Ukrainian Intelligence Unveils Russia’s Military Power: Insights Revealed

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September 21, 2025

Moscow has announced meaningful targets for military equipment production in 2025, including 57 modern combat aircraft, nearly 250 new T-90M tanks, and approximately 1,100 wheeled armored vehicles. However, a closer examination of production trends from 2021 to

How are parallel import schemes enabling Russia to maintain its military production despite sanctions?

Modernization efforts & Key Weapon Systems

Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) has been consistently providing detailed assessments of Russia’s evolving military capabilities, especially since the full-scale invasion of February 2022. Recent reports,corroborated by open-source intelligence (OSINT) and Western analysts,paint a picture of a Russian military undergoing meaningful,albeit uneven,modernization and adaptation. This isn’t simply about quantity; it’s about qualitative improvements in specific areas.

* Hypersonic Missile Development: Russia continues to prioritize the development and deployment of hypersonic weapons systems like the Avangard and Kinzhal. HUR reports indicate increased operational readiness and frequency of testing, posing a significant challenge to existing air defense systems. These weapons, designed to evade customary interception methods, represent a key component of Russia’s strategic deterrence.

* Electronic Warfare (EW) Capabilities: A major focus of Russian military investment is in electronic warfare. HUR intelligence suggests Russia is deploying advanced EW systems capable of jamming communication networks,disrupting GPS signals,and interfering with drone operations. This is particularly evident in eastern Ukraine, where ukrainian forces have reported increased EW activity.

* Drone Warfare Expansion: While initially lagging behind Ukraine in drone technology, Russia has rapidly expanded its drone program. HUR identifies increased production of domestically manufactured drones, including reconnaissance and loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) like the Lancet. These are being deployed extensively for target acquisition and precision strikes.

* Artillery Modernization: Despite ample losses, Russia continues to modernize its artillery forces. Reports detail the introduction of advanced self-propelled howitzers like the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, offering increased range and accuracy.the use of Krasnopol guided artillery shells is also becoming more prevalent.

Logistics and Production Capacity: Adapting to Sanctions

The impact of Western sanctions on russia’s military-industrial complex has been a central question as 2022. HUR assessments reveal a complex picture. while sanctions have undoubtedly created challenges, Russia has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt and circumvent restrictions.

* Import Substitution: Russia has aggressively pursued import substitution,attempting to replace foreign components with domestically produced alternatives. Success has been mixed, with some areas – like basic ammunition – seeing significant progress, while others – like advanced microelectronics – remain heavily reliant on parallel imports.

* Increased Military production: Despite initial disruptions, Russia has significantly increased its military production.HUR reports indicate a substantial rise in the output of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems, and ammunition. This is partly due to the mobilization of the Russian economy and the prioritization of military needs.

* Parallel Import Schemes: Russia has established elaborate parallel import schemes to procure critical components from countries that haven’t imposed sanctions, or through intermediaries.These schemes often involve complex financial transactions and the use of shell companies.

* Rail Network Utilization: The Russian rail network plays a crucial role in transporting military equipment and supplies. HUR monitoring shows a consistent high level of rail traffic dedicated to military logistics, particularly along key routes leading to the front lines.

Command & Control: Lessons Learned and Adaptations

Early in the conflict, Russian command and control (C2) structures were criticized for being rigid and vulnerable. HUR intelligence suggests that russia has learned from these shortcomings and implemented changes to improve its C2 capabilities.

* Decentralization of Authority: Reports indicate a degree of decentralization of authority, granting field commanders more autonomy in decision-making. This is intended to improve responsiveness and reduce delays in reacting to changing battlefield conditions.

* Secure Communication Systems: Russia is investing in more secure communication systems to protect against Ukrainian electronic warfare and intelligence gathering efforts. This includes the deployment of encrypted communication channels and the use of advanced signal intelligence (SIGINT) techniques.

* Mobile Command Posts: The use of mobile command posts has increased, allowing commanders to relocate quickly and avoid detection. These command posts are frequently enough equipped with advanced communication and intelligence gathering equipment.

* Integration of Intelligence Data: HUR assessments suggest improved integration of intelligence data from various sources, including reconnaissance drones, satellite imagery, and human intelligence (HUMINT).This is enhancing situational awareness and enabling more effective targeting.

Case Study: The Battle for Avdiivka (October-November 2023)

The intense fighting around Avdiivka in late 2023 provided valuable insights into Russia’s current military capabilities. HUR analysis of the battle revealed:

* Massive Artillery Barrages: Russia employed massive artillery barrages,utilizing a wide range