Sweden’s ‘Total Defence’ Model: Combatting Hybrid Warfare and Disinformation

Sweden is actively reshaping its national security architecture, holding up a distinct “total defence” model that integrates civil, military, and societal readiness. As hostile states increasingly deploy grey-zone tactics like disinformation, Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency—established in 2022—offers a blueprint for nations like New Zealand grappling with modern hybrid threats.

The Anatomy of Modern Grey-Zone Warfare

Traditional military doctrines are struggling to keep pace with the realities of modern geopolitical competition. Hostile states routinely exploit the space beneath open armed conflict, weaponizing information, cyber operations, and economic pressure to destabilize targeted societies. According to Jan Eldeblad, Sweden’s defence attaché to New Zealand and Australia, the global security environment requires an urgent departure from Second World War mentalities.

“We should not think about as it was during the Second World War ‘cos that isn’t what will happen in future,” Eldeblad explained during a recent Victoria University Centre for Strategic Studies forum, as reported by RNZ. Combating these stealthy tactics demands a complete operational overhaul where speed and societal resilience replace rigid bureaucratic hierarchies.

Here is why that matters for Indo-Pacific democracies: grey-zone operations target social cohesion directly. By spreading targeted disinformation ahead of critical democratic milestones—such as Sweden’s general election—adversaries attempt to erode public trust from the inside out. To counter this, Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency operates under clear directives emphasizing public accountability, utilizing plain-language campaigns like “Don’t be fooled” and “What is your responsibility” across its official communications.

Total Defence and the Need for Institutional Agility

Building resilience against hybrid threats requires more than just high-tech military hardware. Sweden relies on a “total defence” framework that binds civilian agencies, private industry, and military branches into a unified operational ecosystem. But maintaining this readiness demands a radical acceleration of internal decision-making.

Bureaucracy remains one of national security’s greatest vulnerabilities. When military units in Sweden challenged defence headquarters to step back and double the speed of approving structural changes, leadership listened. The resulting administrative pivot took a mere six months to implement, proving that institutional agility is achievable when backed by political and organizational will.

Photo: byteseu.com

Similar debates are playing out across the globe. Defense analysts in Wellington have recently argued that nations like New Zealand move far too slowly when adopting emerging capabilities, such as maritime drones, compared to procuring traditional, high-cost assets like frigates. As former army officer Graeme Doull noted in recent commentary, commercial-speed acquisition models are vital because technology can be purchased, but tactical competence cannot.

Strategic Pillar	Traditional Approach	Sweden’s Total Defence Model
Primary Threat Focus	Open conventional military conflict	Hybrid warfare, grey-zone tactics, and disinformation
Information Security	Ad-hoc public relations responses	Dedicated Psychological Defence Agency within the defence ministry
Procurement & Adaptation	Lengthy bureaucratic acquisition cycles	Compressed six-month approval timelines driven by unit feedback
Societal Involvement	Siloed military and civil agencies	Integrated total defence linking civilian, military, and industry sectors

Translating Lessons from the Ukrainian Frontline

Much of Sweden’s current urgency is directly informed by observations from the war in Ukraine. Having conducted extensive operational work in the region, Eldeblad emphasizes that Ukrainian forces have mastered the art of rapid institutional learning.

“They are learning so fast,” Eldeblad noted, highlighting how survival under intense pressure forces an unprecedented compression of the military-innovation cycle. For Western capitals watching from afar, the core takeaway is clear: national resilience is not a static inventory of weapons, but a dynamic, society-wide capability to adapt under fire.

As governments from Wellington to Stockholm reevaluate their strategic postures, the friction between traditional defense planning and fast-moving hybrid threats will only intensify. The nations best equipped to survive the next decade will not necessarily be those with the largest conventional budgets, but those capable of thinking, deciding, and acting at the speed of modern crisis.

How should mid-sized democracies balance the immense costs of conventional military hardware with the urgent need for grey-zone resilience and societal preparedness? Let us know your perspective in the comments below.