UN Experts Warn Al-Shabab Remains Major Threat to Somalia and East Africa
Table of Contents
- 1. UN Experts Warn Al-Shabab Remains Major Threat to Somalia and East Africa
- 2. Threat Landscape
- 3. Why the Fight Has Proved Persistent
- 4. What Comes Next?
- 5. Evergreen Perspectives
- 6. Context and Voices
- 7. Engage with the Story
- 8. Vulnerability and Recent Incidents
- 9. UN experts’ Assessment – Scope of the Threat
- 10. al‑Shabab’s Operational Evolution in 2024‑2025
- 11. Impact on Somalia’s Security Landscape
- 12. Kenya’s vulnerability and Recent Incidents
- 13. Regional Spill‑Over Effects
- 14. Strategic Responses – What Governments and NGOs Can Do
- 15. Practical Mitigation Tips for Communities
- 16. Case Study: Joint Border Patrol Success in Mandera (June 2025)
- 17. Key Takeaways for Policy makers
Military and political analysts say the danger posed by the al-Qaeda-linked group persists as the region’s sharpest destabilizing force. United Nations experts warn that the threat is the most immediate risk to Somalia and it’s neighbors, particularly Kenya, as the group maintains footholds across parts of southern and central Somalia.
The organisation continues to launch attacks against government and security forces, and also civilian targets, even as regional and international forces step up operations against its networks. Over time, al-Shabab has extended its reach into neighbouring countries, including Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti, underscoring the wider security implications for the Horn of Africa.
Threat Landscape
The group reportedly controls or influences notable areas in southern and central Somalia, enabling sustained violent activity despite ongoing counterterrorism efforts. Its capacity to strike remains despite a long-running, multinational push to degrade its capabilities.
Why the Fight Has Proved Persistent
Experts say the conflict’s longevity stems from a mix of elusive leadership networks, local support dynamics, and the challenge of securing stable governance in areas where state authority is weak. The persistent threat has prompted continued cooperation between Somali forces and international partners, yet the group’s adaptability complicates stabilization efforts.
as the security picture evolves, questions about strategy, resources, and regional coordination remain central to any lasting improvement in the situation.
What Comes Next?
Analysts emphasize the need for sustained regional efforts, better civilian protection, and governance improvements to reduce risk. Maintaining pressure on the group while addressing the underlying drivers of instability is viewed as essential for reducing the likelihood of future attacks.
| Element | Details |
|---|---|
| Group | Al-Shabab (linked to al-Qaeda) |
| Region of Impact | Southern and central Somalia; regional spillover to neighbours |
| Current Threat | High immediate threat to stability in Somalia and East Africa |
| Past Attacks | Incidents in Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti |
| Countermeasures | Somali security forces with international support; ongoing operations |
Evergreen Perspectives
Long-term stabilization hinges on credible governance, inclusive advancement, and durable security reform that address local grievances. The regional security framework must adapt to evolving tactics and maintain a coordinated approach across national boundaries to reduce risk over time. International partners are urged to align support with local needs, ensuring accountability and transparent implementation.
Context and Voices
Analysts note the continued risk despite counterterrorism efforts by Somali authorities and international partners.The situation remains dynamic, with up-to-date assessments highlighting the importance of sustained regional cooperation and governance reforms to curb the group’s influence.
For further background, you can explore official updates from international organizations and independent research groups that monitor security in the Horn of Africa.
Engage with the Story
Two questions for readers: Which regional measures should be prioritized to reduce the threat posed by al-shabab? How can international partners best support Somali authorities in delivering security and stability to communities most affected?
Vulnerability and Recent Incidents
UN experts’ Assessment – Scope of the Threat
- UN Security council Report (December 2025): 15 UN experts unanimously identified al‑Shabab as “the single most destabilising force” in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa.
- Risk Rating: Elevated too “critical” for Somalia, “high” for Kenya, and “moderate‑to‑high” for neighboring Ethiopia, Uganda, and Djibouti.
- Key Drivers:
- Funding Diversification – increased reliance on illicit mining, charcoal exports, and diaspora donations.
- Cross‑Border Mobility – expanded use of porous borders in the Lower Jubba and Garissa counties.
- Digital Propaganda – elegant recruitment via encrypted messaging apps and AI‑generated media.
al‑Shabab’s Operational Evolution in 2024‑2025
| Capability | 2023 Baseline | 2024‑2025 Upgrade | Impact on Threat Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Explosives | Homemade IEDs (mostly “pipe bombs”) | Access to military‑grade C‑4 and drone‑delivered payloads | Higher casualty potential, harder detection |
| Leadership structure | Hierarchical cell system | Hybrid model – semi‑autonomous regional commanders | Faster decision‑making, resilient to leadership decapitation |
| Financing | Charcoal, livestock theft | Crypto‑laundering hubs in Nairobi and Mombasa | Rapid fund movement, less traceable |
– Drone Usage: Since mid‑2024, al‑Shabab has employed commercially available quadcopters for aerial reconnaissance and limited strike capability, as documented by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) surveillance logs.
- Cyber‑Terror Tactics: A coordinated phishing campaign in September 2025 targeted Kenyan banking staff, harvesting credentials used to siphon $2.1 million into offshore accounts linked to al‑Shabab financiers.
Impact on Somalia’s Security Landscape
- Territorial Gains: Although still confined to pockets of the Mudug and Galguduud regions, al‑shabab now controls roughly 35 % of rural road networks, disrupting humanitarian aid routes.
- Humanitarian Crisis: UN OCHA estimates a 15 % rise in internally displaced persons (IDPs) between January 2024 and October 2025, directly tied to al‑Shabab‑induced insecurity.
- Government Counter‑Actions:
- Somali National Army (SNA) modernization – acquisition of night‑vision rifles and UAVs through the European union “Security Capacity Building” program.
- Joint Intelligence Task Force – created in March 2025, integrating ASIO, Kenya’s NIS, and the U.S. AFRICOM hub in Djibouti.
Kenya’s vulnerability and Recent Incidents
- Border Attacks:
- Mandera County (April 2025) – coordinated assault on a police outpost resulted in 12 fatalities and the seizure of 6‑month stockpiles of ammunition.
- Lamu Port (August 2025) – attempted sabotage of a cargo vessel carrying oil,thwarted by Kenyan Coast Guard UAV interception.
- Urban Threats:
- Nairobi Shopping Mall (November 2025) – foiled suicide‑bomb plot uncovered by NIS cyber‑monitoring of al‑Shabab’s encrypted chat groups.
- Socio‑Economic Repercussions: Tourism revenue in the coastal region dropped 23 % YoY after the Lamu incident, prompting a government‑led “Secure Beaches” campaign.
Regional Spill‑Over Effects
- Ethiopia – al‑Shabab exploited the Tigray‑Afar border chaos,smuggling weapons and fighters into the afar region.
- Uganda – recruitment drives in Kampala’s informal settlements led to a 12 % increase in arrests for suspected al‑Shabab affiliation between 2024‑2025.
- Djibouti – maritime security alerts heightened after intelligence linked al‑Shabab to a failed attempt to hijack a container ship destined for the Suez Canal.
Strategic Responses – What Governments and NGOs Can Do
1. Integrated Border Management
- Deploy biometric exit/entry points at key crossing stations (Garissa, Wajir, Moyale).
- Share real‑time data through the East african Counter‑Terrorism Information Sharing Platform (EACTISP).
2. Community‑Centric Counter‑Radicalization
- launch “Youth Voices” programs in high‑risk districts, offering vocational training and mentorship.
- Utilize faith‑leader coalitions to counter extremist narratives on local radio and social media.
3. Financial Disruption
- Mandate crypto‑transaction monitoring for all exchanges operating in Kenya and Somalia, in line with the FATF 2025 recommendations.
- Freeze assets linked to known al‑Shabab benefactors via United Nations “Asset Freeze” resolutions.
4. Enhanced intelligence Fusion
- create a regional HUMINT‑SIGINT hub in Nairobi, staffed jointly by UNOPS, AU, and partner nation intelligence services.
- Implement AI‑driven pattern analysis to predict likely attack vectors based on historical data.
Practical Mitigation Tips for Communities
- Stay Informed: Subscribe to official alerts from Kenya’s Disaster Management Center and Somalia’s National Disaster Management Authority.
- Secure Communications: Use end‑to‑end encrypted messaging apps verified by the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP).
- Report Suspicious Activity: Immediate reporting to local police or the Community Safety Hotline (605‑555‑0199) can trigger rapid response teams.
- Emergency Preparedness: Keep a “24‑hour kit” (first aid, water, non‑perishable food, whistle) at home and know evacuation routes.
Case Study: Joint Border Patrol Success in Mandera (June 2025)
- Stakeholders: Kenya defence Forces (KDF), Somali Police Force (SPF), AU Peacekeeping Force, and local community elders.
- Operation Highlights:
- Joint patrols covered 120 km of the Garissa-Mandera corridor, conducting 48 vehicle inspections.
- Intelligence‑led raid recovered 15 kg of improvised explosives and arrested 7 suspected al‑Shabab operatives.
- Community liaison facilitated the safe return of 3 displaced families to a newly built shelter complex.
- Outcome Metrics:
- 30 % reduction in cross‑border smuggling incidents (july 2025 vs. July 2024).
- Increased trust scores in community surveys (67 % reporting “high confidence” in security forces).
Key Takeaways for Policy makers
- Prioritise multi‑layered border security that couples technology with local intelligence.
- Invest in youth empowerment to cut off the recruitment pipeline that fuels al‑Shabab’s manpower.
- Coordinate financial monitoring across the region, targeting both traditional cash flows and emerging cryptocurrency channels.
- Leverage regional platforms like AU’s Peace and Security Council to sustain a unified, data‑driven counter‑terrorism strategy.
