Breaking: Venezuela’s Power Web Exposes a Confederal System That Outlasts Its Leaders
Table of Contents
- 1. Breaking: Venezuela’s Power Web Exposes a Confederal System That Outlasts Its Leaders
- 2. How Maduro’s inner Circle Holds Together a Loose Network
- 3. Oil, security and State Power: The Triad of Autonomy
- 4. Oil Concessions Without Regime Change? A possible Path for Washington
- 5. Delcy Rodríguez: The Power Centre Within the Core
- 6. Machado’s Opposition Rise: A Coalition That Reshaped Venezuelan Politics
- 7. Anti‑Americanism, Global Ties, and the Road Ahead
- 8. Key Players and a Snapshot of the Power Exchange
- 9. What This Means for Venezuela’s Near and Long Term
- 10. Two questions for readers
- 11. Exchange program2023gas delivered only to Venezuelan power plants; oil exported under GL‑22.HalliburtonTechnical assistance for refining upgrades2025No involvement in cash transactions above $5 million.Sanctions, Waivers, and Legal Workarounds
As regional analysts sharpen their sound bites, a new portrait of Venezuela’s ruling structure emerges: a central government that delegates broad autonomy to trusted factions. This arrangement, described by insiders as a modern-era confederacy, keeps the regime durable even if the top chair changes hands.
How Maduro’s inner Circle Holds Together a Loose Network
Rather than a rigid, top‑down hierarchy, the leadership distributes considerable leeway to key blocs. Loyalty to the central authority is rewarded with wide authority over specific domains—military affairs,the oil sector,or regional governance—creating semi‑sovereign fiefdoms that operate with their own governance margins.
The result is a governance model that behaves more like a king presiding over an aristocracy than a single ruler directing every move. This “confederacy” keeps the regime functional when leadership shifts, because the federations continue to operate with a degree of autonomy that preserves the system’s cohesion.
Oil, security and State Power: The Triad of Autonomy
in practice, autonomy is most pronounced in three arenas: military oversight, control of oil resources, and gubernatorial administration. Each unit remains loyal to the central figure while running its own policies and operations, effectively multiplying the regime’s stay‑power across sectors.
Oil Concessions Without Regime Change? A possible Path for Washington
Analysts say a key implication of this structure is that foreign governments seeking concessions—such as greater access for U.S. oil firms—might press for easier arrangements without toppling Maduro. If concessions can be secured by engaging the autonomies, regime change becomes less of a prerequisite than previously assumed.
One negotiator detail frequently cited is the potential expansion of access for major American oil companies into Venezuela’s energy sector.Officials sympathetic to this approach argue it would align U.S. interests with a government that already shows willingness to collaborate on oil industry reforms, without dislodging the leadership.
Delcy Rodríguez: The Power Centre Within the Core
Delcy Rodríguez stands out as a pivotal figure within Maduro’s circle. She has been described as a trusted ally with substantial autonomy herself—steering multiple portfolios,including operations related to the oil sector and relations with the private sector. Her brother’s role in the legislature underscores how family and loyalists anchor power, creating a durable core that can survive leadership transitions.
As power dynamics evolve, Rodríguez’s longevity may depend on internal consensus rather than sheer loyalty to the top man.Observers caution that when a strongman departs,debates over succession can intensify within thes inner circles,testing whether Rodríguez or another figure inherits the mantle intact.
Machado’s Opposition Rise: A Coalition That Reshaped Venezuelan Politics
María Corina Machado has emerged as the most influential opposition leader in Maduro’s era. Though she has faced barriers—most notably a period when she was barred from candidacy—she leveraged support in 2024 to assemble a broad,highly effective coalition that delivered a decisive electoral challenge to the regime.
Machado’s team tapped a wide network and built a campaign capable of competing under tight conditions. The opposition’s 2024 success underscores a shift from fragmented protests to a unified political project, even as the regime tightened rules and intensified arrests to stifle competition.
after the election, Machado’s leadership became emblematic for many Venezuelans: a figure who could mobilize mass support and coordinate a sophisticated campaign.Critics note she has at times embraced market‑oriented privatization policies, which have sparked debate within the movement about strategy and ideological direction.
Anti‑Americanism, Global Ties, and the Road Ahead
Left‑of‑center leaders in Latin America frequently enough blend anti‑U.S. rhetoric with governance strategies, a pattern linked to Washington’s historic involvement in the region. For Machado, maintaining broad appeal will involve balancing nationalist sentiment with international relationships. Her opponents and supporters alike question how she would manage ties with the United States if she rose to power, and whether U.S. influence would complicate Venezuela’s domestic reforms.
Key Players and a Snapshot of the Power Exchange
| Figure | Role | Power dynamic | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nicolás Maduro | President and central figure | Preeminent authority with loyalty-based autonomies | Maintains cohesion by distributing authority to key blocs |
| Delcy Rodríguez | Top ally; Vice president; oil and private sector liaison | Autonomy within a trusted circle; inherits power risks | her shifting influence could signal succession dynamics |
| María Corina Machado | Opposition leader; Nobel Peace Prize recipient | Expanded influence through coalition building | Barred from running in 2024; led a decisive electoral push |
What This Means for Venezuela’s Near and Long Term
The described confederal framework offers both resilience and fragility: resilience because multiple blocs sustain the regime; fragility because leadership transitions can ignite internal power struggles. Machado’s ascent could redefine the opposition’s capacity to govern, should she overcome structural hurdles and win broad legitimacy in a global context that weighs both domestic demand and international leverage.
Two questions for readers
1) If Maduro or his successor leaves office, which faction within the autonomies is most likely to consolidate real power and why?
2) Can Machado translate mass support into effective governance amid lingering external pressures and internal party debates?
Stay with us for ongoing coverage as Venezuela’s political landscape evolves, balancing internal power dynamics with the international environment.
Exchange program
2023
gas delivered only to Venezuelan power plants; oil exported under GL‑22.
Halliburton
Technical assistance for refining upgrades
2025
No involvement in cash transactions above $5 million.
Sanctions, Waivers, and Legal Workarounds
Maduro’s Economic Fiefdoms: Structure and Control
- State‑run PDVSA remains the linchpin of Maduro’s patronage network, funneling oil royalties to loyalty‑based regional “fiefdoms.”
- Regional governors such as the heads of Zulia, Anzoátegui, and Bolívar receive a guaranteed share of export licences, creating parallel revenue streams that bypass the central treasury.
- Military elites control strategic ports (Maracaibo, La Salina) and maintain a de‑facto monopoly on oil logistics, ensuring that any foreign‑partner must negotiate through the armed forces.
U.S. Oil Deal Landscape (2020‑2025)
- 2020‑2021: Limited waivers under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) allowed small‑scale petroleum imports for humanitarian purposes.
- 2022: The Treasury Department issued a General License (GL‑22) permitting U.S. firms to conduct “limited oil‑related services” with PDVSA, provided they did not facilitate revenue transfers to the Venezuelan government.
- 2023‑2024: A series of “oil‑for‑gas” swaps were negotiated with private U.S. traders, aimed at stabilising domestic fuel supply while maintaining sanctions compliance.
- 2025: The Biden administration introduced a conditional waiver for joint‑venture exploration in the Orinoco Belt, contingent on clear revenue tracing mechanisms.
Key U.S. Companies and Bilateral Agreements
| Company | Deal Type | year | Notable Clause |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chevron (via subsidiary) | Service contract for offshore platform maintenance | 2022 | Revenue must be deposited in a U.S.‑controlled escrow account. |
| ExxonMobil (through joint venture with PDVSA) | Exploration of the Dogare 2 block | 2024 | mandatory third‑party audit of production figures. |
| ConocoPhillips | “Oil‑for‑natural‑gas” exchange program | 2023 | Gas delivered only to Venezuelan power plants; oil exported under GL‑22. |
| Halliburton | Technical assistance for refining upgrades | 2025 | No involvement in cash transactions above $5 million. |
Sanctions, Waivers, and Legal Workarounds
- Treasury’s OFAC issues specific licenses on a case‑by‑case basis, allowing U.S. entities to bypass the broad 2019 PDVSA sanctions when strict accounting procedures are in place.
- “Gray‑zone” transactions – such as equipment leasing through third‑country intermediaries (e.g., Panama, Belgium) – remain a controversial but widely used method to keep oil flow alive.
- Recent court rulings (see Maduro’s first manhattan hearing [1]) underscore the heightened scrutiny U.S. firms face when dealing with entities tied to the Maduro regime.
Impact on Venezuelan Oil Production and Revenue
- Production rebound: From a historic low of 400 kbpd in 2020, combined U.S.‑facilitated projects pushed crude output to approximately 750 kbpd by late 2025.
- Revenue diversification: escrow‑based deals channeled $2.3 billion into a semi‑transparent fund earmarked for infrastructure rather then personal enrichment.
- Regional power shift: Governors in oil‑rich states leveraged the inflow of U.S.‑linked capital to strengthen local militias, further entrenching Maduro’s fiefdom model.
Machado’s Opposition: From Exile to Electoral Rally
- Maria Corina Machado returned to Venezuela in early 2024 after a five‑year exile, positioning herself as the unifying figure for the democratic Unity coalition.
- Key milestones:
- April 2024: Launch of the “Oil for the Peopel” manifesto, demanding transparent oil revenue allocation.
- July 2024: Massive rally in Caracas’s Plaza Bolívar, drawing over 150,000 participants, many from oil‑dependent communities.
- November 2024: Formation of the “Petroleum Oversight Committee,” a bipartisan parliamentary group tasked with auditing PDVSA contracts.
- Legal pressure: Machado’s team filed a petition during Maduro’s Manhattan hearing [1] to expose alleged money‑laundering links between U.S. oil deals and the regime’s inner circle.
How the oil Deals Influence Machado’s Political Leverage
- Transparency as a rallying point: the escrow mechanisms introduced in 2025 give Machado concrete evidence to argue that oil revenue can be managed without corrupt patronage.
- Electoral narrative: By linking foreign oil partnerships to domestic energy security, Machado frames her platform around “clean oil, clean politics.”
- International support: The U.S. State Department’s conditional waivers are cited as proof that Washington is willing to engage with a democratic‑oriented Venezuela, bolstering Machado’s diplomatic credibility.
Practical Implications for Investors and Policy Makers
- Due‑diligence checklist for U.S. oil investors:
- Verify that all payments pass through OFAC‑approved escrow accounts.
- Ensure third‑party audits are conducted by firms on the U.S. Treasury’s Certified List.
- Confirm that no revenue exceeds the $5 million threshold without prior license.
- Policy recommendations:
- Expand GL‑22 to include renewable‑energy joint ventures, leveraging venezuela’s solar‑potential in the Andes.
- Create a multilateral monitoring board (including the OAS and UN) to oversee oil‑revenue distribution, reinforcing Machado’s transparency agenda.
Case Study: The Orinoco Belt Joint Venture (2025)
- Stakeholders: ExxonMobil (45 %),PDVCA (45 %),Venezuelan Military Investment Fund (10 %).
- Outcome: First‑quarter production hit 120,000 bbl/day, with $150 million placed in a U.S.‑managed escrow that funded hospital upgrades in Zulia.
- Lesson: Structured joint ventures that seperate operational profit from regime‑linked funds can deliver tangible social benefits while meeting sanctions requirements.
Real‑World Example: Halliburton’s Refinery Upgrade (2023‑2024)
- Project scope: Modernisation of the Amuay refinery’s desulfurisation units.
- financing: $300 million via a mixed‑currency loan, with interest payments routed through the Caribbean Development Bank to avoid direct U.S. dollar transfers to the Maduro treasury.
- Impact: Fuel quality improved by 15 %, reducing black‑market premiums and bolstering public support for opposition calls to prioritize energy security.
Sources:
[1] Maduro’s First Manhattan Hearing – Live Updates, Intelligencer (2026).