The analyst identified when and why Ukrainian forces will reach a critical point on the battlefield

After occupying the destroyed city of Avdiyivka, Russian forces are slowly moving forward in other areas of the front. For now, the defenders of Ukraine manage to hold their own: new defense lines are being built and ammunition, which has been in short supply lately, is being counted.

Russia’s advantage in manpower, materials and defense production has grown sharply over the past year, and reduced munitions supplies from the United States are in danger of being cut off entirely soon as the US Congress deadlocks over funding.

“The current dynamics of the battlefield do not have a single cause: they are mainly related to the decisions that have been made since 2022. autumn When Russia mobilized its war economy, the West did not, and Ukraine could not. While Russia built a network of defensive fortifications hundreds of miles long and multi-layered, Ukraine did not. Russia has purchased more than a million (by some estimates three million) artillery shells and thousands of drones from its partners, including Iran and North Korea. The West could not match it because it had already reached the bottom of similar resources. “Moscow has made great efforts to restore personnel and replenish its forces, and Kyiv has yet to fully mobilize,” D. Massicot wrote.

According to the analyst, if Western military aid is not increased and Kyiv’s strategy is not fundamentally changed, Ukraine’s situation on the battlefield will continue to deteriorate until it reaches a critical point. She predicts it could happen even before this summer.

Scanpix/AP photo/Ukrainian soldiers

“As things stand now, with Ukraine’s ammunition and manpower needs unmet, Ukrainian units are likely to deplete, making a Russian breakthrough clearly possible.” But now is not the time to despair, it is the time to take urgent action. Russian forces have vulnerabilities that can be exploited and advantages that can be reduced in the long run, but only if Ukraine gets what it needs now,” added D. Massicot in the Foreign Affairs article.

In the early months of the war, the Kremlin reluctantly admitted that its initial blitzkrieg in Ukraine had failed. Until 2022 In August, damaged Russian units became fragile, and tested by Ukrainian forces, they failed in Kharkiv and retreated from Kherson.

However, the analyst notes that Russia has since come to terms with the demands and costs of the protracted conflict.

“Realizing that the war effort was in jeopardy, the Kremlin did what it had previously been unwilling to do: mobilized 300,000 men, dramatically increased defense spending and bought essential weapons from partners to fill the gaps.” Kyiv now finds itself in a maintenance crisis similar to the one Moscow experienced two years ago.”

D. Massicot pointed out that, unlike Russia, Kyiv cannot mobilize its defense industry and quickly increase production volumes. He still has to rely on Western military aid. Ukraine also has a smaller population than Russia, meaning its losses are felt more deeply.

When sufficiently manned, equipped and entrenched, Ukrainian forces have proven capable of inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces and preventing them from converting their paper advantage into decisive gains. The most recent example is the battle for Avdijivka.

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine/Telegram/Soldiers of Ukraine

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine/Telegram/Soldiers of Ukraine

Russia, often relying on airstrikes and using up to 30 thousand soldiers from ten units, still occupied the ruined city in five months. Russia really wanted Avdiyivka and got it.

According to reports, she lost more than 600 tanks and probably thousands of soldiers during the siege. The heavy losses underscore that Russia’s offensive capabilities are still inadequate when trying to overcome Ukraine’s prepared defenses.

“However, there are few areas left on the front line that are as strongly defended as Avdijivka, which means that future Russian attacks may be easier.” Moreover, Russia’s weak points will be of very little importance if depleted Ukrainian units are no longer able to provide defenses or if they cannot quickly replicate the defenses built in Avdiyivka over ten years,” says Foreign Affairs.

The analyst singled out two main advantages of Russia in the war against Ukraine: weapons and manpower. However, he noted that they are not as strong as the Kremlin would like its enemies to think.

“Let’s take Russia’s huge stockpile of weapons: from 2022 its forces lost at least 14,000 pieces of equipment. Some of these losses were compensated by the Russian General Staff by exhuming Soviet military cemeteries and restoring to use thousands of preserved tanks and armored vehicles.

in 2023 Russia revived 1,200 tanks and 2,500 armored vehicles previously in long storage, while producing only 200 new or upgraded tanks. However, these reserves are not infinite. Some researchers have noted that Russia has already withdrawn 25 to 40 percent. of your strategic stockpile, depending on the type of equipment, and the best equipment was probably taken out earlier. What remains is likely to be in poor condition or even beyond repair. If Russia continues at this rate, its remaining reserves will dwindle in the next couple of years, limiting its future options. This, of course, depends on whether Ukraine will have the resources to actively defend itself and restore its combat power.”


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2024-04-16 00:53:35

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