The Submarine Imperative: Why America Needs to Stop Chasing a Commercial Shipbuilding Mirage
The U.S. Navy is facing a critical shortfall in its ability to project power, and the solution isn’t building more cargo ships. While Washington debates reshoring commercial shipbuilding as a matter of national security, a fundamental miscalculation is taking place: focusing on merchant vessels diverts crucial resources from the warships – particularly submarines and unmanned systems – that will truly determine the outcome of a future conflict with China. The idea that reviving a domestic commercial shipbuilding industry will bolster national defense is, bluntly, a costly distraction.
The Illusion of Surge Capacity
Proponents of domestic commercial shipbuilding argue it creates vital “surge capacity” for a crisis, allowing for rapid expansion of sealift capabilities. This argument isn’t entirely without merit. The ability to transport troops and equipment quickly is undeniably important. However, the premise that the U.S. can rapidly build its way to maritime dominance is flawed. China currently controls over half of the world’s commercial shipbuilding capacity, and attempting to replicate that infrastructure domestically would be a decades-long, multi-billion dollar undertaking – a race we’re likely to lose.
Instead of trying to compete where allies already excel, the U.S. should leverage existing programs like the Tanker Security Program and Maritime Security Program, which already secure foreign-built, U.S.-flagged vessels for emergency use. Extending preferences to vessels built in South Korea and Japan, as some policymakers suggest, is a far more pragmatic approach. These nations possess established, efficient shipbuilding industries and a vested interest in maintaining a stable global order.
The Naval Production Crisis: A Clear and Present Danger
The real bottleneck isn’t commercial tonnage; it’s the painfully slow production of naval vessels, especially submarines. These complex machines require specialized facilities capable of handling nuclear propulsion – facilities the U.S. possesses, but not in sufficient quantity. Building a submarine isn’t like assembling a cargo ship; it demands a highly skilled workforce and a dedicated industrial base. Throwing money at commercial shipbuilding won’t magically accelerate submarine production.
Furthermore, the Navy’s vision for future naval warfare – a “hellscape” around Taiwan populated by unmanned vessels – requires a different kind of shipbuilding capacity altogether. These autonomous systems, often smaller and more specialized, won’t benefit from the large-scale infrastructure designed for massive container ships. As the Congressional Research Service notes, the skills and infrastructure required for commercial and naval shipbuilding are largely distinct.
The False Promise of Co-Production
Some argue that “co-production” – building commercial ships to stimulate the naval shipbuilding workforce – is a viable strategy. This is a dangerous fallacy. Building cargo ships won’t suddenly equip workers with the expertise needed to construct advanced submarines or unmanned systems. In fact, it will likely compete for scarce skilled labor, drawing workers away from critical naval projects. Training a skilled shipbuilding workforce takes time and consistent investment – resources better directed towards naval-specific programs.
LNG Carriers: A Case Study in Misguided Policy
The proposed rule requiring 15% of U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) exports to travel on U.S.-built ships exemplifies this misguided approach. South Korea currently dominates LNG carrier production, possessing the specialized expertise in membrane construction that the U.S. lacks. Forcing domestic production would be astronomically expensive – estimates suggest a $15 billion premium compared to purchasing from South Korea – and provide minimal security benefits. As the Atlantic Council points out, focusing on securing reliable gas supplies for allies is more critical than controlling the vessels that transport them. [Atlantic Council – US LNG Shipping and the Jones Act]
Prioritizing Naval Modernization and Repair
Instead of chasing the mirage of a resurgent commercial shipbuilding industry, the U.S. should focus on strengthening its naval shipbuilding base. This means investing in modernizing existing public naval yards, potentially adding a fifth public yard to address critical repair backlogs, and providing consistent, long-term demand signals to unlock private investment. Expanding multi-year procurement contracts for key vessel classes will provide the stability needed for shipyards to invest in infrastructure and workforce development.
Allies as Partners, Not Competitors
America’s power has limits. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby argues, the U.S. must leverage its allies both geopolitically and geoeconomically. In commercial shipbuilding, allies like Japan and South Korea are world leaders. Attempting to duplicate their capabilities is wasteful and counterproductive. The U.S. should embrace a strategy of specialization, focusing on building the warships that matter most while relying on allies for commercial tonnage.
The path to maritime dominance isn’t about building everything at home. It’s about building the right things at home – the submarines, unmanned systems, and naval auxiliaries that will secure America’s future at sea. Let our allies build the merchant ships. Let America build the future of naval warfare. What strategic partnerships do you believe are most crucial for the U.S. to prioritize in the coming decade? Share your thoughts in the comments below!
