Tracks of North Korean drones submitted to the National Assembly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Provided by the National Assembly Defense Committee
On December 26 of last year, when a North Korean drone invaded our airspace and shook Seoul, the capital city, the 1st Army Corps and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which first spotted the drone, properly reported this fact to the Capital Defense Command, which is in charge of air defense operations in Seoul. The fact that it was not spread was found out.
In addition, the issuance of ‘Crane’, an air readiness posture for North Korea, was delayed by an hour and a half.
In the South Korean military, which lacks jointness, it has been pointed out that information sharing between different branches of the military did not work properly, but this time, even among the same army, information sharing did not work properly. Criticism that there is a problem with the situation propagation system of the entire army, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cannot be avoided, and it seems that there will be a theory of responsibility.
According to the facts found in the combat readiness inspection process for the incident currently underway by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at 10:19 am on the day of the incident, the 1st Corps’ local air defense radar caught a strange track in the North Korean region and began tracking it. Even while evaluating the identity of this wake, it headed south, and at 10:25, the operation agent judged it to be an unusual wake and reported it to the corps.
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However, even though this situation occurred and the UAV was operating after crossing the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), the 1st Corps and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not spread it to Subangsa. In the process of reporting it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff after detecting a strange track on its own radar, the submarine found out that the operation was already underway. The Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted this fact, saying, “There was a lack of cooperation and sharing of the situation between the 1st Corps and the Subangsa.”
If an unmanned aerial vehicle invasion occurred in the 1st Corps in charge of Paju, it would be common sense to report it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and inform the police officer in charge of Seoul, but they did not do so.
North Korean drones. yunhap news
In the process, it was also revealed that North Korea’s air power readiness posture, ‘Crane’, had not been issued for about an hour and a half. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, “It is true that the cranes were not immediately issued,” but “However, the South Korean military judged the unknown flight to the south as a North Korean drone even before the crane was issued, and conducted necessary operations such as strengthening anti-aircraft surveillance, emergency deployment of air power, and ground air defense weapons on standby.” measures were being taken,” he said.
The very reason for the existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to conduct efficient operations by centrally commanding various units, but that purpose has not been properly utilized. Even this happened between the same Army’s current operational units, not from different military types.
The final result will not be known until after the military inspection by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the fact that has been revealed so far is expected to intensify the blame for the command, including Chairman Kim Seung-gyeom and the operation headquarters.