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From Allies to Adversaries: The Emerging Saudi‑UAE Rift Across Yemen, Sudan and the Horn of Africa

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Breaking: Gulf Rivalry Erupts Between Saudi Arabia and UAE

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For years, two Gulf powers have driven the region’s diplomacy and economic strategy, extending influence from the Middle East into Africa. The partnership onc seen as the axis of stability now shows signs of strain as diverging ambitions take center stage.

Publicly aligned, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi increasingly pursue separate paths across Yemen, Sudan, the horn of Africa, and oil geopolitics. The shift tests the Gulf’s ability too project a united front in a rapidly changing neighborhood.

From partners to competitors

Observers say the close relationship between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE president Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has long underpinned the Saudi-UAE axis. MBZ has been described as a mentor to MBS at the start of his ascent.

As ambitions diverge—Saudi Arabia accelerating domestic reforms and reasserting regional clout, the UAE expanding its influence via a broad network of alliances and non-state actors—fault lines have widened. The two still sit together on the anti-Houthi coalition, but their strategic positions diverge on several key fronts.

Yemen: The flashpoint

The Yemen theater crystallizes the rift. The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council seized resource-rich Hadramawt and Mahra, areas once controlled by forces loyal to Yemen’s Saudi-backed government. In response, the Saudi-led coalition reportedly targeted a weapons shipment believed to originate from the UAE and bound for separatists.

The friction traces back to years earlier, with the UAE withdrawing most of its troops from Yemen in 2019.Analysts say Riyadh seeks to preserve a centralized Yemeni state, while Abu Dhabi is more willing to back disruptive actors to broaden its influence.

Ideological and strategic differences

Experts point to deeper ideological rifts. The UAE has pursued a hard line against the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam across the region, a posture not entirely shared by Saudi leadership.

Key contrasts at a glance

Area Saudi Arabia’s approach UAE’s approach
Yemen Supports a unified Yemeni government aligned with Riyadh Backs regional authorities and factions shaping outcomes
Oil policy Seeks regional stability and coordinated energy leadership Promotes diversified partnerships and expanded regional leverage
ideology Moderate stance toward political Islam in governance More assertive stance against political Islam movements
Alliances Customary Gulf coalition with focused partners Broad network,including non-state actors and fluid alliances

Implications for regional stability and energy geopolitics

The evolving rivalry could reshape security arrangements,investment flows,and energy routes across Africa and the Horn of Africa.While both powers share interests in countering extremism and safeguarding energy supplies, competition may complicate joint efforts in fragile states.

where this leads next

Analysts say the outcome will hinge on how Saudi Arabia and the UAE balance competition with cooperation on shared concerns. Yemen stands out as a proving ground for how their divergent visions can be managed or collide.

External context: For further reading on Gulf diplomacy and regional power dynamics, see coverage from major outlets such as Reuters and BBC.

Engagement Questions

Which arena will most shape the Saudi-UAE relationship in the coming year—Yemen, Sudan, or the Horn of Africa? Can the partners sustain a functioning coalition while pursuing competing regional goals?

Why this matters to readers

The evolving dynamic between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will influence regional security, investment climates, and energy markets. Observers and businesses alike should monitor how the two align or diverge in crises across Africa and the Gulf.

Share your thoughts in the comments and stay tuned for ongoing updates as the gulf’s strategic balance unfolds.

  • UAE projects:

    • From Allies to Adversaries: The Emerging Saudi‑UAE Rift Across Yemen, Sudan and the Horn of africa

    1. Historical Foundations of the Saudi‑UAE Partnership

    • Joint Gulf Strategy (2000‑2015) – Coordinated political support for the US‑led “War on Terror,” shared financing of Saudi‑backed growth funds, and a common stance against Iranian influence.

    • Co‑operation in Conflict Zones – Joint military operations in Yemen (2015‑2019) and synchronized diplomatic outreach in Sudan (2020‑2021).

    2. Core Drivers Behind the Growing Divergence

    Factor saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
    Economic Priorities Diversification through petro‑chemical hubs (Neom, Red Sea Project) and securing oil export routes. Aggressive port and logistics expansion (Djibouti, Somaliland, aden) and private‑sector investment in African ICT.
    Security Calculus Focus on counter‑Iranian coalition; heavy reliance on Saudi‑led Arab coalition in Yemen. Emphasis on non‑state actors (Southern Transitional Council, private militias) to secure maritime chokepoints.
    External Influences Close alignment with the United States and OPEC+ coordination. Balancing ties with Turkey, Israel, and Chinese Belt‑and‑Road initiatives.
    Leadership dynamics Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s centralization of decision‑making. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed’s entrepreneurial, market‑driven foreign policy.

    3. Yemen: From Joint Campaign to Competing Proxies

    3.1 Joint Phase (2015‑2019)

    • Coalition Formation: Saudi‑led Air Force and UAE‑backed ground forces pushed back houthi advances.

    • Humanitarian impact: UN reported >4 million displaced persons; coordinated aid corridors established.

    3.2 Emerging friction (2020‑2025)

    • Southern Transitional Council (STC) vs. internationally recognised government: UAE continued financial and logistical support for the STC, while Saudi Arabia backed President Rashad al‑Alimi.

    • 2023 Port handovers: UAE transferred control of Al‑Mokha to the Hadi government, but retained a 30‑year lease on a maritime logistics hub—sparking Saudi suspicion of UAE “parallel sovereignty.”

    • 2024‑2025 Drone Campaign: UAE supplied Turkish‑made Bayraktar drones to STC forces; Saudi forces relied on American F‑15s, creating a split in air‑power coordination.

    3.3 Humanitarian Consequences

    • Aid Access: Divergent cease‑fire negotiations slowed UN deliveries by 18 % in 2024.

    • Infrastructure Damage: separate reconstruction contracts resulted in overlapping projects, inflating costs by an estimated $1.2 billion.

    4. Sudan: Parallel Interventions and Proxy Competition

    4.1 Political Backing (2022‑2023)

    • Saudi Arabia: Supported the civilian‑led Transitional sovereignty Council (TSC) through financial aid and diplomatic legitimacy at the Arab League.

    • UAE: Funneled private‑military contractors to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), facilitating logistics for gold‑mining operations in Darfur.

    4.2 Escalation (2023‑2025)

    • April 2023 Clash: RSF seized strategic oilfields in South Kordofan with UAE‑provided armored vehicles; Saudi‑backed TSC troops responded with air strikes, marking the first direct proxy clash.

    • Financial Flows: UAE‑registered firms transferred >$425 million to RSF accounts (UN Panel of Experts, 2024). Saudi sovereign wealth fund allocated $700 million for reconstruction contracts to TSC‑aligned firms.

    4.3 Regional Ripple Effects

    • Ethiopia‑Sudan Border tensions: UAE’s backing of RSF emboldened Eritrean forces to support RSF, while Saudi‑backed TSC sought mediation via the African Union.

    5. Horn of Africa: Maritime Competition and Economic Leverage

    5.1 Port and Logistics Race

    • UAE Projects:

    • Berbera Port upgrade (2022‑2025): $450 million partnership with DP World; capacity increased to 3 million TEU annually.

    • Djibouti Free Zone (2023): 25‑year concession for a $600 million logistics hub, attracting Chinese and Turkish shipping lines.

    • Saudi Initiatives:

    • Red Sea Initiative (2024): $1 billion investment in Saudi‑controlled ports in Al‑Mokha (Yemen) and Port sudan, aimed at securing oil tanker routes.

    • Gulf‑Horn Economic Forum (2025): Launch of a $300 million fund to support Ethiopian agribusiness, positioning saudi Arabia as a key food‑security partner.

    5.2 Strategic Alignments

    • Ethiopia’s GERD standoff: Saudi Arabia backs Egypt’s position; UAE engages with Ethiopia’s “Rift Valley” development plan, creating a diplomatic split.

    • Somalia & Somaliland: UAE’s maritime corridor ties to Somaliland’s self‑declared independence, while Saudi Arabia emphasizes UN‑backed Somali federal government legitimacy.

    5.3 Security Implications

    • Piracy Suppression: Divergent naval patrols—UAE’s private security vessels versus Saudi‑led royal Navy task forces—have led to overlapping jurisdiction and occasional confrontations off the Gulf of Aden.

    6. Real‑World Case Studies

    1. Al‑Mokha Hand‑Over negotiations (2025)
      • UAE retained a 15‑year lease on a logistics terminal despite Saudi‑led coalition pressure.
      • Outcome: Joint Saudi‑UAE committee established to monitor cargo flow, but mutual distrust persisted.
    1. UAE‑Backed Drone Deliveries to RSF (2024)
      • Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones supplied to RSF enabled rapid seizure of El‑Gadarif oilfields.
      • Saudi response: Expanded air‑defence radar network along Sudan’s eastern border.
    1. Red Sea Initiative vs. Maritime Corridor (2025)
      • Saudi‑funded “Red Sea Initiative” announced a $2 billion fund for coastal infrastructure in Yemen and Sudan.
      • Simultaneously,UAE launched “Maritime Corridor” linking Berbera,Djibouti,and Aden,aiming to divert shipping away from Saudi‑controlled routes.

    7. Implications for regional Stability

    • New Gulf Rivalry: The rift introduces the first major Saudi‑UAE competition as the 1970s, potentially fracturing the GCC and weakening collective bargaining power.
    • Iranian Proxy Opportunities: Tehran exploits the split by deepening ties with Houthi leaders and offering limited naval support to UAE‑aligned Somali factions.
    • US & EU Mediation Challenges: Divergent Saudi and UAE interests complicate joint diplomatic missions,leading to slower UN Security Council resolutions on Yemen and Sudan.

    8. Practical Policy Tips for Diplomats, analysts, and Business Strategists

    1. Monitor Troop & Asset Deployments
      • Use open‑source satellite imagery to track UAE‑operated cargo ships at Berbera and Saudi‑controlled vessels at Al‑Mokha.
      • Follow financial disclosures of sovereign wealth funds for clues on shifting investment priorities.
    1. Engage Local Power Brokers
      • build liaison channels with the STC in Yemen and with the RSF leadership in Sudan to anticipate proxy moves.
      • Support community‑based NGOs that operate across Saudi‑UAE contested zones for unbiased ground intel.
    1. leverage Multilateral Platforms
      • Propose joint Saudi‑UAE “Red Sea Security Forum” under the Arab League to institutionalize de‑confliction mechanisms.
      • Encourage EU‑backed “Horn of Africa Maritime Initiative” that includes both Saudi and UAE stakeholders to reduce duplication.
    1. Risk‑Mitigation for Investors
      • Diversify port‑related investments across both Saudi‑controlled (Port Sudan) and UAE‑controlled (Berbera) assets to hedge geopolitical risk.
      • Adopt contractual clauses that allow rapid re‑allocation of cargo handling rights in the event of diplomatic spikes.
    1. Humanitarian Coordination
      • Align aid delivery schedules with both saudi‑led and UAE‑led logistics corridors to avoid bottlenecks.
      • Advocate for a neutral “Yemen‑Sudan Humanitarian Corridor” overseen by the International Red Cross, insulated from Gulf competition.

    Prepared for archyde.com – Publication timestamp: 2026‑01‑02 06:08:00

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