On June 12, 2026, Iranian authorities announced the resumption of limited internet access following a 10-day blackout that had severed communication for millions during escalating airstrikes in the Strait of Hormuz. The move came as the U.S. And Israel intensified their military campaign against Iran, now in its fourth month, while Tehran accused Washington of orchestrating a “proxy war” through regional allies. What has been largely overshadowed in Western coverage, however, is the quiet but transformative role of Iran’s protest movements in reshaping the political landscape—both before and despite the current conflict.
In a newly published analysis for Middle East Report and International Affairs (MERIP), sociologist Mohammad Ali Kadivar—a former editor of the publication and longtime observer of Iranian civil society—challenges the prevailing narrative that external intervention is the only path to democratic change in Iran. Kadivar’s argument, based on decades of fieldwork and interviews with activists, contends that successive waves of protests—from the 2009 Green Movement to the 2022-23 Women, Life, Freedom uprising—have already fundamentally altered Iran’s political calculus. “These movements didn’t fail,” Kadivar writes. “They succeeded in ways the regime never anticipated: by normalizing dissent, eroding the legitimacy of state violence, and creating new coalitions across ideological divides.”
The current war, he warns, risks obscuring these gains. While the Trump administration and some diaspora groups have framed military pressure as the sole viable strategy to “liberate” Iranians, Kadivar’s research suggests the opposite: that external intervention could further marginalize domestic opposition forces, particularly those advocating for secular or feminist-led alternatives. “The regime’s repression has unified disparate groups under a shared grievance,” Kadivar told World Today News. “But if the war diverts attention from these movements, we risk losing the progress made in the streets.”
The Protests That Preceded the War
Kadivar’s analysis traces the evolution of Iranian protest culture through three distinct phases, each marked by shifting tactics and state responses. The first, beginning in 2009 with the Green Movement, saw urban middle-class activists demand electoral reform through mass demonstrations and social media organizing. While the regime crushed the uprising through arrests and propaganda, the movement’s legacy persisted in the form of new digital infrastructures—encrypted messaging apps, independent news outlets, and transnational solidarity networks—that later became critical tools for organizers.
The second phase, from 2017 to 2019, shifted toward economic resistance as sanctions and austerity measures sparked nationwide strikes by workers, teachers, and truck drivers. Unlike previous movements, these protests were led by working-class Iranians in industrial hubs like Isfahan and Ahvaz, where state repression was met with unprecedented solidarity across ethnic and religious lines. “The regime’s response was to label these as ‘foreign-backed,’ but the coordination was entirely organic,” said Kadivar. “This was the first time we saw Shi’a and Sunni workers standing together in the same factories.”
The third phase, beginning in September 2022 with the death of Mahsa Amini and the Women, Life, Freedom movement, marked a generational and ideological expansion. For the first time, protests were led by young women in rural areas, where the regime’s cultural police had previously been most active. The movement’s slogan—“Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” (Woman, Life, Freedom)—became a global rallying cry, but its impact was most profound domestically. “The regime’s initial strategy was to isolate these protests as ‘Western-influenced,’ but the chants and demands were entirely homegrown,” Kadivar noted. “By 2023, even conservative clerics were publicly questioning the morality of state violence against women.”
How the War Alters the Calculus
Since April 2026, the U.S.-Israeli campaign—officially framed as a response to Iran’s alleged support for Hezbollah and Houthi attacks—has shifted from kinetic strikes to a low-intensity blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has retaliated with asymmetric tactics, including cyberattacks on Israeli ports and the seizure of commercial vessels under the flag of U.S. Allies. While the immediate economic impact has been severe—global oil prices surged 18% in May—the longer-term consequences for Iran’s internal politics remain unclear.
Kadivar argues that the war has created a dual dynamic: on one hand, it has consolidated the regime’s narrative of external threat, allowing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to portray protests as “sabotage” by foreign powers. It has accelerated the fragmentation of opposition groups, with some factions advocating for armed resistance while others push for negotiated reforms. “The regime’s biggest fear isn’t the protests themselves—it’s the idea that these movements might find a way to coexist without state control,” Kadivar said.
One critical development is the emergence of regional alliances between Iranian activists and groups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Unlike previous movements, which were largely confined to domestic spaces, the current generation of organizers has leveraged cross-border networks to evade censorship and coordinate actions. For example, the Iranian Women’s Rights Association, based in Erbil, has become a hub for digital organizing, distributing uncensored footage of protests and connecting exiled activists with those inside Iran. “This is the first time we’ve seen a truly transnational Iranian civil society,” said Nazanin Shahrokni, a political scientist at Simon Fraser University, who co-authored a recent report on the topic.
The Gender Dimension: A Movement That Outlasted the State
The role of women in Iran’s protest movements has been particularly transformative, as highlighted in an upcoming event series by MERIP in collaboration with the British Society for Middle East Studies (BRISMES). The first installment, titled “Gender and Revolution”, will feature Manijeh Moradian of Barnard College and Shahrokni discussing how women’s political mobilization has evolved since the 1979 revolution.
Moradian’s research shows that women’s participation in protests has reshaped the boundaries of acceptable dissent. During the 2009 Green Movement, women made up nearly 40% of demonstrators, despite facing disproportionate state violence. By 2022, that figure had risen to over 60%, with women leading chants in cities where religious policing was most severe. “The regime’s response has been to double down on gender apartheid—banning women from certain universities, enforcing mandatory hijab in public spaces—but this has only radicalized younger generations,” Moradian said.
Shahrokni’s work focuses on the intersection of economic and gender politics in Iran’s protests. She notes that women’s labor strikes—such as those by textile workers in Mashhad and teachers in Tehran—have become a primary tactic for challenging the regime’s authority. “Women are not just protesting for their rights; they’re striking to keep their families fed,” Shahrokni said. “This is a movement that understands the regime’s vulnerabilities better than any previous one.”
What Comes Next: The Post-War Reckoning
As the war drags on, the question of what follows remains unanswered. Kadivar’s analysis suggests that the most likely scenario is not a sudden regime collapse, but a prolonged period of political stasis, where the state’s capacity for repression is matched by the resilience of civil society. “The regime knows it can’t win a war of attrition, but it also knows it can’t afford to lose the loyalty of its base,” Kadivar said. “The real battle will be over who controls the narrative of the post-war period.”
One potential flashpoint is the future of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has become both a military and ideological bulwark for the regime. While the IRGC’s involvement in the Strait of Hormuz operations has increased its influence, it has also exposed internal divisions. Hardline factions within the IRGC have pushed for a preemptive strike against Israel, while reformist elements argue for de-escalation to avoid economic collapse. “The IRGC is not a monolith,” said a senior Iranian diplomat, speaking anonymously. “But the war has given the hardliners the upper hand for now.”
Meanwhile, the international community’s stance remains divided. The European Union has called for a ceasefire, but its proposals have been rejected by both sides. The U.S. Has maintained its “maximum pressure” strategy, though internal debates within the Biden administration are growing over whether the campaign has achieved its stated goals. “The risk is that the war becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy,” said a State Department official. “If neither side can claim victory, the only winners will be the hardliners on both sides.”
The next critical test will come in September 2026, when Iran’s Assembly of Experts—the body responsible for appointing the Supreme Leader—is scheduled to convene. While Khamenei’s health remains a subject of speculation, the assembly’s composition has shifted in recent years, with younger, more reformist clerics gaining influence. Whether they will use this moment to push for a new political settlement remains uncertain.
For now, the focus remains on the streets. In Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashhad, activists continue to organize despite the war. Their demands—an end to state violence, economic justice, and gender equality—have not waned. What is unclear is whether the international community will recognize these movements as the true drivers of change in Iran, or whether the war will continue to overshadow their voices.
