wallet-Linking Scam Expands: OTP Codes Used to Hijack E-Wallets
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Breaking: A new wave of fraud targets users linking bank cards to Apple Pay and Google Pay,exploiting the authentication step to seize assets even when card numbers aren’t disclosed. Banks warn that scammers rely on social-engineering tools to obtain one-time verification codes.
In a security advisory, a major vietnamese bank cautioned customers about sophisticated schemes that push card linking to mobile wallets. Criminals employ SMS, email, calls, social media, QR codes, and fake links to trick users into handing over one-time codes that prove possession of a card.
Criminals often already hold some banking details and only need the holder’s OTP to complete the linking process. If a fraudulent link is established, the attacker’s e-wallet can authorize transactions, allowing unauthorized payments even without leaking full card data.
The bank stresses that it never asks customers to share personal information, card details, or OTP codes through phone calls, texts, emails, social networks, or websites. OTP messages tied to wallet verification clearly indicate their purpose, helping customers spot legitimate prompts.
Experts warn that simply sharing an OTP can cause losses.If the code is entered into a fraudster’s system, the user’s card could be added to the attacker’s wallet and used for fraudulent activity, underscoring the risk of money losses even without full card data.
Thes incidents illustrate a shifting tactic in high-tech theft campaigns. Fraudsters are moving beyond phishing for card numbers and are leveraging trust to obtain one-time verification codes, enabling the linking of cards to rogue wallets.
How to Protect Your Account Now
To safeguard assets, banks advise linking Apple Pay or Google Pay wallets only through the financial institution’s official Smart Banking app or through your own device wallet. Always verify the contents of any OTP notification and enter the code only when you initiated the transaction.
Avoid sharing OTP codes unless explicitly requested to complete a legitimate link or transaction. Regularly review the devices and wallets associated with your card in the bank’s app and remove any unfamiliar connections to minimize unauthorized access.
If you suspect fraud, contact the bank’s helpline immediately or report the incident to authorities to obtain prompt assistance and potentially block the card to prevent further losses.
evergreen takeaway: treat OTPs as high-risk credentials that grant access to your payment instruments.Stay vigilant against social-engineering attempts and maintain tight control over linked devices and wallets.
Key Facts At a Glance
| Threat | Mode of Attack | Impact | Protective Steps |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wallet linking fraud | OTP-based verification to connect cards to e-wallets | Unauthorized wallet access and payments | Link wallets only through official banking apps; monitor device associations |
| Information solicitation | SMS, email, calls, fake links, QR codes | Possible data exposure and OTP capture | Do not share OTP; verify sender independently |
| Credential risk | partial data plus OTP enables fraud without full card details | Financial losses | Regularly audit linked devices; block suspicious activity |
For further guidance, you can review official security resources from authorities such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and other trusted bodies.
CISA Security Resources • FBI Internet Crime • Apple Pay Security • Google Pay Help
Disclaimer: This article provides general safety guidance and does not constitute financial or legal advice.
Have you ever received a verification code that prompted you to link a card to an e-wallet? How did you verify its legitimacy? Share your story and tips with other readers.
Public question for Readers
1) Do you regularly review the devices and wallets linked to your payment cards? 2) What steps do you take first if you suspect OTP-based fraud?
**Factors that Enable OTP Hijacking**
How OTP‑Based Card Linking Works in Apple Pay & Google Pay
- When a user adds a new credit or debit card, the wallet generates a request to the issuing bank.
- The bank validates the request by sending a one‑time password (OTP) via SMS, email, or push notification.
- The OTP must be entered in the wallet app to complete the tokenization process, converting the card number into a secure, device‑specific token.
Primary Attack Vectors for OTP theft
- SMS Phishing (Smishing) – Cybercriminals send bogus messages that appear to come from the bank, prompting the victim to click a link adn disclose the OTP.
- SIM‑Swap Fraud – Attackers convince a carrier to transfer the victimS phone number to a new SIM, intercepting every SMS‑delivered OTP.
- Malicious Mobile Apps – Trojan‑laden apps request permission to read incoming SMS messages, silently harvesting OTPs.
- Man‑in‑the‑Browser (MitB) attacks – Compromised browsers inject fraudulent OTP entry fields on the bank’s web portal.
Recent Real‑World Incidents (2023‑2024)
| Date | Platform | attack Method | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| March 2023 | Apple pay | Smishing campaign targeting U.S. iPhone users | > 2,300 compromised cards, average loss $1,200 per victim (Federal Trade Commission report) |
| August 2023 | Google Pay | SIM‑swap performed on European carriers | 1,150 unauthorized card links, total loss €3.4 M (Europol “Mobile Wallet Threat landscape”) |
| February 2024 | Both | Malicious Android app disguised as a QR‑code scanner | 780 victims in Asia, funds transferred within minutes after OTP capture (Verizon DBIR 2024) |
| November 2024 | Apple Pay | MitB attack on a major U.S. bank’s online portal | 420 compromised tokens, rapid revocation prevented larger losses (Bank of America security advisory) |
Why OTP Hijacking Is Notably Effective
- Speed of Tokenization – Once the OTP is verified, the token is instantly usable for contactless payments, leaving little time for user detection.
- Device‑Level Isolation – Tokens are stored in the Secure Enclave (Apple) or Trusted Execution Habitat (Google),making post‑theft removal difficult without a full device reset.
- Limited Transaction Alerts – Many users rely on push notifications that may be delayed by network issues, allowing the first fraudulent transaction to succeed unnoticed.
Security Gaps in the Current Workflow
- Reliance on SMS OTP – SMS is inherently vulnerable to interception and SIM‑swap attacks.
- Lack of Transaction‑Level Verification – Token use does not always trigger a secondary verification for high‑value purchases.
- Insufficient App‑Sandbox Controls – Android’s permission model can be bypassed by repackaged apps that request SMS read access.
User‑Focused Practical Tips
- Prefer Authenticator Apps Over SMS
- Enable push‑based or time‑based OTP (e.g., Google Authenticator, Authy) for card linking whenever the bank offers it.
- Lock Down SIM Changes
- Request a PIN or password on your carrier account to block unauthorized SIM swaps.
- Audit App Permissions Regularly
- On Android, go to Settings > Privacy > Permission manager and revoke SMS access for non‑essential apps.
- Enable real‑Time Transaction alerts
- Set up push notifications for every Apple Pay or Google Pay transaction; enable email alerts as a backup.
- Use Device‑Level Security
- Activate Face ID/touch ID and a strong alphanumeric passcode; enable “Erase data after 10 failed attempts.”
Steps Financial Institutions & Card Issuers Can Take
- Adopt Multi‑Channel OTP Delivery
- Offer biometrics, authenticator apps, or secure in‑app push notifications as alternatives to SMS.
- Implement Behavioral Analytics
- Flag rapid token creation after a new device registration, especially if coupled with a recent SIM‑swap indicator.
- Require Additional Confirmation for High‑Value Tokens
- For tokenization requests exceeding a preset threshold (e.g.,$500),request a secondary verification step,such as a voice call or hardware token.
- Provide Easy Card Revocation
- Offer a one‑tap “Deactivate Apple Pay/Google pay token” feature within the banking app, reducing remediation time.
Emerging Defenses and Future Outlook
- federated Credential Management – Leveraging WebAuthn/FIDO2 for card linking removes the need for OTPs entirely, using cryptographic keys stored in the device’s hardware security module.
- Zero‑Trust Mobile wallet Architecture – Continuous verification of device health (e.g., jailbreak detection) before allowing token provisioning.
- AI‑Driven Phishing Detection – Real‑time scanning of incoming SMS messages for known phishing patterns, automatically quarantining suspicious OTPs.
Key Takeaways for Readers
- OTP theft remains the most common gateway for hijacking Apple Pay and Google Pay cards.
- Protecting the OTP channel-by avoiding SMS, securing SIMs, and using app‑based authenticators-directly reduces the risk of token hijacking.
- Both users and financial institutions must adopt layered defenses, from device‑level locks to behavior‑based analytics, to stay ahead of increasingly elegant fraud campaigns.