other principles of the EU. This provides a precedent for other countries to take similar measures to force the EU to make concessions in the future. It will be more difficult for the EU to maintain the integrity of its principles.
At the same time, this will also have consequences for Ukraine’s EU accession process itself. The opening of EU accession negotiations is only the first step. There is still a long way to go before the real “status transformation”. Even if negotiations are officially launched at the next EU summit in March 2024, it will still depend on the situation of the Ukraine crisis by then. How can the EU still have enough political will to move forward despite continued internal divisions?
Perhaps Zelenskiy’s so-called “major victory” is nothing more than self-comfort.
(Cui Hongjian, Professor, Institute for Advanced Studies in Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University. Source: China Net)

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