This was not intended for the public: internally and quite openly, senior German Air Force officers discussed theoretical possibilities of the use of German Taurus cruise missiles by Ukraine. Here are some details and information about possible consequences:
Is the recording authentic?
The German Ministry of Defense assumes that the conversation was intercepted. “According to our assessment, a conversation in the Air Force was intercepted. We cannot currently say with certainty whether changes were made to the recorded or written version that is circulating on social media,” said a spokeswoman.
What is the content of the conversation about?
At the beginning, a casual chat can be heard on the audio. One of those involved explains that he is currently in Singapore. He raves about the view from the hotel room. “Maybe I’ll send you a photo later. That’s great.” But it quickly becomes more serious: It is a preparatory meeting between the officers for a briefing for Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD), probably in February. The head of the Air Force, Ingo Gerhartz, is part of the group of four. The topic is how Ukraine could use German Taurus cruise missiles in the war against Russia – if Chancellor Scholz reconsiders his no to supplying the weapons.
What questions are specifically discussed in the conversation?
One question is whether Taurus cruise missiles would theoretically be technically capable of destroying the bridge built by Russia to the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, which was annexed in violation of international law. Another point is whether Ukraine could carry out the shelling without the participation of the Bundeswehr, for example in target programming. There is debate about how long it might take to train Ukrainians on Taurus. The recording also shows that there is no political green light for the delivery of the cruise missiles.
What is fundamentally about the debate about Taurus?
The Ukrainian government requested the delivery of cruise missiles in May 2023 in order to be able to hit Russian supply lines in occupied territory behind the front. Scholz decided in October not to send the Taurus rockets to Ukraine for the time being. In recent days he has reiterated his no and explained his reasons in detail. Essentially, it’s about the risk that Germany could become involved in the war. “German soldiers must not be linked at any point or place to the goals that this system achieves,” said Scholz. Parts of our own traffic light coalition, as well as Union politicians, are in favor of a delivery from Taurus and criticize Scholz for his no.
Why is the publication of the conversation explosive?
It is also about military-sensitive information. One of those involved – probably Air Force Inspector Gerhartz – explains that he could imagine that 50 and then another 50 missiles would be delivered in a first tranche, but that would not change the war. The question is how many missiles would be needed to destroy the Crimean Bridge. There is a detailed discussion of how the Bundeswehr’s involvement in supplying the Ukrainians with target data for Taurus could be concealed. However, the participants in the discussion came to the conclusion that this was not possible without crossing the red line of participation in the war formulated by Scholz. The Ukrainians must be given longer training to be able to program target data themselves. However: The whole thing is just a thought game to show politicians possibilities.
Also explosive is the statement in the conversation that the British had “a few people on site” in connection with the use of their Storm Shadow cruise missiles delivered to Ukraine. Chancellor Scholz’s words a few days ago were interpreted in a similar way. “What the British and French are doing in terms of target control and the accompaniment of target control cannot be done in Germany,” said Scholz. The British then stated that Ukraine’s use of Storm Shadow and the target selection process were a matter for the Ukrainians.
How did Russia get included?
The conversation reveals an obvious security vulnerability. Does the fact that one of the participants was staying in a hotel in Singapore play a role? According to dpa information, the participants use the Webex platform for their meeting. The CDU defense expert Roderich Kiesewetter expects further publications by Russia after the leak. “Several other conversations will certainly have been intercepted and may have been leaked at a later date for the benefit of Russia,” he told the news portal “ZDF today”.
What does Russia want to do by publishing the conversation?
Above all, Russia wants to show that Germany – contrary to what the federal government has asserted – has long been a party to the war and is deeply involved in the conflict. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova complained that the conversation demonstrated the “planning of hostilities against Russia, including the destruction of civilian infrastructure.” “We demand explanations from Germany.”
Zakharova’s influential friend Margarita Simonjan made the recording public. The editor-in-chief of the Russian propaganda channel RT first announced the recording as a sensation on Friday morning, then hours later published a Russian text version and finally the audio file with the German original sound online. Simonyan is considered a confidante of Kremlin chief Vladimir Putin, who himself worked as an intelligence officer in the GDR and also temporarily headed the Russian domestic secret service FSB.
Why does Ukraine want to destroy the Crimean Bridge?
The images of an explosion in the fall of 2022 on the Crimean Bridge and new severe destruction in the summer of 2023 after an attack went around the world. Ukraine claimed responsibility for the attacks and repeatedly stated that it would destroy the 19-kilometer-long bridge, with one section for trains and one for cars, as soon as possible. The Taurus demanded by Kiev are considered to be correspondingly powerful here. However, the intercepted conversation makes it clear that a single cruise missile would probably not be enough.
Kiev justified its plans by saying that the structure is important for supplying Russian troops during the invasion of southern Ukraine. However, Russia is also increasingly supplying its troops through the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine. Even before the war, Ukraine had criticized the bridge, which was partially opened in 2018 and 2019, as illegal and a violation of international law.
What significance does the bridge have for Russia – and what consequences would its destruction have?
For Kremlin chief Vladimir Putin, the bridge between Russia and the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, which was annexed in 2014, is an object close to his heart. The billion-dollar property represents a firm economic connection between Crimea and Russia. Millions of tourists come to the holiday island by train and car. Freight transport is also important for supplying the people there. This is also why Russia speaks of civilian infrastructure, the destruction of which would, from Moscow’s perspective, be tantamount to a war crime. The bridge is also used by the Moscow Ministry of Defense, which is why from Kiev’s perspective it is a military object that can be destroyed. Russia has so far carried out severe retaliatory strikes against Ukraine after every attack on the Crimean Bridge. The nuclear power always threatened to defend Crimea using all means possible.
What consequences can be drawn from the publication of the recording?
There is great concern across all parties that security-relevant communication channels are not sufficiently protected. Committees in the Bundestag are expected to deal with the issue from March 11th. The question also arises as to whether there is a general problem. The FDP defense politician Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann called for better precautions against espionage. She told the editorial network Germany (RND) that espionage was “part of Russia’s toolbox of hybrid warfare.”
The German contingent leader for NATO airspace surveillance in the Baltics, Swen Jacob, says: “Especially here in the Baltics, where the Russians are so close, we have to assume that we are being listened to. We also know that we are being listened to. ” The soldiers on site were prepared for this – increased technical measures had been taken to prevent eavesdropping. “We have already done the maximum we can, as far as we can. But it also shows that the Russians are listening.”
