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Cayenne, French Guiana – Authorities in French Guiana are pursuing agreements with Brazil to facilitate the repatriation of prisoners serving sentences for crimes linked to organized criminal networks operating across the shared border. This move, officials say, is a key component of a broader strategy to disrupt transnational criminal activity and address escalating security concerns in the French overseas territory.

The initiative comes as French Guiana grapples with a surge in organized crime, fueled in part by its strategic location as a transit point for illicit goods and a haven for criminal groups. The issue of cross-border crime, particularly involving drug trafficking and illegal gold mining, has long been a point of concern for both French Guiana and its South American neighbors, Brazil and Suriname. The French government believes that returning detainees to serve their sentences in their country of origin will help dismantle criminal structures and reduce recidivism.

Relations between French Guiana and its neighbors, Brazil and Suriname, “are excellent as soon as they start from the ground but they… encounter difficulties at the level of state structures,” according to a recent statement by a government official. This suggests a strong working relationship between local law enforcement and communities, but potential challenges in coordinating efforts at the national level.

Cooperation on Security and Transborder Crime

This effort to return detainees builds upon existing security cooperation between French Guiana, Brazil, and Suriname. In January 2025, the Command of the Gendarmerie (COMGEND) of French Guiana hosted fifteen elite Brazilian and Surinamese shooters for a five-day joint training program. The program, involving members of Brazil’s Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE) from the state of Amapá and the arrested team of Suriname’s Korps Politie Suriname (KPS), focused on intensive training exercises and the exchange of best practices. The Gendarmerie Nationale reported that thousands of rounds of ammunition were used during the training.

This cooperation isn’t limited to tactical exercises. A broader framework of collaboration exists, including joint patrols, intelligence sharing, and coordinated operations across the three territories. Researchers at Confins Revue franco-brésilienne de géographie note that this cooperation has evolved from focusing solely on border control and surveillance to encompassing economic, social, and cultural domains. Instruments like Transborder Joint Commissions, River Councils, and the INTERREG Amazonia cooperation program are all designed to foster integration and address shared development needs.

The Brazil-Suriname Border and its Challenges

The 593-kilometer border between Brazil and Suriname, the shortest border of Brazil, presents unique challenges for security and law enforcement. According to Wikipedia, the border was initially defined in 1906 based on the watershed line between the Amazon basin and the rivers of the Guianas flowing directly into the Atlantic Ocean, with demarcation completed between 1935 and 1936 by a joint Brazilian-Dutch commission. The remote and densely forested terrain makes monitoring and controlling the border extremely hard, creating opportunities for criminal organizations to operate with relative impunity.

The tripoint where the borders of Brazil, France (French Guiana), and Suriname converge (2° 20′ 15.2″ N, 54° 26′ 04.4″ O) is a particularly sensitive area, requiring close coordination between the three countries to prevent cross-border crime. The border is marked by 60 boundary markers, but maintaining their integrity and effectively patrolling the vast area remains a significant logistical challenge.

Implications and Next Steps

The success of the detainee repatriation program hinges on reaching a formal agreement with Brazil that addresses legal and logistical considerations, including ensuring that the rights of the detainees are protected and that they receive appropriate legal representation. Further strengthening cooperation with Suriname will also be crucial, as criminal networks often operate across all three borders. The ongoing training exercises and intelligence-sharing initiatives are expected to continue, with a focus on enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies to combat transnational crime.

Looking ahead, the focus will likely be on expanding the scope of cooperation to include addressing the root causes of crime, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of economic opportunities in border regions. The Bio-Plateaux platform, inaugurated in February 2024, aims to centralize data on water resources and aquatic biodiversity shared by Suriname, Brazil, and French Guiana, demonstrating a broader commitment to regional collaboration. La 1ère reports that this initiative, led by the Office de l’Eau de Guyane, seeks to foster a coordinated strategy for sustainable development.

What are your thoughts on the challenges of cross-border crime in the Guianas? Share your comments below and help us continue the conversation.

The March 23 Movement (M23), a dominant force in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for the past year, is publicly advocating for a federal system of governance rather than secession, according to a recent statement. This shift in stated objectives comes as the group continues to control significant territory in North Kivu province, including areas near the city of Goma, and amid ongoing international pressure. The move signals an attempt to reframe its aims and potentially broaden support within the DRC and internationally.

The advocacy for federalism, a system where power is divided between a central government and regional authorities, represents a significant development in the M23’s public positioning. For decades, eastern DRC has been a region plagued by instability, and the M23’s emergence in late 2021 has exacerbated the existing challenges, displacing hundreds of thousands of people. Understanding the group’s evolving goals is crucial to navigating the complex political landscape of the region. The group operates primarily in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, bordering Uganda and Rwanda, according to Wikipedia.

M23’s Defense of Ties with Rwanda

Alongside its call for federalism, M23 is also defending its cooperation with Rwanda, urging international partners to continue investing in the region despite ongoing security concerns. This defense is particularly noteworthy given repeated accusations from the DRC government and international observers of Rwandan support for the rebel group. The United Nations has documented evidence of Rwandan military involvement in supporting M23, a claim Rwanda consistently denies. The relationship with Rwanda remains a central point of contention and scrutiny.

The EastAfrican reported just days ago on life in Goma under M23 control, noting the continued activity at markets like Kituku on the shores of Lake Kivu. This suggests a degree of normalcy persists even under rebel administration, though reports from organizations like The Novel Humanitarian paint a more concerning picture of a “bona fide police state” focused on security to the detriment of other essential services.

Recent Diplomatic Efforts and Ongoing Violence

Diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict are underway, with Qatar facilitating discussions between the Congolese government and M23. On February 2, 2026, the Congolese authorities and M23 signed a document outlining the terms of reference for a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism under the Doha Framework Agreement, initially signed in November 2025. Separate discussions have also taken place between the DRC and Rwanda, mediated by the United States, resulting in the Washington Agreements in December. However, the United Nations warns that despite this diplomatic momentum, the security situation on the ground remains volatile and continues to deteriorate.

In January 2025, M23 seized Goma, the capital of North Kivu, and weeks later captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. Since then, the rebels have established parallel administrations in areas under their control. The UN continues to allege that M23 is supported by the Rwandan armed forces, allegations Kigali has repeatedly denied.

The History of M23 and its Resurgence

M23 first gained prominence during a 2012-2013 rebellion before resurfacing in late 2021. Described as a Congolese Rwandan-backed rebel paramilitary group, its recent territorial gains have significantly destabilized eastern DRC. The group has framed its actions as a liberation for communities long neglected and repressed by state authorities and other armed groups. However, reports indicate widespread human rights abuses, including summary executions and forced labor, under M23 control. The New Humanitarian’s reporting, based on interviews with Congolese journalists, reveals a pattern of taxation and control imposed by the rebels.

What comes next for eastern DRC remains uncertain. Whereas diplomatic talks offer a glimmer of hope, the continued volatility on the ground and the unresolved accusations of external support for M23 pose significant challenges to achieving lasting peace. The international community will be closely watching the implementation of the ceasefire monitoring mechanism and the progress of further negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda.

What are your thoughts on the M23’s shift towards advocating for federalism? Share your perspective in the comments below.