The German-British historian Orlando Figes on the importance of myths for Russian politics – and the question of what connects the president with Tsar Nicholas I.
Professor Figes, you said in the last FR interview that you wanted to remain an EU citizen after Brexit and therefore wanted to obtain German citizenship. Are you now a German citizen?
Yes indeed. I traveled to Berlin as a German citizen with a German passport.
Congratulations!
Thanks very much!
In an interview it was said that you want to personally kill Russian President Vladimir Putin. I was wondering what item you want to do this with.
No, I have no such plans. Not really, not real. I said I could kill him for what he’s doing, but that’s more of a metaphor than an expression of my anger, not an actual intention.
Is a tyrannicide still appropriate?
If it resulted in the regime disappearing, that would certainly be the best thing that could happen.
Have you ever met Putin in person?
I met him, yes. Even twice. Once at the Valdai conference in 2015. We exchanged a few words. The only useful information I can share after meeting Putin is that he has a soft handshake. He’s not what you’d expect. You could say: behind every dictator there is a little man.
You have already written many books on Russian history. What new perspective do you want to open up now?
It’s sort of my lockdown book, I wrote it during the pandemic. The book was intended to summarize everything I thought about Russian history in contrast to the increasingly imperial interpretation of history by the Putin regime. I found it important to write about the interpretation of Russia’s history, which is now being used as a weapon to justify the war against Ukraine. One should know that no other country has been reinvented as often as Russia, with its history-changing ideologies. The readers should therefore get a sense of what the sacred power of the Tsar, the special mission of Russia, mean.
In a 2021 essay, Putin clearly outlined his position on Russian history, Russians, Belarusians and Little Russians all belong to Russia. Is this a historical pipe dream?
One should ask what such references to the 12th century are supposed to mean for the present. It has absolutely nothing to do with the present. What Putin wrote is just crazy. The idea that there is a Greater Russia with Ukraine as its region is old in this sense, very old stuff, an example of the transition between history and myth. Putin has been using historiography since the 12th century and uses it for domestic mobilization. In addition, there is the oldest story in Russian history.
Which would be?
That Russia is threatened by Western powers. There is an idea that the West wants to take over Russia and destroy the Russian character, values and religion. This is the plot of Eisenstein’s film: the Nazis are coming to humiliate the Russians and it takes a strong leader to save Russia. This story holds true throughout Russian history.
Can Putin be explained by other previous rulers?
He justifies his rule by historical examples since Peter the Great. He is more of an anti-Bolshevik and does not equate himself with Stalin, even if he builds up a personality cult similar to this one: as an autocrat who shoulders the responsibility for the whole country on his shoulders. Stalin said that the Russians need a tsar. This has to do with the particular notions of authority in Russian statecraft. That obviously inspired Putin. Rather than Stalin, however, he compares himself to the tsars who are statues in the Kremlin: Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Alexander who defeated Napoleon, and Nicholas I. The statues stand behind the large table at which he receiving other heads of state and government.
To person
Orlando Figes, born in London in 1959, where he teaches history at Birkbeck College. Figes recently became a German-British citizen. He is one of the most renowned historians in Great Britain and is the author of internationally acclaimed books on Russian history.
Among his most important works include books such as his award-winning standard work “The Tragedy of a People”, “Hundred Years of Revolution” or “The Crimean War”.
His new book “A History of Russia”, ad Engl. Norbert Juraschitz has just been published by Klett-Cotta, 448 pages, 28 euros.
What connects him to Tsar Nicholas I?
Nicholas I is the paradigm of an ideological reflex on the revolutionary movements in Europe after the Congress of Vienna. An example of anti-Western attitudes, Putin most closely resembles him of the four tsars mentioned. Both share the fear of democracy, which could destabilize Russia. Nicholas I drew all of Europe into the Crimean War in the 19th century, eventually losing in what was a disaster for Russia. He adheres to the idea of a holy Russia, the unity of the Slavs, autocracy, orthodoxy and nationalism, all things that Putin shares. Putin thus appears as a defender of Russia against the West.
Things could also end badly for Putin.
I don’t think that Russia can continue this war against Ukraine indefinitely, but rather wants to defend the conquered territories. But Putin will bet that the West will cave in to political instability over the high cost of living. It will be important that the people of Ukraine, who are fighting the war for themselves and for us, can end this war from a position of strength. In the end, the only way out of armed conflicts is diplomacy.
In your book you emphasize the importance of myths for Russian history.
Cultural historian Michael Cherniavsky once said that as life gets tougher in Russia, the more people seek hope and salvation in myths that transcend everyday reality. This idea has been cultivated by state and church for many centuries. The religious continuity for the Russian self-understanding, the holy tsar, holy Russia, the Russian soul, the historical mission. All this is very much alive in Russia. This view reflects the belief that simply having a better standard of living is not enough; you need something bigger, a higher mission. This idea has been preserved in many forms in Russian history.
Where does today’s nationalism in Russia come from?
Nationalism stems from a disappointment after the fall of Communism and the promises of the West. The resentment stems from a lack of recognition by the West. Defeating the Nazis strengthened nationalism just as much as the Cold War reinvigorated nationalism.
Even Peter the Great saw Ukraine in the Russian sphere of interest. Shouldn’t NATO actually have been more sensitive?
The Mongols had taken over these regions, just like the Poles later, the Nazis invaded there. And now you can see the threat posed by NATO from a Russian perspective. Ukraine has a special significance for Russia. But the military incursion has much more to do with creating a land bridge to the Crimea. Putin saw the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and wants to gain influence in Ukraine. It’s a kind of revenge by the former KGB spy for his superiors’ disaster that led to the fall of the Soviet Union.
Since when has this separation between West and East existed that we observe in today’s Ukraine?
It goes back to the rule of the Mongols. The western provinces of Ukraine came under the protection of Poland and later the Habsburgs, the rest was under the rule of the Mongols. This is exactly the front line that was cut off by the Russians in 2014. This border has now become a global front line between Western countries and Russia with China, Iran, maybe even India. It’s a global conflict.
What do you think of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy? How does he affect you?
Absolutely amazing. An inspirational President. He’s very smart. The way he talks to his citizens, just great. But he is in a very difficult situation. Right now he’s upholding the idea of victory: we’re going to defeat Putin and recapture the territories like we did from the Germans in World War II. But wanting to defeat a nation like Russia with its nuclear weapons will hardly be possible. At some point, the West will likely put pressure on Zelenskyy to come to a compromise peace. That will be a high price for him. Because he will not be able to deliver the promised victory.
Which era does today’s Russia remind you of the most?
Hard to say. But it reminds me most of the Russia of 1916. People didn’t want to fight anymore, the economy was badly damaged. Who knows, revolutions come quickly and unexpectedly, that’s the nature of revolutions. Perhaps a revolution is imminent now.
Interview: Michael Hesse