Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in Sahel Province (ISSP) are locked in a violent fratricidal conflict, intensifying across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. As of June 2026, the rivalry has expanded from the tri-border Liptako-Gourma region into littoral West African states, complicating regional security efforts and state stability.
Escalation of the Jihadist Fratricidal War
The conflict between the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and the Islamic State (IS) affiliate ISSP has transitioned from localized skirmishes to a theater-wide war. According to The Jamestown Foundation, the rivalry effectively ended the period of “Sahelian exceptionalism”—a term used to describe the rare, previous period of relative cooperation between these jihadist factions that dissolved in 2019.
Violence has surged throughout the first half of 2026. In April, ISSP claimed to have killed 35 JNIM militants in Niger’s western Tillaberi region, seizing significant caches of weapons and motorcycles. Simultaneously, JNIM released footage depicting the execution of an alleged Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) member in Nigeria’s Kebbi State. This geographic spread, spanning hundreds of kilometers, underscores the intensity of the infighting.
Tactical Doctrine and Operational Synchronization
Photo: Timbuktu Institute
JNIM’s operational model relies on mobility and the exhaustion of state security capacity. As reported by the Jamestown Substack, the group utilizes massed motorcycle maneuvers to facilitate rapid concentration and lateral movement, allowing fighters to encircle fixed positions before dispersing. These tactics were notably observed during the assault on the Malian military position at Dioura in July 2025.
The group’s reliance on night operations further strains the limited resources of regional armies. By conducting raids under low-visibility conditions, JNIM exploits the defensive fatigue of state forces, who often struggle to maintain perimeter security without reliable night-vision or quick-reaction air support. These assaults are not limited to military bases; they increasingly target logistics routes and community-based auxiliary units to degrade the state’s influence in rural areas.
Geopolitical Realignment and the Africa Corps
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The security environment in the Sahel has been reshaped by the withdrawal of French forces and the subsequent arrival of the Russian-linked Africa Corps. According to the Timbuktu Institute, this new military presence has struggled to secure territory, with research suggesting that the brutal methods employed by these forces may inadvertently fuel local recruitment for armed groups.
The current security landscape is defined by a shift in alliances:
Mali and Burkina Faso: The two nations have initiated joint intelligence sharing and cross-border operations to combat mobile insurgent groups.
Logistical Shifts: Due to diplomatic deadlocks and regional sanctions, Bamako has increasingly utilized the port of Conakry in Guinea to import military equipment, including hardware sourced from Russia.
State Capacity: Both governments face severe equipment shortages, particularly in aerial surveillance, which remains a critical gap in monitoring the vast, porous desert regions.
While the alliance between Mali and Burkina Faso is presented by officials as a move toward sovereign security, the Timbuktu Institute notes that the reality on the ground remains difficult. The success of this partnership hinges on the ability of the two armies to achieve concrete results in the tri-border area; failure to restore calm risks undermining the public support currently enjoyed by the ruling authorities.
The Human and Strategic Cost of Instability
Photo: Substack
Civilians remain the primary victims of this multi-layered conflict. The militarization of the region, driven by both the jihadist rivalry and the intervention of external actors, has led to chronic instability. As the Timbuktu Institute reports, the closure of borders and the persistent insecurity are stifling trade and the regional economy.
“Sahelian exceptionalism”The Jamestown Foundation, on the end of the 2019-era jihadist truce.
The near-term outlook for the Sahel remains volatile. JNIM continues to coordinate attacks with local elements, such as the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA), while simultaneously battling ISSP. For regional governments, the challenge is twofold: they must defend static, isolated outposts against a highly mobile, synchronized adversary while managing the domestic political pressures arising from the high costs of a protracted, multifaceted war.
