CPC Central Committee’s Fourth Plenary Session: Unpacking the Simultaneous Resignation of Nine PLA Generals

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Three days before the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced the decision to deal with nine generals on October 17, 2025. These nine generals were officially expelled from the party and military at the same time, which shocked the military circles.

The nine generals who were dealt with are Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong, Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission Miao Hua, Executive Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission He Hongjun, Executive Deputy Director of the Joint Operations Command Center of the Central Military Commission Wang Xiubin, Commander of the Eastern Theater Command Lin Xiangyang, Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong, Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi, Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin, and Armed Police Force Commander Wang Chunning.

The eight people except Wang Houbin are all members of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and their expulsion from the party needs to be confirmed by the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee.

This unprecedented large-scale treatment means two important signals: on the one hand, the military has become the hardest hit area in the recent anti-corruption struggle; on the other hand, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will confirm the punishment of these fallen generals. In addition to these generals, the outside world is expected to affect a large number of lower-level officers. After such a large number of military generals have been dismissed, how will the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army be reshuffled? That remains to be seen.

The military once again becomes the hardest hit area in the anti-corruption campaign

image source,XINHUA

Image caption,China established the “Rocket Army” at the end of 2015, which later became the hardest hit area in the anti-corruption campaign.

After the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the military once again became the hardest hit area in the anti-corruption campaign.

For example, in the entire civil service system, no officials above the ministerial level have been investigated; however, in the military, there is a member of the Politburo, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission He Weidong, and three members of the Central Military Commission, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, who have served as Ministers of Defense, and Director of the Political Work Department Miao Hua, who are also considered to be quasi-deputy state-level officials.

Among the 205 Central Committee members elected at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 44 were military Central Committee members. By the time of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 11 people had been expelled from the party and military membership, which means that the dismissal rate reached 25%.

The most core figure among the generals dealt with this round is He Weidong. He disappeared from public view after attending the closing ceremony of the National People’s Congress on March 11, 2025. Since then, he has been absent from important high-level activities of the CCP. As a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, He Weidong is the first Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission to be purged while in office in the past 60 years.

The last time a Vice Chairman of the Military Commission was dismissed while in office was He Long during the Cultural Revolution. At that time, Lin Biao served as vice chairman of the Military Commission with He Long.

According to public statistics, before Xi Jinping came to power, the only general in the history of the CCP who was punished was Huang Yongsheng. He was punished in 1971 for being implicated in the defection of Lin Biao.

In the eras of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, supreme generals were dealt with. Since Xi Jinping came to power, 22 generals have been expelled from the party and military.

Among them, only eight, Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong, Zhang Yang, Fang Fenghui, Wang Jianping, Wang Xibin, Tian Xiusi, and Liu Yazhou, were generals before Xi Jinping came to power. The remaining 14 were promoted during his tenure. In addition to the nine announced this time, there are also Li Shangfu, Wei Fenghe, Ding Laihang, Li Yuchao, and Zhou Yaning.

In the “Xi Era”, people were promoted and then dismissed

image source,Reuters

Image caption,Qin Gang (left) and Li Shangfu (right) were both promoted to State Councilors and deputy national leaders at the two sessions of the Communist Party of China in March 2023, but they were dismissed more than half a year after taking office.

Most of these fallen PLA generals have one thing in common: they experienced rapid promotion during the Xi Jinping era.

After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the military went through the process of eliminating the influence of Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong. Xu Caihou was announced to be under investigation in March 2014 and was expelled from the party in June of the same year; Guo Boxiong was under investigation in April 2015 and was expelled from the party in July of the same year.

Then starting from the end of 2015, China launched a large-scale military reform. The original four-headquarters system was changed to a multi-departmental military commission system, and the seven military regions were adjusted into five theaters. It was after this round of military reform that a group of young generals were rapidly promoted to the top ranks of the military, the most eye-catching of which were He Weidong and Miao Hua.

He Weidong was not even a member of the Central Committee or an alternate member at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. However, at the 20th National Congress, he was directly promoted to member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Military Commission, becoming the deputy state-level deputy with real power and the highest position that a military member can achieve. Another person who has risen as fast as him is Li Shulei. He also joined the Politburo directly from being an alternate member of the Central Committee and served as the Propaganda Minister of the Central Committee. The two of them also became two rising political stars who attracted much attention after the 20th National Congress: one with a pen and the other with a gun.

It is worth noting that these fallen generals showed strong geographical correlation. He Weidong, Miao Hua, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutong, and Wang Xiubin all came from the 31st Group Army. The 31st Group Army’s military headquarters is located in Tong’an, Xiamen, Fujian. Xi Jinping worked in Fujian for 17 years from 1985 to 2002, during which he inspected the army 14 times. On Army Day, August 1, 2014, Xi Jinping also made a special trip to inspect the 31st Group Army, which was also his 14th inspection of the unit.

With the rise of factions related to the 31st Army after the military reform, the “31st Army” has also become a prominent “factional label” within the military during the Xi Jinping era.

Although Wang Chunning does not belong to the 31st Army, he belongs to the former Nanjing Military Region, the predecessor of the Eastern Theater Command after the military reform.

The other three have a deep relationship with the powerful Political Work Department and its director Miao Hua: He Hongjun once served as Miao Hua’s subordinate or deputy in the Lanzhou Military Region and the Political Work Department of the Military Commission; Yuan Huazhi has long served in the political work department of the Navy and was promoted by Miao Hua when he was the political commissar of the Navy; Wang Houbin has served in the Navy for a long time and served as deputy chief of staff of the East China Sea Fleet. He was also Miao Hua’s former navy department, and was later promoted across the military services to become commander of the Rocket Force.

This time, these direct descendants who were originally considered important to Xi Jinping were collectively eliminated in the anti-corruption campaign, which has attracted attention from all walks of life.

Generals promoted during the Xi Jinping era have fallen in droves. Victor Shih, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, described it as “very confusing”, but gave two possible explanations: the previous Rocket Force nest case was due to the large investment in strategic nuclear weapons in recent years involving huge funds, which allowed a group of officers to become corrupted with less supervision; but some others were not only corrupt, but became too ambitious.

“They were trying to build a power base that threatened the balance of power within the military, so they got into trouble.” Shi Zonghan further explained that this power base was not aimed at Xi Jinping, but was built for himself.

“It’s very similar to the Lin Biao problem. He was very loyal to Chairman Mao, but he was trying to build a huge power base in preparation for the day when Chairman Mao handed over power to him. Chairman Mao didn’t like that. So if Xi Jinping senses this disloyalty, I don’t think he would like it either.”

Image caption,During Xi Jinping’s administration, two waves of anti-corruption surges were launched after the 18th and 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China respectively, and high-level officials of the People’s Liberation Army were implicated.

Fill the void of suspense

This large-scale processing also left some suspense.

The Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee expelled three generals, Li Shangfu, Li Yuchao and Sun Jinming, from the party. The first two, Central Committee member Sun Jinming, were appointed as alternate members. In addition, former Foreign Minister Qin Gang resigned from the Central Committee, leaving three Central Committee members vacant. Ding Xiangqun, Yu Lijun, and Yu Jihong, alternate members of the Central Committee, are alternate members of the Central Committee.

It is worth noting that according to the ranking order of alternate members, Ding Xiangqun, Ding Xingnong, Yu Lijun, and Yu Jihong, the second-ranked Ding Xingnong was skipped. Since Lieutenant General Ding Xingnong is the deputy political commissar of the Rocket Army, his skipping caused widespread speculation that he was involved in the Rocket Army corruption case.

According to the CCP Constitution, vacancies on the Central Committee will be filled by alternate members. The Fourth Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee is expected to replace at least 12 members of the Central Committee, and may also add vice-chairmen and members of the Military Commission. After that, a large number of lower-level dismissed general positions will enter the process.

The outside world is paying attention to whether current members of the Central Military Commission Liu Zhenli or Zhang Shengmin will be promoted to vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and whether Defense Minister Dong Jun will join the Central Military Commission. How to supplement generals in these key positions and reconstruct the military leadership system will become an important aspect of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and even the reshuffle of the PLA’s power structure in the future.

Due to a large number of vacancies in high-level officers, especially those at the general level, the army, navy and rocket force have all lost their main generals. Only the air force is currently relatively less involved. In order to fill these vacancies, many air force generals were transferred to various theaters to hold important positions, and were even transferred across the services to serve as political commissars.

For example, Air Force Lieutenant General Yang Zhibin was transferred to the acting commander of the Eastern Theater Command in 2025 to fill the vacancy left after Lin Xiangyang was fired. He rarely served as the top military officer of the Eastern Theater Command, China’s most powerful military force, with the rank of lieutenant general.

For another example, Han Shengyan, deputy commander of the Central Theater Command and commander of the Air Force of the Central Theater Command, served as the commander-in-chief of the military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Anti-Japanese War on September 3. This selection changed the military parade convention – the commander-in-chief should have been the military chief of the military unit to which the parade site belongs, namely Commander of the Central Theater Command Wang Qiang.

What specific evidence suggests the resignations are linked to systemic issues within the PLA, beyond individual failings?

CPC Central Commitee’s Fourth Plenary Session: Unpacking the Simultaneous Resignation of Nine PLA Generals

The Unprecedented Resignations: A Timeline & Overview

On October 22nd, 2025, news broke of the simultaneous resignation of nine People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generals following the conclusion of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). This event, unprecedented in recent Chinese political history, has sent ripples through international observers and sparked intense speculation regarding its causes and implications. The resignations encompass a range of PLA branches, including the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, suggesting a systemic rather then isolated issue. Key figures reportedly involved include Lieutenant General Wang Haijiang (former Deputy Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force),and several other high-ranking officers with important responsibilities in military logistics and technology.

Key Areas of Focus During the Fourth Plenary Session

The Fourth Plenary session, held from October 18th-21st, 2025, officially centered on strengthening national security and modernizing the military. Though, reports indicate a significant portion of the discussions revolved around:

* Corruption within the PLA: Allegations of widespread corruption, particularly in procurement and logistics, were a central theme. This builds on previous anti-corruption campaigns targeting the military, initiated under xi Jinping.

* Technological Advancement & Self-Reliance: The session emphasized the need for accelerated technological innovation within the PLA, reducing reliance on foreign technology, especially in critical areas like semiconductors and advanced weaponry. The “Made in China 2025” initiative was heavily referenced.

* Combat Readiness & Joint Operations: Improving the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations and maintain a high level of combat readiness was another key focus. Recent military exercises in the South China Sea and around Taiwan were cited as examples of ongoing efforts.

* Ideological Purity & Loyalty: Reinforcing ideological alignment with the CPC and ensuring unwavering loyalty to Xi Jinping were consistently stressed throughout the session.

potential Causes Behind the Mass Resignations

Several interconnected factors likely contributed to this extraordinary event. Analyzing these requires understanding the complex dynamics within the PLA and the broader chinese political landscape.

* Anti-Corruption Drive Intensification: The resignations are widely believed to be linked to an intensified anti-corruption campaign. The scale of the resignations suggests a deeper investigation than previously seen, possibly uncovering systemic issues. This aligns with Xi Jinping’s ongoing efforts to consolidate power and eliminate perceived disloyalty within the military.

* Performance Concerns & Military Modernization: The PLA’s performance in recent simulations and assessments may have fallen short of expectations, particularly regarding technological capabilities. The resignations could be a result of accountability measures related to these shortcomings. the pressure to achieve rapid military modernization is immense.

* Internal Power Struggles & Factionalism: While difficult to confirm,the possibility of internal power struggles within the PLA cannot be discounted. The simultaneous nature of the resignations suggests a coordinated action, potentially linked to a shift in power dynamics.

* Concerns over Rocket Force Leadership: Reports suggest particular scrutiny was focused on the PLA Rocket force, responsible for China’s strategic missile capabilities. The removal of key figures within this branch raises concerns about potential issues related to command and control, or even allegations of misconduct.

Implications for China’s Military & Foreign Policy

The resignations have significant implications for China’s military capabilities and its foreign policy posture.

* Potential Disruption to PLA Operations: The sudden departure of nine generals could temporarily disrupt PLA operations and decision-making processes. Filling these positions with qualified replacements will take time.

* Impact on Military Modernization: The focus on accountability and potential restructuring could slow down the pace of military modernization, at least in the short term.

* Increased Scrutiny from International Observers: The event will undoubtedly attract increased scrutiny from international observers,particularly regarding China’s military intentions and its commitment to transparency.

* Reinforced xi Jinping’s Control: despite potential short-term disruptions, the resignations ultimately reinforce Xi Jinping’s control over the PLA and demonstrate his willingness to take decisive action against perceived threats to his authority.

* South China Sea & Taiwan Strait: The situation could lead to increased tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, as China seeks to project strength and resolve amidst internal upheaval.

Ancient Precedents & Comparative Analysis

While the scale of these resignations is unprecedented in recent