Global shipping companies have largely suspended operations through the Strait of Hormuz following Iranian warnings issued after the U.S. And Israeli strikes against Iranian targets on February 28, 2026. The immediate concern for Europe is not necessarily a short-term oil or gas shortage – unlike the energy crisis of early 2022 triggered by the war in Ukraine – but rather how price shocks, logistical disruptions, and supply chain vulnerabilities will ripple through its industrial base.
The threat to close the Strait of Hormuz dates back to the 1970s, when the 1973 oil embargo demonstrated the power wielded by control of energy routes, with European dependence on foreign oil reaching 97%. The 1979 oil shock reinforced this understanding, as the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran gained a significant geopolitical lever with its control over the northern shore of the strait.
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) transformed the strait into a theater of operations, marked by attacks on tankers by both sides attempting to weaken their opponent and internationalize the conflict. The U.S. Responded by deploying a fleet to guarantee freedom of navigation, a principle it has upheld since. Throughout subsequent decades, the threat of closing Hormuz has been a recurring element of Iranian diplomacy, used in negotiations over its nuclear program and as leverage against sanctions. In 2011, Iranian naval exercises in the strait prompted increased insurance premiums and a Western naval deployment. Similar effects were seen in 2019 after attacks on two tankers in the Gulf of Oman. Even during the Israel-Iran conflict in June 2025, Tehran ultimately refrained from closing the strait, reportedly due to pressure from Beijing, which relies on the passage for half of its oil imports.
This history reveals a persistent tension: closing Hormuz is a self-limiting weapon, as Iran would also bear the economic and diplomatic costs. Although, the current situation in March 2026 alters this calculation. Cornered, the Iranian regime may perceive closing the strait as a final deterrent, rather than a suicidal act. Ebrahim Jabbari, an advisor to the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated on state television that anyone attempting to traverse the strait would face a “severe response.”
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicated that in 2024, the U.S. Imported approximately 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil and condensate through the Strait of Hormuz, representing about 7% of its total imports. Approximately 20% of global oil supplies and 20% of liquefied natural gas (LNG) transit the strait, which is only 40 kilometers wide at its narrowest point. Brent crude oil surpassed $79 a barrel on March 4, 2026, an increase of roughly 9% since February 28th, the first day of the attacks. The cost to charter a supertanker to carry oil from the Middle East to China has doubled in the past week, reaching a record high of over $400,000 per day.
The disruption affects industrial value chains through three distinct channels. First, energy prices: an interruption of oil and gas traffic immediately impacts crude oil and natural gas prices, and electricity prices. Second, non-energy inputs: disruption also affects raw materials – minerals, chemicals, fertilizers – crucial to European industry, threatening production continuity. Third, logistical disorganization: if tensions in Hormuz coincide with disruptions in the Red Sea, due to Houthi rebels (Yemen), allied with Iran, maritime traffic will be diverted around the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa). This would add fifteen to twenty days to transit times, increase fuel costs by hundreds of thousands of dollars per voyage, and lead to soaring “war risk” insurance premiums.
The European chemical and petrochemical sectors are most directly exposed, facing pressure on cost competitiveness since 2022 in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. The price of industrial gas in Europe is two to five times higher than in the United States, and even more so compared to producers in the Gulf region. BASF has already reduced European capacity and shifted investments to the U.S. And China. Further cost differentials could render entire production lines uncompetitive, potentially accelerating planned relocations.
The steel industry faces a double shock from any major energy crisis: direct increases in production costs and a contraction in demand from sectors like automotive and construction. Approximately 30% of European primary aluminum production has been suspended since 2021, and industrial energy demand fell by 6% in both 2022 and 2023. Weakened by competition from subsidized Chinese steelmakers and the investment required for the carbon transition, the sector lacks the margin to absorb another shock without further capacity reductions.
The fertilizer industry illustrates the complexity of these propagation mechanisms. A major consumer of natural gas and importer of sulfur and ammonia from the Gulf, it reduced or halted production during the 2022 gas price surge. A Hormuz shock could repeat this scenario, impacting the already fragile agricultural sector and triggering a cascade effect on the food industry – the largest industrial employer in the European Union with 4.2 million direct employees – and potentially fueling food price inflation.
Cement, glass, and high-temperature materials, requiring processes up to 1,550°C and difficult to electrify in the short term, are concentrated in small and medium-sized enterprises with low margins. Shutting down a furnace is industrially complex and expensive, putting these sectors at risk of permanent closures during a prolonged shock. The automotive industry, the EU’s leading exporter, is exposed to rising raw material costs, logistical disruptions, and declining demand. Tier 1 and 2 suppliers – often SMEs in Germany, France, Spain, and Italy – cannot absorb simultaneous cost increases and revenue declines, as demonstrated by the semiconductor crisis of 2020-2021.
The situation in early March 2026 is complicated by historically low gas stocks – approximately 46 billion cubic meters at the end of February, compared to 60 and 77 billion in the previous two years, limiting the buffer against a crisis. Industrial leaders, having learned from 2022, may anticipate a prolonged shock and accelerate capacity reduction decisions. Public budgetary support margins are also reduced, with the substantial measures taken between 2021 and 2023 having increased deficits.
Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, stated on NBC News on March 5, 2026, that Iran has “no intention” of closing the Strait of Hormuz “at the moment,” but did not rule out the possibility if Israel and the U.S. Continue their war. He added that Iran is “prepared” for a potential ground invasion, which would be a “disaster” for its enemies. Efforts are underway by the U.S. And European nations to form a coalition to secure shipping lanes.
The structural response lies in industrial decarbonization, viewed not as a regulatory constraint but as an economic security strategy. Electrifying processes where feasible, developing low-carbon hydrogen for high-temperature processes, and drastically improving energy efficiency reduce exposure to external fossil fuel shocks. The EU’s Clean Industrial Deal explicitly links decarbonization and industrial resilience, recognizing that reducing dependence on imported hydrocarbons is both a climate objective and a competitiveness and security lever.
This perspective reframes the false dilemma between short-term competitiveness and the energy transition. In a structurally unstable geopolitical environment, every investment in energy efficiency or electrification is also a reduction in exposure to future Hormuz shocks – or those that may arise from pressures on the EU from the American LNG supplier. The value of this insurance, systematically omitted from conventional industrial profitability calculations, is considerable and growing with increasing geopolitical instability.
The Hormuz crisis of 2026 is not an unpredictable anomaly. The strait’s history – from the tanker war to the crises of 2011, 2019, and 2025 – confirms that this threat is central to global energy geopolitics and must be integrated as a normal assumption into all European industrial planning.
