“The main conclusion that emerges from all the data is that the General Traffic Regulation was violated seven times, resulting in the tragic accident,” the ND MPs point out in their conclusion that they submitted today to the investigative committee.
“As confirmed by all the witnesses who testified before the Commission, if the rules of the General Traffic Regulation had been strictly followed the accident would not have happened.
In the conclusion it is expressly emphasized that there was not the slightest attempt to cover up, while the operational interventions in the area of the fatal collision were made by decision of the competent operational collective bodies based on the need to move the damaged trains.
On the matter, a Justice investigation is being conducted at the same time into the interventions of the agencies”, says the parliamentary majority.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
1. The General Traffic Regulation was violated 7 times, resulting in the tragic accident in Tempe:
i. the Larissa station master did NOT use the fully functional remote control panel to do automatic route planning, but put the fatal train upside down on the descent line
ii. the Larissa station master was NOT monitoring the remote control panel, where the wrong track change was constantly clear
iii. the Larissa station master did NOT inform the driver by handing him the 1001 form, which is required in any case of an anomaly or danger on the line
iv. the drivers of the fatal IC62 train entered a descent line WITHOUT a 1001 form
v. the train drivers did NOT stop the train as they should have
vi. the train drivers did NOT contact the Larisa station master to clarify that the train has entered the descent line upside down
vii. the train drivers did NOT make an announcement regarding the position of the train as it passed through the intermediate stations
As confirmed by all the witnesses who testified before the Commission, if the rules of the General Traffic Regulations (GKK) had been strictly observed by all parties involved, the accident would not have occurred. In fact, even one of these GKK violations, if it had not happened, could have prevented the accident.
It should be noted that the GKK of the OSE, which if followed faithfully guarantees safe traffic on the railway network, is legally binding and was characterized by experts who testified to the Commission as “the KOK of the railway”, “the 10 Commandments of Moses”, even ” Gospel” for the railway.
2. Automated traffic management systems – currently used on a small part of the European network – improve safety but do not eliminate risk.
These systems (signaling, remote control, ETCS, GSMR) contribute to the safer operation of the railway network. Of course, they do not eliminate the risk, after all, their operators are human. All together, combined, as provided by ERTMS, i.e. the European train traffic management system, approach a very high degree of safety and accident prevention, as long as the General Traffic Regulation is faithfully followed.
The implementation of ERTMS will be mandatory in European countries from 2030. A small percentage of railway systems in EU countries currently implement ERTMS in its entirety. It is characteristic that ETCS, the most effective system, which provides the possibility of automatic train stopping, is in operation on only 14% of European railways.
Therefore, based on the current European and national legislative framework, the operation of the railway without the aforementioned systems is considered permissible and safe, as long as the GKK is observed, as testified by almost all the witnesses examined.
From 1985 to 2001, systems were installed that were never fully operational, their decommissioning was provided for by Convention 717 in 2014, while other systems were provided for by conventions of 2006 and 2007, the completion of which was delayed.
4. The split of OSE in 1996 with the creation of its subsidiary companies ERGOSE, TRAINOSE and GAIAOSE, added to the problematic execution of railway projects.
The problem was exacerbated with the “sale” of TRAINOSE in 2017, with terms unfavorable to the Greek State, to the state-owned Italian railway and then with the sale in 2018 of ESSTY to the now private TRAINOSE, with equally unfavorable terms.
5. The implementation of the contracts for the automated systems was significantly accelerated during the Karamanlis Ministry, while especially the 717 project would have been delayed much more, if an extension had not been granted but had been dissolved and re-announced.
Contract 717/2014, for the signaling and remote control systems, while it should have been completed by 2016, had only been implemented in 18%. An extension was granted with recognition of the sole fault of ERGOSE for the delays and then, until 2019, another 5 extensions were granted with the joint responsibility of the Greek State.
After July 2019, a significant effort was made to resolve the timing issues, resulting in the completion of the 717 in September 2023, despite problems due to the COVID pandemic, the global crisis and supply chain delays.
Regarding the granting of the 7th extension of Contract 717, after the acceptance of a relevant objection by the then Minister of Infrastructure and Transport K. Karamanlis, it is considered absolutely certain by the Commission that if this extension had not been granted and the contract had been dissolved, its work of contract 717 would still not have been completed to date.
The remaining timing contracts for the automated systems – which were pending under several Governments – have progressed decisively over the last 4 years with the result that today they have all been largely completed. In particular, GSMR was finally delivered in 2021 and ETCS in December 2023. GSMR and ETCS on the trains are pending, where actions by Hellenic Train, GAIAOSE and RAS are required.
All the decisions of the political leadership were taken in compliance with the prescribed procedures with recommendations of the competent services and with the public interest as a criterion.
6. Rail transport security control mechanisms must be strengthened. RAS is the pillar of safety under both EU and national legislation in railway safety issues. If it had found very serious gaps or deficiencies, it could even suspend the operation of the railway.
Moreover, Hellenic Train, since it was not just claiming higher compensations but had actually found serious safety issues due to the state of the infrastructure and non-integration of the systems, should have proceeded with an immediate suspension of services.
In relation to the National Safety Rules, the Commission found that the country has rules in force in the field of safety, with the most important being the General Traffic Regulation, i.e. the regulation that was violated on the night of the fatal accident.
Regarding the National Safety Rules the Commission found that the country has rules in force in the field of safety, with the most important being the General Traffic Regulation, i.e. the regulation that was violated on the night of the fatal accident.
7. The OSE must be strengthened, both financially and with human resources.
OSE has been for many years one of the biggest “patients” of the Greek State. And the memo policies from 2010 onwards weakened him, since he lost more than half of his employees. The measures taken from 2019 onwards to increase funding and employees must be continued with greater intensity.
8. The causes of the accident must be investigated calmly, away from political exploitation, in order to render justice, as Greek society wishes.
The responsibilities of all those directly involved in the tragic accident, as well as the persons who held responsible positions in the relevant organizations and companies, are already being examined by ordinary justice. The Commission’s analysis did not reveal any acts or omissions of political figures linked to the accident. The political responsibility was objectively assumed by the then Minister K. Karamanlis with his immediate resignation on the day of the tragic accident, an act that, among other things, facilitated the control of the case.
9. There was no attempt to cover up with interventions in the area of the fatal collision.
The operational interventions in the area were made by decision of the competent operational collective bodies based on the need to move the damaged trains with heavy-duty machinery, which had to operate on safe and stable ground. However, a judicial investigation is also underway into the interventions of the competent bodies.
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