The expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty on February 5th marks a turning point in U.S.-Russia nuclear relations, effectively ending decades of formal limitations on strategic nuclear weapons. While several multilateral agreements remain in place, the passing of New START signifies, for all practical purposes, the end of traditional arms control between the two nations, raising questions about the future of nuclear deterrence and stability.
Some analysts predict the treaty’s demise will inevitably lead to a new arms race, fueled by the complex interplay between U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear arsenals. This view posits a “three-body problem” where each nation reacts to the perceived buildup of the others. But, others, like Heather Williams, argue that the end of New START does not necessarily portend an escalation in nuclear arms.
The situation is largely uncharted territory, as most professionals in the field have only known a period of bilateral arms control with Russia. Determining whether an arms race will occur is often more art than science, dependent on whether the issue is viewed through the lens of disarmament, deterrence, or the pursuit of nuclear primacy. For some, the treaty’s expiration is a setback; for others, it presents new opportunities for the United States.
Despite concerns about a potential arms race, Russia is likely to proceed cautiously, focusing on maintaining its status as a nuclear peer to the United States and ensuring it has sufficient safeguards against potential U.S. Advancements in missile defense or counterforce capabilities. This isn’t a radical shift, but rather a continuation of existing strategy. According to estimates from Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, Russia currently has 1,718 strategic warheads deployed, exceeding the U.S. Count of 659 as of September 2022. However, Russia faces significant economic and industrial constraints, particularly in light of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, which could hinder its ability to sustain a large-scale arms race.
Moscow retains an advantage in non-strategic nuclear weapons and the diversity of its delivery systems, areas not covered by New START. This disparity has prompted discussions in the United States about the need for greater force diversity. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Thomas DiNanno highlighted this issue at a recent conference on disarmament in Geneva, noting Russia’s modernization and expansion of these forces as an “intolerable disadvantage” for the U.S., given that a large portion of deployed U.S. Nuclear weapons were subject to New START limitations.
Despite perceptions of a Russian advantage in nuclear modernization and warhead production, the reality is more nuanced. As DiNanno recently stated, the U.S. “retains non-deployed nuclear capacity that can be used to address the emerging security environment.” Russia possesses the capacity to add warheads to existing missiles, but expanding the number of deployed launchers would be a significant challenge. Current programs to replace existing intercontinental ballistic missiles are behind schedule, and new ballistic missile submarine production is sluggish. Production of novel nuclear weapon systems, such as the Poseidon, Avangard, and Burevestnik, will be limited in quantity and unlikely to fundamentally alter the strategic balance.
Russia has relatively inexpensive means of maintaining parity in deployed warheads and has already invested heavily in hedging against potential U.S. Missile defense systems. This may explain Moscow’s proposal for a moratorium on quantitative force expansion, even after the treaty’s expiration. Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently praised New START and offered to maintain the treaty’s quantitative limits.
Rumors suggest ongoing discussions between Washington and Moscow regarding a potential agreement to continue observing the treaty limits for at least six months after its expiration.
Given Russia’s constraints and differing force requirements, it’s unclear why Moscow would actively pursue an arms race. This may be why Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently reiterated the offer to observe treaty limits, positioning Moscow as interested in arms control while continuing to modernize its nuclear forces. The U.S., unlike Russia, extends nuclear deterrence to a network of allies globally. China’s growing nuclear capabilities are also increasingly influencing U.S. Nuclear strategy, which historically focused on deterring Russia. The current U.S. Position is that future arms control must include both Russia and China, without harming U.S. Interests or ignoring noncompliance, and that negotiations should be conducted from a “position of strength.”
Bilateral arms control with Russia has been deteriorating since the early 2000s. The U.S. Withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, and Russian violations led to the U.S. Withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty in 2019. New START was the last major arms control treaty between the two countries. The treaty allowed for 18 on-site inspections annually, with a total of 328 conducted since its signing, along with annual notifications and data exchanges. However, inspections were suspended in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia subsequently blocked U.S. Attempts to conduct on-site inspections following its invasion of Ukraine, claiming insufficient notice. The State Department declared Russia in non-compliance with the treaty in January 2023.
In February 2023, Putin announced Russia’s suspension of participation in New START, a move seen by some as largely symbolic, given the U.S.’s superior national technical intelligence capabilities. Moscow’s actions appear to have been an attempt to leverage arms control as part of broader negotiations regarding Ukraine and U.S. Military support for Kyiv, but ultimately proved self-defeating.
Russia is also reportedly on a path to violate the Outer Space Treaty by developing a nuclear anti-satellite weapon. This behavior has further poisoned the well in U.S. Policy circles regarding arms control with Russia.