Iranian state television has designated Mojtaba Khamenei as a janbaz, or wounded veteran, of the current conflict, marking the first official acknowledgment of his condition following the strikes that killed his father. More than three weeks after his appointment to succeed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the new Supreme Leader has not appeared in any photograph or video clip accessible to the Iranian public, having issued only two written statements since assuming the role.
The transition occurs against the backdrop of a war that began on February 28, during which US-Israeli strikes eliminated Iran’s veteran Supreme Leader and a host of top figures, including Revolutionary Guards commanders. Despite the depletion of senior leadership, the ruling system has maintained its ability to strategise and operate, relying on a complex power structure built from the 1979 revolution. The Islamic Republic’s hierarchy is buttressed by layered institutions with a shared commitment to the survival of the theocratic system rather than dependence on a small number of individuals.
Succession and the Office of the Leader
Under Iran’s official ideology of velayat-e faqih, or rule of the Islamic jurist, the Supreme Leader is a learned cleric wielding temporal power on behalf of Shi’ite Islam’s 12th imam. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who held the office since 1989, enjoyed unquestioning obedience throughout the system and retained the last say on all major issues. His office, known as the bayt, maintains a large staff that shadows other parts of Iran’s government, allowing the leader to intervene directly across the bureaucracy.
Mojtaba Khamenei has inherited the role and its extensive formal powers, but he lacks the automatic authority enjoyed by his father. Selected by the Revolutionary Guards, the new leader may be beholden to the hardline military corps in a way his predecessor was not. The opacity surrounding his public presence raises questions regarding his physical recovery and the extent of his direct control over the bayt during active hostilities.
Strategic Command and the Revolutionary Guards
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has assumed an even more central role in strategic decision-making following the installation of Mojtaba Khamenei. Long prepared to withstand decapitation of their leadership, the Guards operate with a mosaic organisational structure. This design ensures a line of replacements is already named for each commander, with every unit able to operate independently according to set plans.
Many top-ranking Guards commanders were killed early in the conflict, following a list of senior commanders killed in strikes the previous year. They have been replaced with other experienced men who have so far proven able to manage a complex war effort. That resilience reflects the command depth of a corps that took the lead in the 1980-88 war with Iraq and has spearheaded Iran’s close involvement with groups fighting in conflicts across the Middle East for decades.
Among the surviving leadership, Revolutionary Guards head Ahmad Vahidi remains a pivotal figure. The corps’ latest commander was appointed after his two immediate predecessors were killed. Influential in the Guards for years, Vahidi fought in the Iran-Iraq war, ran the Qods Force, served as defence minister and helped crush internal dissent. Working alongside him is Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force chief Esmail Qaani, a secretive figure who has managed Iran’s ties with proxies and allies across the region since taking over the unit in 2020 following the death of Qassem Soleimani.
Political Leadership and Civilian Authority
Iran’s political system merges clerical rule with an elected president and parliament, and all branches retain a significant role in running the Islamic Republic along with the Guards. The killing of the late Khamenei’s main adviser Ali Larijani was a substantial blow to the ruling authorities given his extensive experience, his ability to operate between Iran’s different power centres and his skills negotiating with the outside world.
Other capable, experienced political figures remain, but the prominent individuals likely to step into the shoes of Larijani and other assassinated officials may be more hardline than those who have been killed. The death of Revolutionary Guards naval head Alireza Tangsiri was another significant blow; Tangsiri had reportedly played a significant part in Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guards commander, Tehran mayor and failed presidential candidate, may be the biggest political heavyweight still alive. He has been increasingly vocal over recent weeks, setting out Iran’s stance as the war has developed. Judiciary Head Ayatollah Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, a former intelligence head sanctioned for his role in the repression of mass protests in 2009, is widely seen as a hardliner maintaining domestic control.
Executive and Diplomatic Channels
President Masoud Pezeshkian remains the most senior directly elected figure in Iran, giving him an important voice, though the presidency is far less important than it once was. The limits of his influence were starkly illustrated earlier this month when he incurred the Guards’ ire by apologising to Gulf states for Iranian attacks on their territory, forcing him to partially retract his comments.
Former Supreme National Security chief Saeed Jalili, an injured veteran of the Iran-Iraq war and one of the most hardline figures in Iranian politics, remains active. The losing 2024 presidential candidate and uncompromising former nuclear negotiator continues to hold sway within security circles. On the diplomatic front, Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi has conducted high-stakes negotiations with Iran’s Western foes, as well as with global powers Russia and China, which maintain a better relationship with Tehran, and with Iran’s Arab neighbours and rivals.
Guardian Council member Ayatollah Alireza Arafi serves as a senior cleric and leading member of the body that chooses which candidates to exclude from elections. He was so well trusted that he was chosen to join the three-man interim council running Iran after Khamenei’s death. As the conflict persists, Parliament Speaker Qalibaf was said by an Israeli official and a source familiar with the matter to have been negotiating with the U.S. Over recent days, though no formal agreement has been announced.
