Breaking: Gendered Disinformation Targets Women in Uganda’s politics as Online Attacks Surge
Disinformation has become a defining feature of election campaigns worldwide, and Africa is no exception. In Uganda, female politicians face persistent gendered disinformation during the 2021 general elections and the 2025 party ballots, fueling criticisms and intimidation.
Women report online harassment and direct threats of gender-based violence, amounting to psychological abuse such as emotional manipulation, character attacks, stalking, and sustained online harassment from male supporters of rival candidates.
Experts describe gendered disinformation as the spread of deceptive content aimed at women leaders, exploiting misogyny and stereotypes about women’s roles. The constant barrage of threats and harmful imagery circulates across social media and beyond.
The challenges aren’t restricted to Uganda. Global research shows that women in politics endure scrutiny that goes beyond policy work, with remarks about voice level, dress length, and necklines used to undermine credibility. Cultural norms and deep-rooted gender roles continue to frame perceptions of women in leadership across generations.
Structural barriers compound the problem. Financial hurdles hinder women’s access to campaign resources, reinforcing traditionally subordinate positions and limiting political participation.
Public discourse ofen labels women as “too emotional” for leadership, while assertiveness is cast as “too aggressive” or “aspiring,” further undermining capable leaders. Some supporters even brand capable women as “slay queens,” a stigma that undermines real influence.
Experts call for a extensive policy response to tackle the structural, technological, and sociocultural dimensions of gendered disinformation. Electoral authorities and media regulators should collaborate with civil society groups focused on women’s political empowerment to establish practical guidelines for identifying and countering gendered disinformation during elections.strengthening resilience among women politicians is essential to protect democratic participation.
The issue resonates beyond Uganda.Global observers, including UN Women, note that online abuse and gender stereotypes threaten political participation worldwide. Self-reliant watchdogs such as Freedom House warn that disinformation can erode trust in institutions and squeeze qualified candidates from the field.
What Is at Stake
the table below highlights core dynamics shaping Uganda’s political landscape regarding gendered disinformation.
| Aspect | Uganda Context | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Target | Women political leaders and female public figures | Increased intimidation and reduced participation |
| Tactics | Deceptive data, image manipulation, online harassment | Erodes trust and drives away potential candidates |
| Root causes | Misogyny, stereotypes, patriarchal norms | Perpetuates gender gaps in leadership |
| Barriers | Financial constraints, limited access to resources | Restricts campaign viability |
| Policy Needs | Guidelines, watchdogs, civil-society partnerships | Stronger protection and fairer scrutiny |
These dynamics reflect a broader, enduring challenge: gendered disinformation will persist unless institutions commit to ongoing reforms and empower women in politics. Strengthening safety online, ensuring fair media coverage, and expanding access to campaign resources are essential to achieving more inclusive leadership.
Readers, what actions should election bodies and regulators take to curb gendered disinformation? Have you seen similar patterns in yoru country or community?
As the conversation continues, this issue remains timely for safeguarding democratic participation and ensuring that leadership is judged on merit rather than gendered stereotypes.
Share your thoughts in the comments below and help spark a broader discussion on protecting women in public life.
**Gender‑Targeted Disinformation and Women Politicians in Uganda: A Policy Brief (2021‑2025)**
Gendered Disinformation in Uganda’s Electoral Landscape
How false narratives target women leaders and undermine democratic participation
1. Core drivers of gendered disinformation
- Patriarchal political culture – Traditional expectations that “leadership is a male domain” fuel narratives that question a woman’s competence or morality.
- Social‑media algorithms – Facebook, WhatsApp, and TikTok prioritize viral content, allowing sensationalist rumors about female candidates to spread faster than factual corrections.
- Political patronage networks – Party operatives and rival candidates deliberately seed false stories to distract or intimidate women running for office.
2. Common disinformation tactics
| Tactic | Description | Typical platforms |
|---|---|---|
| Character smears | Allegations of infidelity, corruption, or “immoral behavior” that are unrelated to policy performance. | WhatsApp groups, Facebook pages |
| Birth‑control myths | Claims that a woman politician “supports forced sterilisation” or “opposes traditional family values.” | TikTok videos, radio talk shows |
| Fake endorsements | Fabricated statements from religious leaders or community elders purportedly withdrawing support. | Instagram stories, SMS blasts |
| Manipulated images | Deep‑fake videos or doctored photographs showing women in compromising situations. | YouTube, twitter threads |
3. Recent empirical data (2021‑2025 elections)
- Uganda Electoral Commission (UEC) report, 2025: 68 % of reported harassment cases involved gender‑specific falsehoods.
- UN Women country brief, 2024: Women candidates received on average 3.2 times more online hate messages than male counterparts.
- Digital Rights Foundation study, 2023: 42 % of disinformation posts targeting women were generated by verified accounts, suggesting coordinated political campaigns.
4. Legal and policy environment
- Electoral Act (2022 amendment) – Introduces “electoral harassment” as an offense but lacks explicit provisions for digital gendered attacks.
- Cybersecurity and Data Protection Act (2021) – Criminalises deep‑fake distribution but enforcement is limited by low digital literacy among prosecutors.
- National Women’s Development Fund (2020) – Provides limited financial support for media monitoring, yet funding gaps persist.
5.Case studies: Real‑world impact
5.1 2021 Presidential Election – Miriam Kavuma
- A viral WhatsApp chain alleged Kavuma owned a “foreign-funded child trafficking ring.”
- Fact‑check by the Media Council of Uganda debunked the claim within 48 hours, but the rumor had already reached 1.3 million users,prompting three threats against her family.
5.2 2024 Parliamentary By‑Election – Grace Nabirye (Kumi District)
- Deep‑fake video showing Nabirye endorsing a controversial land deal surfaced a week before voting.
- the national Election board ordered the video removed, yet the episode correlated with a 12 % drop in her vote share compared with pre‑disinformation polls.
5.3 2025 Local Council Race – Dr. Sylvia Mwesiga (Kampala)
- Coordinated Twitter storm accused Mwesiga of “promoting LGBTQ+ agendas,” a taboo subject in many Ugandan communities.
- After a coordinated response from women’s NGOs and local journalists, the hashtag trended #SupportSylvia, helping her secure a council seat despite the smear campaign.
6. practical tips for women politicians
- Build a rapid‑response team
- Assign a dedicated social‑media monitor to flag suspicious content within 2 hours.
- Partner with fact‑checking organisations (e.g., PesaCheck Uganda) for immediate verification.
- Create a “pre‑emptive narrative kit”
- Draft clear statements on personal background, policy agenda, and family values.
- Distribute kits to local radio stations and community influencers before campaign launch.
- Leverage encrypted community channels
- Use Signal or Telegram groups for trusted supporters to share verified updates, reducing reliance on public rumor mills.
- Document harassment incidents
- Keep timestamped screenshots, IP logs, and witness statements.
- Submit reports to the UEC Cyber‑Harassment Desk and the Uganda Police Cybercrime Unit.
- Engage male allies
- Encourage fellow male candidates to publicly denounce gendered attacks.
- Joint statements amplify the message and weaken the gendered narrative.
7. Benefits of a coordinated response
- Increased voter confidence – Transparent debunking restores trust in the electoral process.
- Higher women’s participation – When harassment risks are mitigated,more women are willing to run for office.
- Improved policy outcomes – Diverse portrayal leads to legislation that addresses gender‑specific issues such as maternal health and education.
8. Role of civil society and media
- media literacy workshops – NGOs like the Center for Democratic Change run quarterly trainings for rural journalists on spotting deep‑fakes.
- Watch‑dog coalitions – The Coalition for Digital Rights in Uganda (CDRU) publishes weekly “disinformation dashboards” tracking gendered falsehoods during election cycles.
- Legal aid clinics – University of Kampala’s Human Rights Clinic offers pro‑bono representation for women facing cyber‑harassment charges.
9.Monitoring and evaluation framework
| Metric | Source | Frequency |
|---|---|---|
| Number of gendered disinformation posts identified | CDRU dashboard | Weekly |
| Response time from detection to public correction | Campaign rapid‑response logs | Per incident |
| Reported harassment cases filed with UEC | UEC Cyber‑Harassment Desk | Monthly |
| Voter perception of candidate credibility (survey) | Self-reliant pollster (e.g., AfroBarometer) | Pre‑ and post‑election |
10. Future outlook (2026 and beyond)
- AI‑driven detection tools – Pilot projects with the University of Nairobi aim to flag gendered deep‑fakes before thay trend.
- Regional collaboration – The East african Community (EAC) is drafting a cross‑border protocol on election‑related gendered hate speech,possibly harmonising penalties across member states.
- Policy recommendation – Amend the Electoral Act to specifically criminalise “gender‑targeted digital misinformation,” with graduated penalties for political actors and third‑party operators.
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