The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) lapsed on February 5, 2026, without renewal, as the United States and Russia remain at odds over the future of nuclear arms control. The treaty, which limited U.S. And Russian strategic nuclear arsenals, expired after a decade in effect, leaving the two nations without a formal agreement governing their most destructive weapons for the first time in decades.
U.S. President Donald Trump, despite briefly considering a one-year extension proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2025, ultimately rejected the offer. Trump announced on February 5th via social media his intention to pursue a “new, improved and modernized Treaty,” signaling a desire for a more comprehensive agreement.
Speaking before the Conference on Disarmament on February 6th, U.S. Under Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno outlined the administration’s goals, stating the U.S. Would seek to include China in future arms control discussions and attempt to limit all nuclear warheads held by both Russia and the United States. This ambition extends beyond the scope of New START, which focused solely on deployed strategic warheads.
The inclusion of China represents a significant shift in U.S. Strategy. Beijing’s nuclear arsenal has grown rapidly in recent years, increasing from an estimated 250 warheads in 2015 to 600 operational warheads currently, with projections reaching 1,000 by 2030, according to the Department of Defense. China has consistently refused to participate in nuclear arms negotiations, raising questions about its willingness to engage in arms control measures.
The Trump administration previously attempted to bring China into the arms control process during its first term. In 2020, U.S. Negotiator Marshall Billingslea symbolically placed Chinese flags at an empty table during negotiations with Russia in Vienna, a move that Beijing dismissed as “unserious, unprofessional, and unappealing.” That effort, along with a proposal for a one-year freeze on all U.S. And Russian nuclear warheads with a verification regime, failed to yield results. Moscow agreed to the freeze but rejected the verification component, which would have required substantial negotiation and implementation time.
A key sticking point remains the issue of non-deployed nuclear warheads. The Obama administration had proposed negotiations with Russia to address all nuclear warheads – deployed and non-deployed, strategic and nonstrategic – but Moscow rejected this proposal. New START only limited “deployed” warheads, meaning those mounted on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Removing warheads from ICBMs effectively removed them from the treaty’s constraints.
Achieving a new agreement will require navigating complex issues, including the future of U.S. Missile defense programs. In 2025, Trump announced the “Golden Dome” missile defense initiative, aiming for an impenetrable defense system utilizing space-based interceptors. The project is estimated to cost over half a trillion dollars. China and Russia have expressed concerns about the potential impact of such a system, particularly the deployment of weapons in space.
According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Yeaw, speaking on February 17th, “all nuclear weapons states need to be involved” in the arms control process. This suggests a potential broadening of negotiations to include the United Kingdom and France, which collectively maintain approximately 500 nuclear warheads, further complicating the process. Russia has consistently insisted on the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in any arms control agreements.
Although the U.S. Possesses 3,700 nuclear warheads and Russia holds 4,300, the disparity in numbers may present an opportunity for a renewed bilateral agreement. Washington might also seek to revitalize the U.N. Security Council Permanent Five process – involving the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, and France – to establish confidence-building measures, such as expanding existing agreements on pre-notification of strategic ballistic missile launches. Moscow and Beijing currently have a similar agreement in place.
The administration faces the challenge of persuading both China and Russia to engage in meaningful negotiations. Addressing concerns regarding U.S. Missile defense developments, potentially through limits or increased transparency, may be crucial to securing their participation. The U.S. Will also need to consider Russia’s reluctance to discuss nonstrategic nuclear weapons and whether Washington is prepared to discuss long-range conventional strike systems, where the U.S. Holds a significant advantage.