A large-scale jihadist attack on soldiers in Benin’s Alibori department in April 2025, coupled with a failed coup attempt in December of the same year, has prompted a shift in the country’s defense posture, raising concerns about escalating instability in the region, according to a new report released Friday by Crisis Group.
The report, titled “On the Horizon: February-July 2026,” identifies Benin, Colombia, Ethiopia and Israel/Palestine as potential hotspots for conflict and crisis in the coming months. It highlights key actors and dates to watch, aiming to support global conflict prevention efforts.
In Benin, the report warns that the jihadist threat, primarily from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), is expected to persist in the northern departments of Alibori and Atacora. Parks Pendjari and W, which border Burkina Faso and Niger, serve as key transit and supply zones for the group. Although a military pullback from isolated outposts has reduced attacks, it also risks granting insurgents greater freedom of movement, endangering civilians.
The lack of security cooperation with Niger and Burkina Faso further complicates Benin’s efforts to secure its northern border. Analysts warn that JNIM messaging, attacks on civilians, and potential resurgence in raids on army posts are key indicators to watch. Intercommunal tensions, which JNIM could exploit, and shifts in Benin’s security posture are also areas of concern.
Beyond the northern threat, the report notes the potential for armed violence to spread to eastern Benin, particularly in Borgou department, due to activity from criminal or jihadist groups operating across the border from Nigeria’s Kainji Lake Park. Limited security coordination between Cotonou and Abuja could exacerbate the situation.
Political tensions are also expected to intensify around Benin’s presidential election on April 12th. Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni, chosen by President Patrice Talon as his successor, is expected to win, but may struggle to control a divided ruling coalition. The exclusion of the main opposition party, Les Démocrates, from the election has heightened tensions, raising the risk of street protests and potential crackdowns. Authorities may also detain more opposition politicians in connection with the December 2025 coup attempt.
Turning to Colombia, the Crisis Group report anticipates continued political violence ahead of elections, with threats against politicians, activists, and community leaders likely to persist. High-profile assassinations remain a credible risk, as demonstrated by the June 2025 killing of prospective right-wing candidate Miguel Uribe. Armed groups may restrict access to polling stations and engage in intimidation and vote buying in areas under their control.
The report also raises the possibility of U.S. Intervention in the presidential election, potentially through public messaging, threats, or diplomatic pressure. A détente between President Petro and former President Trump could unravel, leading to Washington attempting to influence the outcome in favor of a more pliable candidate. Such maneuvers could strengthen Petro’s movement if perceived as interference.
Escalating violence along the Colombia-Venezuela border is another concern, particularly following recent developments in Venezuela. The National Liberation Army (ELN) may station more fighters along the border to maintain control of drug trafficking and smuggling routes, potentially leading to clashes with state forces and rival groups.
In Ethiopia, the report highlights rising tensions between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which could descend into renewed conflict in Tigray. The TPLF accuses the government of violating the Pretoria agreement that ended the 2020-2022 Tigray war, while Addis Ababa alleges that the TPLF is forming hostile alliances with Eritrea. A violent standoff in late January underscored the danger of escalation.
The report also warns of the potential for renewed hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, fueled by Ethiopia’s ambition to regain sea access and concerns about Eritrea’s support for Ethiopian opposition groups. The ongoing conflict in Sudan further complicates the situation, with Ethiopia and Eritrea backing opposing sides.
Finally, the report focuses on the fragile truce in Gaza, warning that Israeli attacks, which have killed over 600 Palestinians since October 2025, are expected to continue. Dire humanitarian conditions are unlikely to improve unless Israel allows in agreed-upon volumes of aid. Progress on Phase 2 of the ceasefire, focused on governance and reconstruction, faces significant challenges, including ambiguities surrounding the Board of Peace and hesitancy among international actors.
In the West Bank, the report anticipates continued Israeli repression and dispossession of Palestinians, with far-right ministers expected to accelerate settlement expansion and policies designed to economically suffocate the Palestinian Authority.
