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Israel’s War Capacity: How Many Conflicts at Once?

Israel’s Perpetual War: Is ‘Mowing the Grass’ Now a Regional Strategy?

Over 56,000 lives lost in Gaza, escalating conflicts in Lebanon and Yemen, and ongoing skirmishes in Syria – while Israel simultaneously calibrates its response to Iran. The notion of a “transformed Middle East,” touted by Prime Minister Netanyahu and even lauded by former President Trump, feels increasingly distant. Instead, a chilling reality is taking shape: Israel appears to be embracing a strategy of perpetual, multi-front conflict, a regional extension of the long-held doctrine of “mowing the grass.”

The Evolution of ‘Mowing the Grass’

The term “mowing the grass” originated in Israeli defense circles after the 2014 Gaza war, describing a strategy of periodic military action to degrade the capabilities of Hamas without attempting full-scale occupation or eradication. It was a pragmatic acceptance of a long-term stalemate. However, the devastating Hamas attacks of October 7th, 2023, initially prompted a shift towards a more ambitious goal of dismantling the group entirely. Now, it seems Israel is reverting to type, but on a dramatically expanded scale. This isn’t just about Gaza anymore; it’s about containing Iran and its network of proxies across the Levant and beyond.

A New Level of Risk Tolerance

According to Marav Zonszein, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, there’s been a fundamental shift in Israel’s calculus. “We don’t trust the intentions of our adversaries, only our own capabilities,” she explains. This translates to a willingness to use force more readily, even if it means sustained, low-intensity conflicts in multiple theaters. The recent strikes against Iran, and the subsequent escalation in Lebanon and Yemen, are prime examples. While these actions carry inherent risks, Israeli leaders appear to believe the benefits – deterring Iran, maintaining regional dominance – outweigh them.

The Costs of Perpetual Conflict

But is this sustainable? A country of just 10 million people can’t indefinitely act as a regional hegemon. The economic strain is already significant. The 12-day conflict with Iran alone may cost around $6 billion, representing 1% of Israel’s GDP. Defense spending already consumes nearly 9% of the nation’s GDP, a figure that continues to climb. While the economy has proven surprisingly resilient, burning through munitions at the current rate is unsustainable long-term. Furthermore, the constant mobilization of reservists is impacting the economy and exacerbating existing social tensions, particularly regarding military service exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Israelis.

Gaza: A Diverging Conflict

Interestingly, the public and political response to Israel’s various conflicts differs markedly. While strikes on Iran garnered widespread support, even from opposition parties, the war in Gaza is increasingly unpopular. Israelis are fatigued by the conflict, prioritize the return of hostages, and suspect Netanyahu is prolonging the fighting for political gain. The devastating humanitarian toll in Gaza has also led to international isolation and strained relations with key allies. This divergence highlights a critical point: Israel’s regional conflicts, conducted largely from the air or through limited ground incursions, are far less costly in terms of manpower and domestic political capital than the grinding war in Gaza.

The US Role and the Trump Factor

Israel’s ability to pursue this multi-front strategy is heavily reliant on continued US support, both in terms of military aid and political backing. While the Trump administration has been largely supportive, even belatedly embracing the strikes on Iran, Trump’s relationship with Netanyahu has been complex and unpredictable. His recent outburst questioning the competence of both Israeli and Iranian leaders underscores the potential for shifting US policy. A change in administration could dramatically alter the strategic landscape.

Will ‘Mowing the Grass’ Actually Work?

The fundamental question remains: can “mowing the grass” – even on a regional scale – achieve lasting security? Critics argue that it merely postpones the inevitable, creating a cycle of violence without addressing the underlying causes of conflict. As Crisis Group’s Zonszein points out, “The risks are that you just are in an endless series of military strikes and you don’t actually achieve your goal.” The recent attacks by the Houthis in the Red Sea, including the sinking of cargo ships, demonstrate that even targeted strikes don’t necessarily deter determined adversaries. Moreover, the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities may have inadvertently accelerated its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

Normalization on Hold?

Netanyahu’s broader regional ambition – normalizing relations with Arab states – is also threatened by the ongoing conflicts. While Trump is pushing for deals with Syria and Saudi Arabia, the carnage in Gaza has made it politically difficult for Arab governments to engage diplomatically with Israel. Netanyahu appears to believe that projecting strength will ultimately facilitate normalization, but this proposition remains untested.

Ultimately, Israel’s embrace of a perpetual war strategy is a high-stakes gamble. It may buy time and maintain a degree of regional dominance, but it comes at a significant economic, social, and political cost. The long-term consequences – a permanently destabilized Middle East, a spiraling arms race, and a deepening cycle of violence – are deeply concerning. The question isn’t simply whether Israel *can* fight these forever wars, but whether it can afford to, and what kind of future it is building in the process. What are your predictions for the future of regional stability in the Middle East? Share your thoughts in the comments below!


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