The European Union’s leaders have reached a rare moment of clarity—unanimity on Ukraine, but deep divisions over China—that reshapes Brussels’ global strategy at a time when both superpowers are testing the bloc’s resolve. After years of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán blocking EU solidarity on Kyiv, the 27 member states this week approved a 12-month extension of sanctions against Russia, the longest yet, while China’s economic dominance forces a reckoning over whether Europe can afford to remain dependent on its largest trading partner.
For the first time since Russia’s full-scale invasion, the EU is presenting a united front on Ukraine—but the cracks over China expose how far the bloc still is from a cohesive foreign policy. The contrast could not be starker: while Brussels stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Kyiv, its internal debates over how to counter China’s industrial and technological ambitions reveal a continent still grappling with its own vulnerabilities.
Why Ukraine’s unity marks a turning point—and what it means for Putin
Ursula von der Leyen’s declaration that “the tide is turning in favor of Ukraine” was not just rhetoric. Behind the scenes, EU diplomats point to recent battlefield gains in eastern Ukraine, where Ukrainian forces have pushed back Russian lines in key sectors, and Moscow’s desperate attempts to restrict information flow—most notably its ban on Telegram, a platform widely used by Ukrainian troops and civilians. “Putin is building a wall of steel against his own people,” von der Leyen said, framing the crackdown as a sign of Moscow’s weakening position.
Yet the unity is fragile. While all 27 members backed the sanctions extension, Hungary’s new prime minister, Péter Szijjártó—replacing Orbán—has signaled caution. “We support Ukraine, but we must also think about the long-term consequences of prolonged conflict,” Szijjártó told reporters, a stance that mirrors Orbán’s past objections but with less overt defiance. Meanwhile, Baltic leaders like Lithuania’s Gitanas Nausėda warn that any future negotiations with Russia must be led by Ukraine, not Brussels. “Europe cannot repeat the mistakes of 2014,” Nausėda said, referencing the failed Minsk agreements, which he called “a trap set by Putin.”
Expert take: “The EU’s shift on Ukraine is real, but it’s also tactical,” says Alexander Rahr, senior associate fellow at Chatham House. “The sanctions extension is a message to Kyiv that Europe is committed, but the real test will be whether member states can agree on what a ‘just peace’ looks like—and whether they’re willing to pay the economic price to enforce it.”
China’s economic leverage: How deep is Europe’s dependence?
The EU’s divisions over China are not just ideological—they’re economic. The bloc imports 41% of its critical minerals from China, including rare earths essential for electric vehicles and semiconductors. Germany, once the most vocal advocate for engagement with Beijing, now warns of “massive inequalities” in trade, while France’s Emmanuel Macron has pushed for a “Made in Europe” industrial strategy to counter Chinese dominance in tech and green energy.
Spain’s Pedro Sánchez struck a more conciliatory tone, arguing that Europe “needs friends” and must maintain “balanced” relations with China. But his government’s recent joint letter with allies calling for firmer EU stance on China’s subsidies and state-led industrial policies undercuts that narrative. “We can’t afford to be naive,” said Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten, whose country has become a vocal critic of China’s economic coercion. “Our companies are losing ground to Chinese rivals because we’ve been too slow to act.”
Yet the economic reality is stark: cutting ties with China would hurt Europe’s export-driven economies. A Bruegel Institute study estimates that a 30% reduction in Chinese imports would cost the EU €1.2 trillion in lost trade over five years. “The question isn’t whether we can decouple from China—it’s whether we can decouple without China,” says Andreas Umland, a Ukraine-China expert at the Mercator Institute. “And the answer is no—not yet.”
The Ukraine-China paradox: Why Brussels can’t pick a side
The EU’s dual challenge—supporting Ukraine while managing China—exposes a structural weakness: Brussels lacks a unified strategy for great-power competition. On Ukraine, the bloc has finally aligned, but only after Orbán’s departure and Zelensky’s high-profile lobbying. On China, the divisions run deeper, with member states split between those pushing for tariffs and subsidies (France, Netherlands) and those advocating engagement (Spain, Italy).
Historically, the EU has struggled with this dilemma. In 2019, Brussels imposed anti-subsidy duties on Chinese electric vehicles, but the measures were watered down after lobbying from German automakers. Today, the stakes are higher: China’s subsidies for EVs and solar panels are undercutting European firms, yet the EU’s Green Deal Industrial Plan lacks the funding to compete.
“The EU’s problem isn’t just China—it’s America,” says Umland. “Washington is distracted by its own election cycle, and Brussels is left holding the bag. The question is: Can Europe build its own industrial base, or will it remain dependent on both Beijing and Washington?”
What happens next: Three scenarios for Europe’s next move
1. The Ukraine-first approach: The EU doubles down on military and economic support for Kyiv, while delaying tougher measures on China until after the 2027 European Parliament elections. This would keep the bloc united on Ukraine but risk alienating Beijing further.
2. The pragmatic middle path: Brussels adopts targeted sanctions on Chinese tech and industrial sectors (e.g., semiconductors, EVs) while maintaining trade ties in critical minerals. This would require Germany and France to compromise—a gamble given their economic interests.
3. The decoupling gamble: The EU accelerates its Critical Raw Materials Act and fast-tracks subsidies for green tech, but at the cost of higher energy prices and slower growth. “This would be politically explosive,” warns Rahr, “but it might be the only way to break China’s grip.”
One thing is clear: the EU’s moment of unity on Ukraine won’t last if member states can’t agree on how to handle China. “The real test isn’t whether Europe can stand with Ukraine,” says Jetten. “It’s whether Europe can stand up to China—and that’s a fight we’re not ready for yet.”
The bottom line: Why this moment matters for global power
The EU’s schizophrenia over China and Ukraine reflects a broader truth: the world’s democracies are still figuring out how to compete with authoritarian powers without tearing themselves apart. For now, Brussels has chosen two paths—one clear (Ukraine), one muddled (China). The question is whether the bloc’s newfound unity on Kyiv can translate into a strategy for the longer game. Because if Europe can’t decide whether to embrace or resist China, it risks losing ground to both Moscow and Beijing.
What’s your take? Will the EU’s unity on Ukraine last—or will China’s economic pull drag the bloc back into division? Drop your thoughts in the comments.
