In a surprising diplomatic turn earlier this week, former U.S. President Donald Trump asserted that China would not supply arms to Iran and claimed Beijing was “incredibly happy” with his decision to permanently open the Strait of Hormuz, framing the move as a rare point of U.S.-China cooperation amid escalating Middle East tensions. The comments, made during a televised interview with WION, signal a potential recalibration in great-power dynamics over one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, where nearly 20% of global oil transit passes annually. While Trump’s characterization oversimplifies a complex strategic calculation, the underlying reality is that both Washington and Beijing share an interest in preventing Hormuz closure—even as they compete for influence in Tehran and vie for control of global energy flows.
This development matters far beyond the Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz is not just a conduit for crude; This proves a linchpin of global energy security, and any disruption risks triggering cascading effects across industrial supply chains, inflation metrics, and emerging market stability. For China, the world’s largest oil importer, ensuring unimpeded access through Hormuz is existential—over 40% of its crude supply flows through the strait. For the U.S., while less directly dependent, the strategic imperative lies in averting a crisis that could empower adversaries, spike global energy prices, and strain alliances with Japan, South Korea, and India, all of whom rely heavily on Gulf energy. Trump’s framing, though politically charged, inadvertently highlights a zone of tacit coordination where great-power rivalry yields to mutual interest in maritime stability.
To understand the gravity of this moment, one must glance beyond the rhetoric. Iran has repeatedly threatened to close Hormuz in response to U.S. Or Israeli actions, most notably during the 2019–2020 tanker crisis and following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani. Yet Beijing has consistently avoided endorsing such actions, despite its strategic partnership with Tehran. In 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement covering energy, infrastructure, and defense, but it notably omitted any commitment to mutual defense or Hormuz-related escalation. Instead, Chinese state advisors have privately warned that blocking the strait would invite a U.S.-led naval coalition and severely damage China’s reputation as a guarantor of global trade—precisely the image it cultivates through initiatives like the Belt and Road.
Meanwhile, U.S. Policy toward Hormuz has evolved from reactive patrols to proactive diplomacy. Since 2023, the Biden administration has quietly engaged backchannels with both Beijing and New Delhi to coordinate maritime domain awareness, sharing satellite data and vessel tracking to deter illicit activity. This trilateral coordination—though never formalized—has contributed to a sustained period of Hormuz stability since late 2024, with zero major disruptions recorded despite regional flare-ups in Gaza and Lebanon. As one senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted,
The real story isn’t Trump’s claim—it’s that Washington and Beijing have, for now, found a way to avoid turning Hormuz into a flashpoint, even as they compete everywhere else.
The economic stakes are immense. A mere week-long closure of Hormuz in 2023 was estimated by the International Energy Agency to have increased global Brent crude prices by $15–20 per barrel, potentially shaving 0.5% off global GDP growth. For emerging economies already grappling with debt distress and currency volatility, such a shock could trigger balance-of-payments crises. Conversely, stable flow supports not only energy markets but also the shipping, insurance, and logistics sectors that underpin globalization. The World Bank estimates that Hormuz-related disruptions add up to $12 billion annually in indirect costs to the global economy—insurance premiums, rerouting fees, and inventory buffers—when perceived risk rises.
To contextualize the current alignment, consider the following comparison of key stakeholders’ interests and capabilities regarding the Strait of Hormuz:
| Actor | Primary Interest | Leverage over Hormuz | Recent Action (2024–2025) |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Prevent adversarial control; ensure ally access | Naval presence; alliance networks | Led IMSC patrols; shared intel with UAE/Saudi Arabia |
| China | Secure energy imports; protect trade routes | Economic influence; dual-use infrastructure | Funded Gwadar port upgrades; avoided Iran arms deals |
| Iran | Leverage in negotiations; deter attacks | Geographic control; missile range | Conducted drills; avoided actual closure since 2020 |
| India | Ensure oil supply; protect diaspora | Naval reach; refinery dependence | Deployed destroyers; joined MARA initiative |
This table illustrates why neither Washington nor Beijing benefits from Hormuz instability, despite their broader rivalry. China’s reluctance to arm Iran—contrary to Trump’s assertion—stems not from altruism but from calculation: supplying advanced weapons could provoke a regional arms race, justify U.S. Sanctions on Chinese entities, and undermine Beijing’s narrative of peaceful development. As Fu Ying, former vice foreign minister of China and chair of the Laiwu Forum on International Relations, explained in a March 2025 interview,
China’s engagement with Iran is economic and diplomatic, not military. We will not risk our global standing to settle others’ regional scores.
Looking ahead, the durability of this tacit Hormuz understanding depends on three variables: the trajectory of U.S.-Iran negotiations, China’s confidence in its energy diversification (including Russian pipeline gas and strategic reserves), and whether Israel perceives any opening to act unilaterally against Iranian nuclear sites. If any of these shift, the current equilibrium could fracture rapidly—turning a corridor of cooperation into a cockpit of contestation.
For now, the Strait of Hormuz remains open—not because of idealism, but because even rivals recognize that some waters are too vital to poison. The real challenge lies in sustaining this fragile consensus as great-power competition intensifies elsewhere. Can Washington and Beijing keep compartmentalizing their rivalry when the stakes extend beyond trade or technology to the very flow of global commerce? That is the question keeping strategists awake in Beijing, Washington, and beyond.
