The Israeli announcement came, as usual, through the Hebrew media (Hebrew Channel 12) in leaks to feel the pulse of the other side before it was officially presented through the American “mediator”, Amos Hochstein, who is supposed to visit Lebanon in the next few days.
The details of the agreement, according to the leaks, stated that Israel would keep the entire Karish field, while Lebanon would keep all the disputed area, including the “Qana field” that extends to the Israeli economic zone, provided that Lebanon pays Israel financial compensation, which is the price of the overlapping area. It is approximately one third of Qana.
This item is one of the obstacles that are supposed to provoke the Lebanese side, with the report indicating that it has the approval of the Lebanese government!
One of the very interesting items is that the agreement specifies, in one of its clauses, that the company that will work on the economic borders to be agreed upon will be the Israeli “Energean” company, which also holds Greek citizenship. This clause is a guarantee to Israel that Hezbollah will not harm the Israeli platforms, since the identity and affiliation of the driller and the extraction ship will be one, namely, the Energean company, and any harm here will be harm there, and vice versa. The report stated that this creates an equilibrium and a balance of deterrence: platform versus platform, which means preventing attempts to attack the Israeli platform.
Against the background of the “crystallized agreement”, Israel decided that the beginning of gas extraction from the Karish field would be at the beginning of October, and not in September, as had been planned from the beginning. And “most important of all” is that Israel wants to say that the postponement of gas extraction until October is for technical reasons, and not related to Hezbollah’s threats, and “this is what we were told to say,” as the report’s author indicated.
Was this agreement approved by Lebanon’s official? It seems that the Israeli talk is very far from being true. In fact, such an agreement can be a document of Israeli demands from Lebanon, or an agreement between the American “mediator” and Israel to set up Lebanon for Israel’s interest, and not an agreement between Lebanon and the enemy.
Against the background of this report, it seems that the American mediator has ended his weeks of relaxation in Greece, to resume the “invasive mediation.” But what is long overdue, if the Hebrew reports are true, foretells the worst, and not a settlement that takes care of the interests of the two sides, but rather raises more than one question mark in Lebanon: Was it bad intent that led to putting such a formula on Lebanon? Is the aim of the rhythm among the Lebanese? And what is the meaning of this delay so that after it a formula of compromise that the enemy and the mediator realize will be rejected?
Regardless, Israel’s announcement of its intention to extract gas from the Karish field at the beginning of next October, in contrast to the date it had set at the beginning of September, would, according to Israeli estimates, defer the confrontation with Hezbollah, although it does not cancel it out at all. Which explains its continued military alert and threats.
The postponement raises question marks: Is it a technician that a number of ministers in the cabinet spoke about after Hezbollah threatened to target the field? Or was the delay due to technical malfunctions due to the approaching date of activating the threat of Hezbollah? Does postponing extraction mean postponing the activation of threats? Is it sufficient, according to the alleged agreement, for Hezbollah to benefit and slow down the rush to implement threats, especially since the “agreement” is a clear “sharing” against the background of the bad intentions of the enemy and the mediator?
Questions, especially those related to the possibility of escalation, remain without complete answers until the “mediator” returns from his leave carrying the “agreement” that crystallized with him.
Postponing the entitlement of the first of September to the first of October, does not end the anticipation, anxiety and mutual energies between the two sides, and does not take the finger off the trigger, and keeps the two sides, Hezbollah and “Israel”, each according to his assessments about the intentions of the other side. This is the feature of the coming weeks, which will witness, as it is estimated, a “reminder dose,” or doses, unless the mediator abandons his suspicious procrastination, without this canceling the possibilities of escalation in the date of the canceled extraction, on the first of September. Especially since the crystallized agreement, as received from Tel Aviv, is not an agreement.
Against this background, Israel, and specifically the intelligence services, is seeking to estimate what Hezbollah can do, whether for the remaining days until September, and later until the beginning of October, and within a strategy of absorbing the decisions that may come, in several directions:
– Working to reverse the positions, considering that the “reminder dose” or any targeting of the Israeli gas installations is an initiative initiated by Hezbollah, and not as a result of its decision to extract gas from Karish, before settling the conflict with Lebanon. This is what secures for Israel, in its belief, the legitimacy of “responding to an attack”, not responding to a response.
The coming weeks may witness a “reminder dose” of resistance unless the mediator abandons his suspicious procrastination
Excessive threats, emphasizing that Israel’s response, if Hezbollah targets any of its invading assets, even if it is a formality, will resort to a disproportionate response, leading to days of combat or war.
These threats aim to restrain Hezbollah from the initiative, or reduce its size, and it is a battle that Israel is waging before the act to prevent it, and it has nothing to do with what it will respond to necessarily.
The Israeli army’s announcement of alertness and readiness for a confrontation, described by Defense Minister Benny Gantz as it may take a day or days of combat, or even a battle, and it is an alert that the enemy is keen to demonstrate publicly, with the Hebrew media covering it up, including the alert land, sea, air and intelligence forces, and all This serves one goal: deterring Hezbollah and preventing it from approaching, once again, the Karish field.
Announcing a bombed agreement, shows Israel that it is the initiator of settlements, even though it is bombed and undermines the entire official approach in Lebanon, all with the aim of reversing the positions between it and the Lebanese side.
But will the military parades, the manifestation of capabilities and mobilization, the threat of combat days and disproportionate responses, as well as the presentation of bomb agreements, freeze Hezbollah’s memorial initiative? More importantly, will it freeze Hezbollah’s escalatory initiative if Israel decides to start extracting gas from Karish, after Lebanon rejects what was said in Israel as an “agreement” and what was referred to in other contexts as an “American proposal”?