China’s Defence Diplomacy: Navigating Uncertainty Under a Second Trump Term
What if China is already preparing for a dramatically different approach to security relations with the United States, one defined by cautious observation and a willingness to adapt to an unpredictable partner? Recent signals, including a lower-level delegation to the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), suggest Beijing isn’t rushing into engagement with a potential second Trump administration, instead opting for a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy rooted in internal uncertainty.
This hesitation isn’t necessarily a sign of escalating tensions, but rather a pragmatic response to a uniquely ambiguous geopolitical landscape. As Lin Ying-yu, an assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, explains, China has yet to finalize its position on how to handle relations with the US under a new Trump term, largely due to the lack of direct dialogue between Xi Jinping and the former President.
The Shangri-La Dialogue: A Strategic Pause?
The decision to send a lower-level delegation to the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, a key regional security forum, has sparked considerable debate. While some speculate about a potential corruption probe involving Defence Minister Dong Jun – a narrative increasingly dismissed by analysts – a more likely explanation is a deliberate attempt to gauge the US response to security and defence issues before committing to a higher-level engagement. This mirrors a pattern observed in previous years, where China has varied its representation at SLD depending on the state of US-China relations.
“This is a way for China to first observe how the US responds in the security and defence space, before deciding what kind of posture or attitude to adopt going forward,” Lin notes. Sending a lower-level representative allows Beijing to test the waters without committing to a firm stance, a strategy reminiscent of China’s approach in the early 2010s when it initially sent deputy chiefs of staff to the forum.
“There’s been speculation about whether Admiral Dong is in political trouble, but that doesn’t ring true,” says Drew Thompson, a former US Department of Defense (DOD) official. “His recent travel history, including visits to Berlin and Thailand, signals he remains active in his official capacity.”
Beyond the Corruption Narrative: Internal Dynamics and Strategic Calculation
The recent wave of corruption investigations within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has understandably fueled speculation about Defence Minister Dong Jun’s absence from SLD. However, experts like Lin Ying-yu caution against drawing direct connections. China’s internal political processes are opaque, and decisions regarding senior officials are made at the highest levels of the Communist Party.
The dismissal of previous defence ministers, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, over corruption charges undoubtedly adds to the scrutiny. Nine PLA generals and at least four aerospace defence industry executives have also been implicated in the ongoing anti-corruption campaign. However, Dong Jun’s continued international engagements – including a meeting with Thailand’s Chief of Defense Forces – suggest he hasn’t been sidelined.
The Historical Precedent: Fluctuating Engagement Levels
China’s engagement with SLD has historically been inconsistent. While the last three defence ministers – Wei Fenghe, Li Shangfu, and Dong Jun – all delivered keynote speeches, prior to 2019, China often sent representatives at the deputy chief of staff level. This fluctuating engagement reflects China’s evolving strategic priorities and its willingness to adjust its level of participation based on the broader geopolitical context.
China’s defence diplomacy is, therefore, less about rigid adherence to a fixed strategy and more about calculated flexibility.
Understanding China’s historical patterns of engagement at forums like SLD provides valuable context for interpreting current events. Don’t assume a change in representation automatically signals a crisis; it could be a deliberate tactic to assess the situation.
Implications for US-China Relations: A Period of Strategic Ambiguity
The current situation points towards a period of strategic ambiguity in US-China relations. Without direct communication between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, Beijing is likely to adopt a cautious approach, prioritizing observation and risk assessment. This could manifest in several ways:
- Increased Military Posturing in the South China Sea: A subtle demonstration of resolve without escalating to direct conflict.
- Strengthened Partnerships with Russia and Other Nations: Diversifying alliances to mitigate potential US pressure.
- Focus on Economic Resilience: Reducing dependence on US markets and technologies.
This doesn’t necessarily mean a breakdown in relations, but it does suggest a more complex and unpredictable dynamic. The US should anticipate a more measured and calculated approach from Beijing, one that prioritizes self-preservation and strategic flexibility.
China’s cautious approach to engagement with a potential second Trump administration underscores the importance of clear communication and predictable policies. A lack of dialogue could lead to miscalculations and unintended escalation.
Looking Ahead: The Future of China’s Defence Diplomacy
The next few months will be crucial in shaping the future of US-China relations. If Trump wins the election, establishing a direct line of communication between Xi Jinping and the US President will be paramount. Without it, China is likely to continue its ‘wait-and-see’ approach, potentially leading to increased tensions and a more fragmented geopolitical landscape.
Furthermore, the ongoing anti-corruption campaign within the PLA could have long-term implications for China’s military modernization and its ability to project power. While the stated goal is to improve the PLA’s effectiveness, the disruption caused by the investigations could hinder its progress. See our guide on China’s Military Modernization for a deeper dive into this topic.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: Is the corruption probe the primary reason for Defence Minister Dong Jun’s absence from SLD?
A: While speculation exists, most analysts believe the absence is more likely a strategic decision to observe the US response before committing to a higher-level engagement.
Q: How has China’s participation in SLD changed over time?
A: China’s participation has fluctuated, ranging from sending deputy chiefs of staff to defence ministers, depending on the state of US-China relations and its strategic priorities.
Q: What are the potential implications of a cautious Chinese approach to US engagement?
A: A cautious approach could lead to increased military posturing, strengthened partnerships with other nations, and a focus on economic resilience.
Q: What is the significance of Dong Jun’s recent travel to Berlin and Thailand?
A: These visits signal that Dong Jun remains active in his official capacity despite his absence from SLD, suggesting he hasn’t been sidelined by the corruption probe.
What are your predictions for China’s defence diplomacy in the coming years? Share your thoughts in the comments below!
