The Pentagon confirmed on Monday that U.S. Military forces conducted a precision airstrike in eastern Syria on May 12, targeting an Iranian-backed militia group responsible for a recent rocket attack against a U.S. Base in Iraq. The strike, which destroyed a command-and-control facility near the Syrian-Iraqi border, marked the first direct U.S. Military action against Iranian proxies since the Biden administration took office—yet officials stopped short of calling it an act of war.
The strike followed a May 10 rocket barrage on Erbil International Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan, an attack that wounded three U.S. Service members and damaged infrastructure. While the U.S. Has not formally attributed the rocket fire to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or its affiliated militias, intelligence assessments reviewed by U.S. Officials point to the Kata’ib Hezbollah network, a group designated as a terrorist organization by Washington. The IRGC’s Quds Force, led by Gen. Esmail Qaani, has been identified in classified briefings as the operational arm coordinating such attacks, though Tehran denies direct involvement.
What complicates the legal and strategic calculus is the absence of a formal declaration of war—or even a congressional authorization—despite decades of covert and overt U.S. Military operations in the region. Since the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. Has maintained a near-constant military presence in Iraq and Syria, conducting hundreds of strikes against Iranian-backed groups under the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Yet the Biden administration has repeatedly rejected framing these actions as “war,” instead classifying them as “counterterrorism operations” under the 2001 AUMF, which was invoked after the 9/11 attacks.
Legal scholars and former officials say the distinction is increasingly untenable. “The U.S. Has been at war with Iran’s proxy network for years, whether we admit it or not,” said Admiral James G. Stavridis, a former NATO supreme allied commander and current dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “The question isn’t whether we’re at war—it’s whether we’re winning and whether Congress is willing to debate the costs of a conflict that’s already being fought.” The Pentagon has not sought new authorization from Congress, citing the 2001 AUMF as sufficient legal cover—a position that has drawn criticism from lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.
Iran’s response to the May 12 strike has been measured but deliberate. State media, including the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, described the attack as an “act of aggression” while avoiding direct threats of retaliation. However, Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have escalated indirect pressure, launching drones and rockets against U.S. Positions in Syria and Iraq over the past month. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reported 17 such incidents in April alone, a sharp increase from previous months.
Diplomatic channels remain frozen. The U.S. And Iran severed direct negotiations in 2018 after Washington withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and indirect talks through regional intermediaries have yielded no breakthroughs. The Biden administration has signaled openness to reviving the nuclear deal but insists any agreement must address Iran’s regional militias and its ballistic missile program—a demand Tehran has repeatedly rejected as non-negotiable.
On the ground, the U.S. Military’s posture reflects a calculated risk assessment. While the May 12 strike was the most overt action since the 2020 killing of IRGC Gen. Qasem Soleimani, U.S. Forces have continued to operate in Syria under the guise of “overwatch” missions against ISIS remnants—a mission that has effectively provided cover for strikes against Iranian proxies. The U.S. Has approximately 900 troops in Syria and 3,000 in Iraq, with rotational deployments to deter further attacks.
What remains unclear is whether the latest escalation will trigger a broader confrontation. Iranian officials have historically avoided direct military clashes with U.S. Forces, preferring to proxy conflicts through militias. Yet the IRGC’s Quds Force has expanded its footprint in Syria, embedding operatives with militia groups to direct operations. A leaked U.S. Intelligence assessment from March indicated that Iran is preparing to deploy additional short-range ballistic missiles to its proxies in Iraq, a move that could further raise tensions.
The next critical juncture may come in early June, when the U.S. And Iraqi governments are scheduled to hold high-level security talks in Baghdad. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, who has sought to balance relations with both Washington and Tehran, has called for a “de-escalation” but has not condemned the recent attacks. His office has not responded to requests for comment on whether the talks will address the U.S. Military’s presence in Iraq or the activities of Iranian-backed groups.
For now, the U.S. Military’s operations continue under the radar of public debate. A Pentagon spokesperson declined to comment on whether the May 12 strike would lead to further actions, stating only that “the U.S. Will continue to defend our personnel and interests in the region.” In Tehran, the Supreme Leader’s office has not issued a direct response, but hardline lawmakers in the Iranian parliament have called for a “stronger response” to U.S. Aggression—a signal that internal factions are divided over how to proceed.
