Approximately 80 commercial aircraft lost GPS signals over Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 9 due to suspected deliberate jamming.
The first suspicion falls on this Russian convoy in the North Sea, although it is difficult to find definitive proof.
Strategic Implications of North Sea Signal Sabotage
- Operational Redundancy: Aviation safety remains intact due to backup systems, though reliance on GPS-based approach procedures is increasingly tested.
- Regulatory Response: The Dutch Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur has launched a formal investigation into the jamming, which affected at least seven inbound flights at Schiphol Airport.
- International Diplomacy: Earlier that year, the Netherlands, along with seven other European nations, submitted a complaint to the United Nations regarding Russian disruptions of European satellite communications.
GPS Failure Patterns Near Schiphol
The disruption began at approximately 18:08 local time, as reported by data analysts at Hexbird. Pilots of commercial airliners, including a KLM Boeing 737, an Air France jet, and a Lufthansa flight, reported GPS failure to air traffic control at Schiphol.
According to NRC, the KLM pilot explicitly notified the tower of “GPS L+R FAIL” at 18:19, indicating the loss of both primary navigation systems. A Lufthansa pilot reported “GPS 1 FAULT” two minutes later, followed immediately by “GPS 2 FAULT,” while an Air France pilot informed air traffic control that the signal had been lost for fifteen minutes.
Amateur radio monitor Kees Westerdijk, who tracks signals via FRL Radar, said that the event lasted roughly 20 minutes. “I thought my equipment was broken at first,” Westerdijk told NRC. While the Dutch air traffic control agency confirmed that seven aircraft experienced difficulties during landing, they emphasized that safety was not compromised, as pilots transitioned to alternative navigation protocols.
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Low Power Satellite Signals Allow Easy GPS Jamming
The technical ease of GPS jamming stems from the inherent weakness of satellite signals, which are transmitted at low power levels. Maarten Weyn, professor of wireless communication systems at the University of Antwerp, explained that generating a signal stronger than the satellite transmission effectively forces a receiver to process noise rather than location data.
“It is actually very easy to disrupt the GPS of aircraft,” Weyn said. He added, “We can only guess, but perhaps the convoy also wanted to keep out prying eyes in the form of drones.”
While the current incident targeted aircraft, Weyn warned that the technology is not limited to aviation. “In principle, the GPS in our cars or on our smartphones could also be disrupted,” he said.
The location of the interference, estimated by Hexbird to be 50 to 85 nautical miles north of the island of Texel, aligns with the transit of three Russian cargo vessels and one naval escort. Experts suggest this tactic is part of the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare, intended to sow fear, uncertainty, and confusion in Europe.

Navigation Resilience in Hybrid Conflicts
The aviation industry maintains multiple layers of navigation to mitigate the loss of satellite data. Rudy Pont, a pilot with the Belgian Cockpit Association (BeCA), said that jamming is not a direct danger to the aircraft. Pilots are trained to handle GPS outages and can even navigate manually in extreme emergencies. Luchtvaartdeskundige Melkert said that he is not aware of any aircraft accidents directly linked to jamming.
These alternatives include various backup systems, such as ground-based radio beacons and inertial platforms that calculate position based on speed, direction, and acceleration. Joris Melkert, an aviation expert at TU Delft, said that while jamming is “schering en inslag” (common practice) on the eastern flank of NATO territory, it remains less hazardous than “spoofing,” where false data is fed into the system.
| Event Date | Region Affected | Primary Navigation Impact | Reported Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| July 23 | UK-Netherlands Border | GPS Signal Loss | 18 Minutes |
| November 9 | BE, NL, DE, UK Airspace | GPS L+R Failure | Approx. 20 Minutes |
Future Infrastructure Protections
European authorities are currently developing more resilient satellite navigation architectures to counter these threats. Research groups, including those led by Weyn, are focused on multi-frequency transmissions that are significantly more difficult to block. “Think of satellites that transmit on many more frequencies, which makes it harder to block those signals,” Weyn said. “Those are things that Europe is building now.”
The last comparable disruption occurred on July 23, when similar jamming was recorded near the boundary of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.