Lebanon is systematically advancing financial measures against Hezbollah-linked entities that satisfy international regulators.
Financial Restrictions and Institutional Survival
The Lebanese Central Bank issued Circular 170 on July 14, barring regulated financial institutions from dealing with Al-Qard al-Hassan (AQAH) and related sanctioned, unlicensed entities. However, the measure stops short of closing AQAH or seizing its assets. AQAH’s liquidity challenges predated these restrictions, with the institution freezing compensation checks on June 23 after having already disbursed nearly $500 million.
AQAH retained branches that survived Israeli strikes. According to a U.S. Treasury assessment from February 2026, Hezbollah continued using the institution, and AQAH officials established Jood SARL to convert gold into cash and ease liquidity pressures. While Lebanon’s Interior Ministry withheld AQAH’s annual 2026 certificate of good legal standing pending investigations, its underlying association registration remains intact. An-Nahar reported that revoking that registration requires a Cabinet decision, but Justice Minister Adel Nassar stated on June 18 that the government had not placed the AQAH file on the Cabinet agenda.
Judicial efforts have similarly stalled. Nassar referred AQAH and Jood to the public prosecutor in June for investigation, yet An-Nahar reported that the case remained dormant by July 21. Prosecutors were waiting for the Central Bank to provide documents establishing financial violations but had not requested them independently.
Parallel Networks and Revenue Streams
Iran remains Hezbollah’s primary external financial backer. Secretary-General Naim Qassem has acknowledged Iranian funding for postwar relief and reconstruction. The U.S. Treasury reported in November 2025 that Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps-Quds Force transferred more than $1 billion to Hezbollah since the beginning of that year, primarily through money exchange companies. Iran and Hezbollah have also utilized gold shipments to transfer funds.
Besides money from the Iraqi state, Shiite religious authorities and shrines, Iran-backed Shiite militias, and Iraqi citizens, Qassem also noted that smaller donations form part of their financial network. The Houthis raised funds directly for Hezbollah in 2019 and subsequently for its Lebanese support base, while Hezbollah has also employed cryptocurrency.
Domestically, Hezbollah generates revenue through commercial networks concealed behind nominal owners. According to the Treasury, a commercial network operated by financier Alaa Hamieh diverted more than $100 million to Hezbollah since 2020, while Hamieh used his state investment post to steer millions toward Hezbollah-linked projects.
Hezbollah entities manage and move these funds through structured channels. Its Central Finance Unit oversees income and expenditure, Bayt al-Mal acts as its treasury, and AQAH provides banking services while holding cash and gold. AQAH officials have used personal shadow accounts to disguise transactions, moving more than $500 million through Lebanese banks. WaTaawanou, a crowdfunding charity, directs donations to Hezbollah-run hospitals and businesses. These funds support personnel, weapons procurement, social programs, housing, and post-war reconstruction.
Lebanon’s Intermediate Circular 761, issued by the Central Bank on May 4, 2026, and effective June 30, requires regulated nonbank financial institutions—including exchange houses, finance companies, specialized lenders, and electronic-payment providers—to identify customers, report cash transactions of $1,000 or more, and flag structured transactions designed to evade thresholds. These rules can still be circumvented through unlicensed hawala networks, where senders pay foreign brokers and local partners disburse funds in Lebanon without utilizing regulated institutions.
Compliance Pressures and Unresolved Standoffs
The restrictions have altered Hezbollah’s operational methods rather than restricting its access to capital. Following tightened controls at Beirut’s airport, Iran shifted toward couriers transporting smaller amounts of cash or jewelry while moving hundreds of millions of dollars through Dubai. In October 2025, after the Lebanese transfer firm Whish Money shut down WaTaawanou’s donation account, the charity instructed contributors to use AQAH alongside other money-transfer agencies. Hezbollah also planned a new AQAH branch in Tyre without signage, and financiers have transferred companies to relatives or associates under sanctions pressure.
Substantive financial pressure would require fulfilling obligations under Lebanon’s Financial Action Task Force (FATF) action plan. This entails conducting terrorist-financing investigations, identifying true beneficial owners, seizing illicit cross-border currency and precious metals, and enforcing targeted financial sanctions. Effective enforcement would require closing AQAH, prosecuting individuals who move money through personal accounts, shutting replacement companies, seizing cash and gold, revoking licenses of compliant financial firms, and cutting Hezbollah-linked businesses off from state contracts and institutions.
Lebanese leaders maintain that a direct assault on Hezbollah’s finances would threaten the resources sustaining the organization and risk renewed internal conflict. With the government unlikely to invite a direct confrontation amid an ongoing standoff over Hezbollah’s disarmament, the state continues to navigate regulatory compliance while preserving the domestic status quo.
