The Looming Succession in Iran: Why Elected Institutions May Be the Unexpected Stabilizer
With Iran facing both the fallout from recent state violence and the specter of potential U.S. conflict, the question of what comes after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – now 86 years old – is no longer a distant concern, but an immediate geopolitical pressure point. But the most likely outcome isn’t a dramatic upheaval, but a subtle, pragmatic shift: a de facto transfer of power to the very elected institutions the current regime has long sought to control. This isn’t democratization, but a recognition by Iran’s elite that clinging to the current, increasingly untenable system poses a greater risk than cautiously ceding ground.
The Paradox of Participation in an Authoritarian System
Iran isn’t a typical dictatorship. Unlike closed military juntas, it maintains a facade of democratic participation through regular elections for presidents, parliaments, and local councils. However, this participation exists within tightly controlled boundaries. Unelected bodies – primarily the security apparatus and the judiciary aligned with the Supreme Leader – effectively neutralize the sovereignty of these elected institutions. This creates a system of “elections without sovereignty,” where the ballot box offers a limited outlet for expression but little real power to shape policy.
This paradox has fueled cycles of disillusionment and renewed engagement. Following the contested 2009 presidential election and the subsequent Green Movement, the regime doubled down on control, carefully vetting candidates and centralizing authority. Yet, even under these constraints, participation persisted. As many Iranians discovered, disengagement only deepened their exclusion, turning voting into a pragmatic act of harm reduction rather than a genuine expression of popular will.
The Cracks in the Foundation of Supreme Leadership
For over two decades, the office of the Supreme Leader has been the central pillar of Iran’s political order. But this concentration of power, while durable, is not permanent. Increasing hostility towards the system isn’t limited to the public; it’s also brewing within the political and security establishment itself. This discontent manifests not as open rebellion, but as a reluctance to publicly consolidate around a successor, a preference for ambiguity, and a fear of locking in arrangements that could prove destabilizing.
The office of the Supreme Leader is losing its authority to command unquestioned obedience. Reproducing the current model through another unelected leader or a security-dominated succession would likely exacerbate the existing legitimacy crisis. The alternative, while uncertain, involves a shift in where authority is actually exercised – a de facto rebalancing of power towards elected institutions.
A History of Missed Opportunities for Reform
Attempts at internal change aren’t new. President Mohammad Khatami’s reformist agenda in the late 1990s sought to expand freedoms and rebalance power. However, the response to the Green Movement demonstrated the regime’s unwillingness to accommodate challenges to its core authority. This pattern – repression followed by limited, controlled pragmatism – has shaped Iran’s political landscape for years.
Why Elected Institutions Are Best Positioned to Fill the Void
Iran’s presidents, parliamentarians, and ministers, despite their limitations, possess a crucial advantage: they are accountable to the electorate and responsible for governing in practice. They bear the consequences of policy failures and derive political weight from their mandates. This practical experience and accountability make them uniquely positioned to navigate a succession crisis and shape any elite accommodation that emerges.
A shift towards elected governance wouldn’t necessarily require abolishing the Supreme Leadership, but rather allowing elected bodies to become the primary locus of governance. This could take several forms: a collective leadership council, an interim arrangement granting expanded responsibilities to executive and parliamentary bodies, or the selection of a successor who actively facilitates a rebalancing of power. Proposals for collective leadership have been circulating since 2015, indicating a growing awareness within the system of the need for change.
The Regional Implications and the Role of Coercive Diplomacy
The stability of the Middle East is inextricably linked to Iran’s internal dynamics. Regional actors aren’t necessarily motivated by ideological sympathy for Tehran, but by a fear of the consequences of state collapse, refugee flows, and economic disruption. They prioritize a stable Iran capable of managing internal dissent and external pressures without escalating conflict.
The current situation resembles coercive diplomacy more than a prelude to war. U.S. signaling and economic pressure aim to shape Iranian calculations. However, focusing solely on military leverage risks missing the opportunity presented by Iran’s internal political crisis. Premature escalation or attempts to impose an external solution could backfire, consolidating power within the security apparatus and foreclosing the possibility of a pragmatic accommodation.
External actors should prioritize restraint, avoiding actions that would hinder internal dialogue. Recognizing alternative authorities prematurely or making rhetorical commitments that preclude elite accommodation would be counterproductive. Direct military action, in particular, would likely strengthen hardliners and stifle any potential shift towards elected governance.
This isn’t a call for instant democratization, but a recognition of political reality. Compared to militarization, fragmentation, or renewed repression, a pragmatic shift towards elected governance offers the most plausible path towards stability – aligning Iran’s internal dynamics with the interests of its society and the region. What are your predictions for the future of Iran’s political system? Share your thoughts in the comments below!
