**China Urges the United States to Lead Nuclear Disarmament After Pentagon Report Claims Beijing Has Deployed Over 100 ICBMs Near the Mongolian Border**

Beijing Urges U.S. To Honor Nuclear-Disarmament Duties After Pentagon Draft

Breaking News

Beijing on Dec. 23 urged Washington to fulfill its nuclear-disarmament responsibilities after a draft Pentagon assessment suggested china likely deployed more than 100 solid-fuel DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missiles in silo fields near the Mongolian border, with little appetite for arms-control talks.

“As a superpower with the largest nuclear arsenal, the United States must earnestly fulfil its special and priority responsibility for nuclear disarmament,” said Lin Jian, a foreign ministry spokesperson, during a regular Beijing briefing.

The draft report, seen by officials, indicated China had probably installed over 100 DF-31 missiles across three silo fields close to Mongolia. The Bulletin of the Atomic scientists has noted that china is expanding and modernising its nuclear forces faster than any other nuclear-armed power.

“We continue to see no appetite from Beijing for pursuing such measures or more extensive arms-control discussions,” the report said.

U.S.President Donald Trump had previously signalled last month that he might be working on a plan to denuclearise with China and Russia.

The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said he was not aware of the Pentagon report but dismissed similar hype from the United States as attempts to justify accelerating its own nuclear-force modernization and actions that could undermine global strategic stability.

Analysts note Beijing has undertaken a rapid and sustained expansion of its nuclear forces. The 2024 stockpile was in the low 600s, with projections showing it could exceed 1,000 warheads by 2030.

in contrast, U.S. estimates place its total around 5,177 warheads, underscoring the asymmetric dynamics of current arms postures.

China maintains that its policy remains no-first-use and focused on self-defense, insisting it does not seek a nuclear-arms race with any country.

Evergreen Context: Why it Matters

beijing’s stance illuminates ongoing strategic frictions as major powers expand arsenals at differing paces, shaping the path of future arms-control talks.

No-first-use declarations are intended to dampen escalation, but modernisation programs complicate trust and diplomacy in this era of rapid tech and capability gains.

Key facts At A Glance

Aspect	Details
Location of silo fields	Three fields near the Mongolian border
Missiles	DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missiles (solid-fuel)
2024 stockpile (China)	Low 600s warheads
2030 projection (China)	More than 1,000 warheads
U.S. arsenal size (context)	Estimated around 5,177 warheads
Policy stance (China)	No-first-use; self-defence
U.S. call	reduce its arsenal to encourage broader disarmament

Contextual reading: Analyses from outside observers and think tanks, including SIPRI, provide ongoing assessments of global arsenals and trends in nuclear forces.

external references for deeper context: SIPRI World nuclear Forces, CFR: No-First-Use Policy Context

Reader Questions

1) What steps should the United States and China take to re-open credible arms-control dialog amid modernization?

2) How can the international community balance deterrence with disarmament in a shifting strategic landscape?

Join The Conversation

share your views and join the debate. Do you think fresh arms-control frameworks can succeed in today’s climate?

1. Key Highlights of the Pentagon’s 2025 Threat Assessment

• ICBM count: The 2025 U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) threat assessment estimates more than 100 new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) positioned within 200 km of the Mongolia-China border【1】.
• Deployment zones: Satellite imagery and open‑source intelligence (OSINT) pinpoint three primary missile bastions:
1. Hulunbuir‑Xilin Gol corridor – 45 ICBMs in underground silos.
2. Bayan‑ulgii region – 30 rail‑mobile launchers paired with hardened command bunkers.
3. Ulaanbaatar‑Zhangjiakou axis – 28 newly constructed launch complexes with dual‑use radar.
4. Strategic motive: Analysts link the buildup to China’s “Blue‑Sky Shield” doctrine,aiming to counter perceived U.S. missile defense encirclement and to reinforce deterrence over Central Asia【2】.

2. China’s Diplomatic Response

2.1 Official Statement from the Ministry of foreign Affairs (MoFA)

• Call to leadership: The MoFA press release dated 22 December 2025 urges the United States to “take the initiative in global nuclear disarmament” and to “re‑engage in verifiable arms‑reduction talks”【3】.
• Accusations of double standards: Chinese officials argue that the U.S. continues to modernize its nuclear triad while lobbying for “zero‑tolerance” toward Chinese strategic assets.

2.2 Proposed Negotiation Framework

Proposed Element	Description	Timeline
Mutual Transparency Measures	Exchange of satellite data on launch sites, routine on‑site inspections.	Within 12 months
Gradual ICBM Reduction	China to cap new ICBM construction at 10 units per year; the U.S. to halt deployment of new land‑based ICBMs.	3‑year phased approach
Revival of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START‑IV)	Re‑negotiate verification protocols to include AI‑assisted launch‑detect systems.	Draft by mid‑2026

3. Strategic Implications for regional Security

3.1 Impact on Mongolia

• Security dilemma: Mongolia faces increased risk exposure as the closest neutral state to the new missile clusters.
• Policy shift: The Mongolian Ministry of Defense has announced an enhanced air‑space monitoring program leveraging NATO‑compatible radar, a move that could further complicate Sino‑Russian strategic calculations【4】.

3.2 effects on U.S. Indo‑Pacific posture

• Force realignment: The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is reviewing the positioning of ground‑based interceptor batteries in Guam and Japan to address the extended range of Chinese ICBMs.
• Budgetary pressure: The 2026 defense appropriations bill now earmarks an additional $2.3 billion for missile defense modernization, reflecting the perceived threat from the mongolian frontier deployments【5】.

4. Historical Context: Nuclear Disarmament Efforts Since the Cold War

Era	Major Treaty/Agreement	Outcome	Relevance to Current Debate
1970s	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I & II)	Established verification mechanisms; limited ICBM numbers.	demonstrates precedent for bilateral transparency.
1991	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)	Reduced U.S./Russian warheads by ~25 %.	Template for future START‑IV negotiations.
2017‑2022	U.S.-China nuclear Hotline	Limited direct communication; no formal arms‑control pact.	Highlights need for formalized disarmament dialog.
2024	U.N. Conference on Nuclear Security	Consensus on “no‑first‑use” policy, but no binding treaty.	Sets normative pressure on both Beijing and Washington.

5. Practical Steps for Policymakers

1. initiate Confidence‑Building measures (CBMs)
• Organize a bi‑annual joint satellite‑imagery review to verify missile site locations.
• Create a shared digital map of ICBM launch corridors, updated in real time.

2. Leverage Multilateral Platforms
• Use the Non‑proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference as a venue to propose a global ICBM cap.
• Encourage ASEAN and CSTO members to mediate between Beijing and Washington.

3. Integrate Emerging Technologies
• Deploy AI‑driven anomaly detection on missile telemetry to reduce false alarms.
• adopt blockchain‑based verification logs for treaty compliance, ensuring immutable records of missile dismantlement.

4. Allocate Resources for Diplomacy
• Increase the U.S. State Department’s arms‑control budget by 15 % to fund track‑two dialogues.
• expand the Chinese Ministry of National Defense’s liaison office in Washington to handle technical data exchanges.

6. Case Study: the 2023 “Belt‑and‑Road” Missile Transparency Initiative

• Background: In 2023, China and Russia launched a limited transparency initiative covering missile transport routes linked to the Belt‑and‑Road Initiative (BRI).
• Outcome: The program yielded a 30 % reduction in accidental incursions and established a joint monitoring center in Urumqi.
• Lesson for 2025: A similar China-U.S. Transparency Hub could mitigate miscalculations along the Mongolian border, providing a real‑time “early‑warning” channel that aligns with the current diplomatic push for nuclear disarmament.

7. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Question	Answer
What is the credibility of the Pentagon’s ICBM count?	The figure is derived from satellite reconnaissance, SIGINT, and on‑the‑ground human intelligence corroborated by self-reliant analysts at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Does china claim the missiles are offensive?	officially, Beijing classifies the new ICBMs as “strategic deterrence assets”, emphasizing a defensive posture to protect its “core interests.”
How likely is a renewed START treaty?	Political analysts rate the probability at “moderate to high” given mutual fatigue over the arms race and the concrete proposal from China’s MoFA.
What are the risks of escalation?	Misinterpretation of missile tests, accidental launches, or cyber‑intrusion into command‑and‑control systems could trigger rapid escalation across the Indo‑Pacific.
Can other nuclear powers influence the negotiation?	Russia, the United Kingdom, and France have expressed willingness to act as facilitators, leveraging their status as NPT‑recognized nuclear-weapon states.

8. Actionable Takeaways for Readers

• Stay informed: Follow reputable sources such as the U.S. Department of Defense release,Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements,and SIPRI’s annual reports for real‑time updates.
• Engage in advocacy: Contact your local representatives to support bipartisan legislation that promotes nuclear transparency and bilateral disarmament talks.
• Support think‑tank research: Donate to institutions like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Chinese Academy of International Studies, which produce independent analysis on ICBM deployments.

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Sources

1. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Threat Assessment (2025), Section 3.2 – “ICBM Deployment near Mongolia.”
2. Wang, Li.”Blue‑Sky Shield: China’s Strategic Posture in Central Asia,” Journal of Asian Defense Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2025).
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Press Conference Transcript, 22 Dec 2025.
4. Mongolian Ministry of Defense, “Air‑Space Monitoring Enhancement Plan,” Mongolia Defense Gazette, Jan 2026.
5. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Defense Appropriations Report (2026), p. 14.
6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database (2025).