2023-06-08 21:58:10
blue News talks to military analyst Niklas Masuhr about the Ukrainian counter-offensive, Russian reconnaissance, the tying up of military forces and the erratic ways of Yevgeny Prigozhin.
No time? blue News summarizes for you
- Security researcher Niklas Masuhr from ETH Zurich believes that the Ukrainian counter-offensive has already begun.
- But one shouldn’t expect a “start signal” after which tanks will roll out on all fronts. Rather, sectors would be tested and attacked more intensively if weaknesses were revealed.
- Russian reconnaissance prevents large units from concentrating unnoticed.
- According to Masuhr, Kiev must weigh up which forces it will use for an offensive because these may no longer be available as the war progresses.
- Criticism of the Russian military leadership is currently only accepted from the nationalist corner.
To person
ETH ZH
Niklas Masuhr is a military analyst and security researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich.
Mr. Masuhr, the Ukrainian counter-offensive is already underway, isn’t it?
I think it’s already happening – the question is where to draw the line. I believe that the operations that have been witnessed in recent weeks, such as strikes against Russian infrastructure and logistics, can add up to some extent. That’s what they call it in English shaping operations, these were therefore already preparatory measures.
But?
The discussion sometimes seems artificial to me: where does a counter-offensive begin? The idea that there will be a go-ahead and then tanks will roll out on all sectors of the front is effectively unrealistic. It’s about increasing the pressure at different points and that has to be coordinated. When the offensive rolls, there will be sectors that will be used more than others, also depending on where success is most likely to be achieved.
Can you deploy troops unnoticed these days if you want to launch an offensive?
No, actually not. So far, with the exception of the first phase of the war, we have seen that at the tactical level fighting is mostly done with fairly small formations. Maybe that’s changing now. But due to the saturation of sensors, it becomes difficult to concentrate troops, which are especially needed for offensive actions. It is known that the Ukrainians are getting Western reconnaissance results and data. But the Russians also have reconnaissance drones and planes in particular.
That means?
This means that operational surprise is less likely to result from moving large units of troops unnoticed, but from hitting certain sectors more strongly than others and then quickly moving troops to exploit weaknesses.
Would Ukrainian troops have had cover on the right western side?
In principle, one can assume that the quality of Russian reconnaissance in particular decreases the further one moves away from the front. It was seen during the war that Russia was always bad at hitting mobile targets accurately at long ranges. But in Cherson near the front, the reconnaissance data will still have been good, which is also reflected in the fact that Russian troops have meanwhile used loitering ammunition against Ukrainian artillery positions more effectively.
Do you think Kiev planned to advance across the Dnieper to support an offensive in Zaporizhia?
I’m rather skeptical that Ukraine would have launched an amphibious assault across the Dnieper with significant troops. That would probably be associated with quite high risks. The Russians had six months to dig in. They have artillery in position. There are two Russian defensive lines on the east bank. But the prospect has forced Russian troops to remain in position there.
So forces are bound?
It is analogous to the debates that have taken place about Russian advances from Belarus. Such advances were considered politically unlikely. But Ukraine probably needs at least minimal security at the border. On the Russian side, there is also a virtual attrition of troops being tied up in the Kherson Oblast – even if there is more or less consensus among analysts that a mechanized advance by Ukraine across the Dnieper would have been rather unlikely. What you have seen there so far were mainly commando and reconnaissance actions.
An attack on the flanks was also expected in Bachmut, but not much happened: is that a delaying tactic?
So far it has seemed that Ukraine is primarily attacking the lines in Zaporizhia, but that doesn’t mean that more will not happen in Luhansk and Donetsk in the coming days and weeks. My impression is that the hoped-for encirclement of Russian troops in Bakhmut was more the hope of Ukrainian supporters to explain their adherence to the city’s defenses, which has been the subject of controversy. Which doesn’t necessarily mean that flanking attacks might not be a valid option there.
Is the pressure of expectations of the counter-offensive in Ukraine damaging?
I would like to answer the question like this: Several parameters need to be reconciled here. One is the expectations in the West and in our own country. The other is the military reality. It is quite possible that Ukraine will face a dilemma in the course of the offensive. The consideration will then be how risky it can act in certain sectors. Each offensive action costs life, material and ammunition. This is then missing in the next attack. The strategic question behind this is how strongly Ukraine is now relying on this counter-offensive, and what is holding it back for the further course of the war? Pressure to succeed and political factors play a role, but I can’t judge from the outside what that is.
The Russian army already claims to have destroyed several Leopard tanks: does this propaganda reflect a fear of western weapons?
I don’t know if that’s fear. The Russian military has of course heard the debate in the West. And also that the invulnerability of systems like the Leopard has sometimes been exaggerated, especially in German-speaking countries. A Leopard 2A4 can be destroyed. We saw that in Syria. Western weapon systems in Ukraine will be destroyed. If the Russian side can demonstrate that these systems are not doing what they promise, that would be to their advantage. However, how these systems will play out at the end of the day, we don’t know.
Prigozhin prophesied Russia Losses When Offensive Begins: Is Wagner Boss Just Concerned?
Admittedly, I cannot fully understand Yevgeny Prigozhin’s political game. There is a genre of Russian military bloggers and commentators à la Igor Girkinwho complain about the conduct of the war from a nationalist point of view. Not because the war is happening, but because of the perceived incompetence of the Department of Defense and the Army. My impression is that criticism is most likely to come from this area.
Does that also apply to Prigozhin?
Prigozhin made similar statements early in the war, even before Wagner played a prominent role. Which of course comes into play: during the battle for Bakhmut it was seen that there was a rivalry between Prigozhin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the supreme commander Valeri Gerasimov. The military situation partly overlaps with political communication.
Will Wagner still play a role in the war in Ukraine?
I’m not sure if the announced deduction takes substance. There are essentially two types of Wagner troops: There are prisoner battalions. We have known for several months that the Russian Ministry of Defense is also trying to set up such units. This may also be done to further limit Prigozhin’s ecological niche. On the other hand, there are the experienced and relatively well-equipped cadres that were also deployed in the Battle of Bakhmut. It is this category that is also used abroad. Certainly elements of the Wagner group will still play roles. But to what extent remains to be seen. It depends on military but also political factors.
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