An unannounced visit by the commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Ismail Qaani, to Iraq, this week, in an effort to bridge the rift between Shiite political forces, but the visit “failed”, it seems, in resolving the position of the leader of the Sadrist movement Muqtada al-Sadr, who is seeking to form a government of a “national majority” ‘, according to observers.
No official party, Iraqi or Iranian, announced the news of the visit, but pictures published on social media of Qaani visiting the tomb of the leader of the Popular Mobilization Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and the late Shiite cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr in Najaf, confirmed his arrival in Iraq.
After these photos were leaked, Iranian media outlets, including Mehr News Agency, published details about Qaani’s visit to Iraq, stating that he “meeted with the leaders of the coordination framework in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, with the aim of unifying the positions of the Shiite house.”
She also indicated that he “discussed the formation of an alliance that includes all Shiite political parties, as well as the file of forming the new government.”
And Mehr News Agency stated in a report, last Monday, that “it is hoped that Qaani will hold a meeting with the leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, in the coming hours.”
Qaani visited Najaf on Sunday, local media reported, and he appeared in photos published by websites affiliated with pro-Iranian factions, crouching at the tomb of the former deputy head of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed in an American strike in Baghdad alongside Qaani’s predecessor, Qassem Soleimani, two years ago.
Najaf Ashraf; Visiting the holy shrine of Martyr Abu Mahdi Al-Mohandes pic.twitter.com/JuzlsCNmmM
– اسماعیل قاآنی | Esmail Qaani (@EsQaani) January 16, 2022
The meeting between Al-Sadr and Qaani did not take place until the time of preparing this report, which was confirmed by Western journalists, including the BBC’s correspondent in Iraq, Nafisa Kohnavard.
“Qaani asked to meet with al-Sadr twice, but his requests were rejected,” Kohnavard said in a tweet on Twitter.
No meetings between Muqtada & Qaani yet.
Yesterday in Najaf Iran’s Qods force commander Qaani has requested twice to meet Muqtada but his requests were declined.
This evening Mr. Qaani has gone back to Najaf to try again but until now no success, Iraqi sources confirmed to me— Nafiseh Kohnavard (@nafisehkBBC) January 17, 2022
It quoted sources close to al-Sadr confirming that no meeting took place between the leader of the Sadrist movement and the commander of the Iranian Quds Force.
Al-Sadr’s office and those close to him did not respond to Al-Hurra calls to request comment on Qaani’s visit.
Political analyst Najm al-Qassab says, “Qaani is not Soleimani, and the Sadrist movement that won the elections does not want to forfeit this victory, because it believes that it may not be repeated in the upcoming elections.”
Al-Qassab added to Al-Hurra website that “the Sadrist movement tried twice, won them in the last elections and handed over all the ministries and the government to the other Shiite party, but they did not offer anything, neither to the Shiite political and societal component nor to the other components.”
Al-Qassab believes that “Qaani does not even affect the parties close to Iran that have supported them over the past years, which is what made them.”
But the head of the Iraqi Center for Media Development, Adnan Al-Sarraj, says that Qaani’s meetings “were limited to the leaders of the coordination framework, and there was no meeting with Al-Sadr on his agenda.”
Al-Sarraj added to Al-Hurra that Qaani “never met with Al-Sadr, but went to Najaf to perform the ceremonies of visiting the holy shrines and the tomb of Sayyid Muhammad Al-Sadr and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis.”
Al-Sarraj continues, “The conversation within the framework says that Qaani did not come up with a project, but rather came up with an idea related to increasing understanding between Shiite political forces in order to unify their efforts.”
Al-Sadr has been relentlessly repeating for several months that his current will choose the prime minister. He calls for the formation of a “national majority” government represented by the parties that received the highest number of votes.
Al-Sadr’s positions contradict those called for by the coordination framework that includes pro-Iranian factions, which demand traditional and consensual governmental solutions that include all parties.
The coordination framework includes the “Al-Fateh” coalition representing the Popular Mobilization, which won only 17 seats compared to 48 in the previous parliament, as well as the “State of Law” coalition headed by former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (33 seats), and other Shiite parties.
Al-Qassab stresses that “Al-Sadr is still insisting on forming a majority government, even with the framework in place, but this must be done on its own terms.”
Among the most prominent conditions of Al-Sadr, according to Al-Qassab, is “the control and organization of the popular crowd, because he sees that there are many parties who have taken advantage of the name of the crowd and turned it into a commercial benefit institution, and the second matter is to open files of corruption throughout the previous governments,” noting that these two conditions “annoyed some parties within the coordination framework.” .
Al-Qassab believes that “whether the leaders of the framework agree to al-Sadr’s conditions or not, he is proceeding with forming the government,” noting that “the first message he sent to them and weakened them was to pass the presidency of Parliament and its two deputies.”
Al-Qassab believes that “Iran is no longer interested in the Iraqi issue as much as it was in the past, as it has failed in many of the region’s files in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and others, and today it wants to get out of the sanctions imposed on it.”
And he continues, “Iran benefited a lot from Iraq in the past, but today it has lost its influence in the central and southern regions.”
“In the end, they see that al-Sadr’s success may be the lesser of two evils, because he is not against it, but at the same time against the interventions or personalities who represented Iran and are believed to have offended the doctrine, Iraq and Iran,” according to al-Qassab.
On the other hand, Al-Sarraj warns that if “the Sadrist movement is alone in forming the government, it will not last long, because the framework has a strategic decision in this regard, including boycotting the political process.”
But Al-Sarraj confirms that there is a tendency to reach “a kind of understanding” with the Sadrist movement.
Al-Sarraj also points out that “the framework made a strategic decision that they will remain coherent, and there is no agreement in isolation from any of the framework parties.”
Al-Sarraj confirms that Qaani told the leaders of the framework that “with the possibility of cooperation in any way the Iraqis see fit, whether through a major alliance or cooperation between the framework and the current.”