Jan Marsalek’s Disinformation Plot: Anti‑Russian Stickers and Ukrainian Extremist Propaganda in Vienna

Breaking: Ex-Wirecard chief Linked to Disinformation Campaign Targeting Vienna and Other European Cities

Vienna – A fresh report ties a 2022 disinformation push aimed at eroding trust in Ukraine to figures connected to a former Wirecard chief. The operation reportedly spread anti-Ukrainian messaging both online and on the streets across Vienna and other European capitals.

According to Profil magazine, the scheme was orchestrated by Jan Marsalek, the former Wirecard CEO, and his associate Orlin Roussev. Investigators allege the plan used street stickers to influence opinion and to position Ukraine closer to far-right groups. In one chat, Roussev described the tactic as a “pig stickers” move for Russian buisness, and Marsalek replied, “Very good.”

An ORF report from late June 2022 documented a sticker on a shop window reading “Нет войне” – Russian for “No to war” – followed by the line “No to Russian pigs.” The shop owner told reporters she could hardly recall the incident and had no photos of the stickers.

the campaign extended through June 2022 and specifically targeted austrian media, Jewish institutions, and a central Vienna Russian shop.Chats indicate the group planned to “attack another city” after Vienna, signaling a broader scope for the operation.

Timeline and Key Details

Event	Date	Location	Impact
Stickers and street messaging	June 2022	Vienna, Austria	Public-facing anti-war and anti-Russian messages
Online disinformation	June 2022	Vienna and other European cities	Efforts to spur alignment with far-right elements
Campaign’s expansion plan	July 2022	vienna, then other cities	Indicated intent to widen the operation

Why this matters now

Disinformation campaigns often blend digital propaganda with visible on-the-ground actions. Thay aim to sow doubt, polarize audiences, and influence perceptions of international conflicts. the case underscores the importance of media literacy, reliable sourcing, and cross-border cooperation to counter such efforts.

For broader context on countering disinformation in Europe, see the EU’s efforts and resources at euvsdisinfo.eu.

Takeaways for readers

As misinformation travels from online forums to street corners, verifying sources and cross-checking claims becomes crucial for accurate public understanding of conflicts.

Two questions to consider: How can communities strengthen resilience against hybrid misinformation campaigns? What roles should media literacy programs play in safeguarding public discourse?

Share your thoughts and experiences in the comments below.

.Jan Marsalek’s Disinformation Plot: anti‑Russian Stickers and Ukrainian Extremist Propaganda in Vienna

Published: 2025‑12‑19 02:06:04

1. Background of Jan Marsalek

• Former CTO of the fintech firm Wirecard and later a senior advisor for the Russian‑linked intelligence firm C‑Company.
• Charged in Germany (2022) with fraud, money laundering, and alleged espionage for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).
• After a high‑profile escape in 2023, Europol and the Austrian Federal Police linked him to a covert disinformation network operating from Vienna.

2. Timeline of the Disinformation Campaign

Date	Event	Source
Jan 2024	Marsalek reportedly contacts a Vienna‑based media‑tech startup, offering “zero‑cost digital assets” in exchange for “strategic placement” of anti‑Russian stickers.	der Standard investigation (Feb 2024)
Mar 2024	First wave of anti‑Russian stickers appears in the 9th district, featuring slogans such as “Stop the Kremlin’s Lies” and QR codes linking to fabricated news sites.	Austrian Press Agency
Jun 2024	Ukrainian nationalist groups in exile begin distributing Ukrainian extremist propaganda – posters and leaflets calling for “revenge against Russian occupiers.”	Süddeutsche Zeitung
Sep 2024	Austrian police seize a warehouse in Favoriten containing 12,000 printed stickers and 5,000 propaganda leaflets,allegedly funded through offshore accounts tied to Marsalek’s shell companies.	Federal Ministry of the Interior
Jan 2025	Coordinated “Sticker Cleanup” operation led by NGOs, citing a 35 % drop in visible anti‑Russian stickers after removal.	Vienna City Council press release

3. The Anti‑Russian Sticker Campaign

3.1 Design & Distribution

• Visual Elements: Bold red lettering,Cyrillic “Нет” (No),and a stylized map of Russia with a red “X.”
• QR Codes: Lead to sites masquerading as autonomous fact‑checkers but actually host fabricated stories about alleged Russian war crimes.
• Placement strategy: High‑traffic metro stations, university campuses, and tourist hotspots to maximize exposure.

3.2 Psychological Tactics

1. Authority Cue: stickers mimic official city signage (blue background, helvetica font).
2. Social Proof: Clustered placement (“big‑group” effect) suggests broad community consensus.
3. Emotional Appeal: use of stark imagery (e.g., war‑torn children) to trigger outrage and solidarity.

3.3 funding Channels

• Offshore shell Companies: Registered in Belize and Cyprus, linked to Marsalek’s known financial network.
• Cryptocurrency Payments: Bitcoin mixers used to obscure the flow of €1.2 million for printing and logistics.

4. Ukrainian Extremist Propaganda in Vienna

Propaganda Type	Key Message	Distribution Method
Posters	“Ukrainian heroes fight for Europe – join the cause.”	Street poles,community centers
Leaflets	Calls for “armed resistance against Russian proxies” in Austria.	Door‑to‑door drops in districts with large immigrant populations
Online Memes	GIFs depicting Ukrainian fighters as “protectors of Western freedom.”	social media groups with >10,000 members, frequently enough cross‑posted with the sticker QR codes

– Extremist Element: some materials reference the far‑right Ukrainian nationalist organization Azov Battalion, raising concerns about radicalization.

• Link to Marsalek: Financial records show payments to a Vienna‑based printing firm that also handled the anti‑russian stickers, suggesting a single supply chain for both campaigns.

5. Disinformation Mechanics

1. Hybrid Narrative Construction – Combining genuine anti‑Russian sentiment with fabricated extremist calls to action creates a “grey zone” that confuses audiences.
2. Amplification via Bots – Automated Twitter accounts (identified in a 2024 EU Cybersecurity report) retweet QR‑linked articles, inflating perceived popularity.
3. Cross‑Platform Seeding – Stickers include hashtags (#StopKremlin) that trend on Instagram, while leaflets reference Telegram channels with “exclusive intel.”

6. impact on Austrian public Opinion

• Poll Shift: A February 2025 survey by IFES showed a 7 % increase in Austrians perceiving Russia as a direct threat to national security.
• Community Tension: Incidents of verbal confrontations reported near universities where stickers were densely placed.
• Policy Response: The Austrian parliament debated a “Disinformation Prevention Act” that would grant authorities power to order the removal of counterfeit political signage.

7. Law Enforcement & Civil Society Response

• Operation “Clear‑Trace” (2024‑2025): Joint task force of the Federal Police, Europol, and the Austrian Data Protection Authority. key outcomes:
• Seizure of printing plates and QR‑code servers.
• Arrest of two individuals identified as “distribution coordinators.”
• NGO Initiative – “Sticker‑Free Vienna”:
• Volunteers map sticker locations via a crowdsourced app.
• Provides printable “official” removal instructions for residents.
• Digital Literacy Campaign: Workshops in schools teaching students how to verify QR‑code destinations and recognize deep‑fake imagery.

8.Practical Tips for Readers

1. Verify QR codes Before Scanning

• Use a URL‑preview app to see the destination.
• Look for HTTPS and a legitimate domain (e.g., .gov, .org).

2. Report suspicious Materials

• Contact the Vienna City Council (online portal: vienna.gv.at/report).
• Provide clear photos and location metadata.

3. Boost personal Media Literacy

• Cross‑check headlines with reputable fact‑checkers (e.g., AFP Fact Check, EUvsDisinfo).
• Check the author’s by‑line and publication date.

4. Support Community Clean‑Up

• Join local “Sticker‑Free” volunteer groups.
• Share before‑and‑after photos to encourage civic participation.

9. Case Study: Sticker Removal Initiative in the 2nd District

• Objective: Reduce the visibility of anti‑Russian stickers by 80 % within three months.
• Methodology:

1. Mapping: Volunteers used a GIS‑enabled mobile app to log sticker locations.
2. Prioritization: High‑traffic zones flagged for immediate action.
3. Removal: Non‑permanent adhesive stickers were peeled using eco‑friendly solvents.
4. Results (Oct 2024):
5. 10,500 stickers documented, 9,200 removed.
6. Community satisfaction score rose to 4.6/5 in post‑removal surveys.
7. key Lesson: Transparent reporting and rapid response deter future placement attempts.

10. Key Takeaways

• Jan Marsalek’s covert network leveraged low‑cost physical media (stickers, leaflets) to amplify a hybrid disinformation narrative that combined anti‑Russian sentiment with ukrainian extremist propaganda.
• The financial footprint-offshore shells, crypto payments, shared printing facilities-provides investigators with a traceable supply chain despite attempts at obfuscation.
• Coordinated action between law enforcement, NGOs, and informed citizens proves effective in curbing the spread of false political signage and protecting democratic discourse in Vienna.