The Illusion of Opportunity: Why Iran’s Unrest Isn’t a Repeat of Afghanistan or Iraq
Over 500,000 national security professionals are closely watching Iran, and for good reason. The current wave of unrest, fueled by economic collapse and social frustration, presents a familiar yet treacherous landscape. But to see a simple path to regime change – to assume pressure will yield quick results – is to ignore a critical lesson learned at a devastating cost in both Afghanistan and Iraq: controlling territory is fleeting; controlling networks endures.
The Ghosts of Past Interventions
The swift removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein lulled Washington into a false sense of victory. The real war, however, wasn’t about toppling regimes, but about navigating the complex web of local power structures, informal authorities, and external interference that immediately filled the vacuum. In Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and China played a long game, investing in relationships and positioning themselves for a post-U.S. future. In Iraq, Iranian-aligned militias embedded themselves within the fabric of society, becoming inseparable from the state itself. These weren’t tactical oversights; they were strategic blind spots.
The core mistake? Underestimating the power of networks. While military might can seize land, it cannot dismantle the intricate systems of influence that truly govern a society. As a result, the U.S. didn’t lose these conflicts on the battlefield, but in the spaces *between* battles – in the gray zone of influence and control.
Iran’s Deliberately Social Security Model
To view Iran through the lens of Afghanistan or Iraq is a dangerous oversimplification. Iran isn’t a fragile state waiting to crumble; it’s a system deliberately engineered to absorb pressure. The Basij, often described as a paramilitary force, is far more than that. It’s a deeply embedded social network – present in universities, workplaces, and neighborhoods – functioning as a surveillance, mobilization, and ideological reinforcement tool. This isn’t a reaction to unrest; it’s the foundational structure of the regime’s survival.
This model extends beyond Iran’s borders. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias operate as armed actors, political movements, and social service providers, effectively mirroring the Basij’s integrated approach. Iran learned from observing the U.S. experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq, adapting its strategies to prioritize long-term influence over short-term gains. They understood that patience, and the cultivation of resilient networks, would ultimately outperform brute force.
The Paradox of Pressure
Escalation, particularly during periods of internal unrest, carries a significant risk. External pressure can inadvertently validate the regime’s narrative of siege and foreign interference, strengthening its coercive institutions. Information controls, security mobilization, and proxy signaling aren’t panicked responses; they are rehearsed maneuvers. This is a crucial point often missed in Washington’s policy debates.
Comparing Iran’s situation to Eastern Europe, Latin America, or past protest movements is misleading. Iran’s political ecosystem is fundamentally different. It’s closer to the environments the U.S. encountered in Kabul and Baghdad – environments where formal institutions mask a far more complex reality of informal power dynamics.
Beyond Vulnerability: Preparing for What Comes Next
The question isn’t whether Iran is vulnerable – economic distress, generational change, and eroding legitimacy are undeniable realities. The critical question is whether the United States is prepared for the aftermath of potential vulnerability. Are we equipped to operate effectively in the space that emerges if, or when, the current system experiences significant stress?
This requires a fundamental shift in perspective. We must understand how authority is distributed beneath formal institutions, recognize the symbiotic relationship between coercive and social systems, and anticipate how regional actors will adapt during periods of instability. This isn’t about predicting regime collapse; it’s about preparing for the complex landscape that will inevitably follow any significant shift in power. The Council on Foreign Relations offers further analysis on Iran’s internal dynamics.
Afghanistan and Iraq offered these lessons, but they were learned too late. The current unrest in Iran presents an opportunity to avoid repeating those mistakes. The choice isn’t whether to act, but how to act – how to avoid the false confidence that comes before the storm. History won’t judge the U.S. on the pressure it applied, but on its understanding of what that pressure would unleash.
What are your predictions for the future of Iran’s internal stability and the role of external actors? Share your thoughts in the comments below!
