national security

The Venezuelan Supreme Court’s decision to interpret President Nicolás Maduro’s recent detention as a temporary absence, allowing Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to govern indefinitely, has drawn criticism from opposition figures and Washington officials who say the move circumvents constitutional requirements for immediate elections. The ruling, which avoids a snap election that could challenge the ruling socialist party’s control, has been condemned as a maneuver to maintain power through legal loopholes.

“The regime used a legal mechanism to maintain institutional control although avoiding an immediate electoral process,” Mauricio Vaquero, country coordinator for María Corina Machado’s Vente Venezuela party in Colombia, told The Cipher Brief. “The Supreme Court decided she would assume as interim president, but a Chavista Supreme Court, not the democratic legal one.”

The security apparatus that sustained Maduro’s rule remains largely unchanged. Diosdado Cabello, the Interior Minister and a figure wanted by U.S. Authorities on narco-terrorism charges, continues to control Venezuela’s security forces and armed collectives, according to reports. His involvement in coordinating the release of political prisoners highlights the complex dynamics of the current transition.

Foro Penal, a Venezuelan human rights organization, estimates that approximately 711 political prisoners were detained as of mid-February. While some prisoners have been released, these releases often come with restrictions. Juan Pablo Guanipa, an opposition politician freed on February 8 after eight months of detention, was re-arrested hours later and is now under house arrest with an ankle monitor, as reported by The Cipher Brief. “They were released, they reunited with their families, until the enlightened stupidity of some politicians led them to believe they could do whatever they wanted and stir up trouble in the country,” Cabello stated following Guanipa’s re-arrest.

Luis Bustos, a spokesperson for the Primero Justicia opposition party based in Bogotá, stated that his party alone has 61 members imprisoned as political prisoners. He warned of continued risks of arrest for those expressing dissent.

In Caracas and other areas, armed collectives continue to demonstrate the regime’s ability to maintain social control outside of formal state structures. Vaquero reported that following Maduro’s arrest, a directive circulated calling for the capture of opposition supporters, suggesting that repression has not diminished.

Opposition figures, and U.S. Officials increasingly acknowledge that legitimate elections are unlikely in the near term. Concerns center on the corruption of the electoral system under Chavismo, including alleged manipulation of voter registries and military involvement. Vaquero claimed the government has registered deceased individuals and provided identity cards to foreign nationals, including Cubans, Russians, and members of Colombian rebel groups.

María Corina Machado, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and leader of the unified opposition, estimated in early February that transparent elections using manual voting could take place within 9 to 10 months. However, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, Delcy’s brother, ruled out elections in the near future, citing the need for stabilization.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt echoed the administration’s reluctance to commit to an electoral timeline. When pressed on when elections might be held, Leavitt stated it was “too premature and too early to dictate a timetable,” emphasizing that the administration has “maximum leverage over the interim authorities in Venezuela.”

The constitutional framework allows Acting President Rodríguez to serve 90 days, with a possible extension approved by the Chavista-controlled National Assembly. However, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of temporary absence provisions effectively eliminates firm deadlines.

A U.S. Intelligence official, speaking on background, estimated that credible elections require dismantling entrenched power structures, extending well beyond constitutional requirements. Bustos suggested elections might realistically occur next year, contingent on stabilizing the country and strengthening institutions.

Despite these obstacles, the U.S. Can exert influence through continued pressure and negotiations over sanctions relief. However, the regime appears to be attempting to outlast Washington’s attention by complying tactically with American demands while preserving fundamental power structures.

Paola Salazar, director for Medellín and Antioquia state at Colombia’s migration agency, noted that migratory flows between Colombia and Venezuela have remained stable since January 3, suggesting Venezuelans are not yet convinced conditions have fundamentally changed. Alejandro Méndez Hernández, a Venezuelan community organizer in Bogotá, stated that trust remains absent, preventing migrants from returning despite Maduro’s removal.

Acting President Rodríguez told NBC News that she would hold free and fair elections but declined to commit to a timeline, stating it would be determined through political dialogue. She also indicated that Machado would face legal scrutiny upon any return for allegedly calling for military intervention and sanctions.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has outlined a three-phase approach for Venezuela’s future – stability, recovery, and transition to democracy – but has not provided a specific timeline. Rubio emphasized the desire for a “friendly, stable, prosperous Venezuela” and ending threats from groups like Hezbollah and Iran, acknowledging that the transition “can’t take forever.”

Diosdado Cabello represents a significant obstacle to a genuine transition. With control over security forces and armed collectives, he possesses the coercive apparatus to maintain regime control. A U.S. Intelligence source identified Cabello as a key figure whose removal or neutralization would be necessary for a democratic opening.

The regime’s relationships with Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, and China complicate transition planning. Bustos stressed the need for an extended transition period due to the presence of these actors.

The re-extradition of Alex Saab in early February, designated by the United States as a key financial operator for Maduro, demonstrates some cooperation from regime elements with American law enforcement. His arrest represents a test of cooperation with Washington, as U.S. Authorities accuse him of moving approximately $350 million out of Venezuela through corrupt contracts.

Nearly 9 million Venezuelans in the diaspora are reassessing their return prospects, but few are making immediate plans. The combination of continued repression, economic uncertainty, and the presence of the same officials who forced their exile creates a wait-and-see dynamic.

The situation in Venezuela tests the U.S. Administration’s approach to authoritarian transitions. Current policy reflects a preference for energy security over democratic reform, prioritizing regional stability and securing oil access over the unpredictable outcomes of rapid political reforms. This pragmatism risks legitimizing a rebranded authoritarianism, retaining the repressive mechanisms of Maduro’s regime.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela James Story assessed that Rodríguez will play for time, doing “just enough to make it appear as if they are complying” while waiting for U.S. Focus to shift.

Venezuela’s post-Maduro transition reveals the limitations of decapitation strategies against entrenched authoritarian systems. While removing Maduro eliminated the regime’s symbolic figurehead, the intelligence and security apparatus remains intact. Elections cannot occur in the short term, at least not elections meeting minimal standards of freedom and fairness. As long as the same power structure is in place, cosmetic reforms cannot address this fundamental barrier.

“Where Diosdado Cabello has been, obviously repression has not disappeared,” Vaquero added. “It materializes with collectives, with social pressure, with selective judicialization. And obviously, while Diosdado remains in power, there won’t be profound change but rather tactical changes.”