Bitcoin Mixer Criticized by ZachXBT for Laundering North Korea’s Stolen Funds

Kruw, the pseudonymous operator of the largest coordinator of on-chain bitcoin mixes, touted growth on X this week — and blockchain investigator ZachXBT publicly replied that the coordinator’s biggest user is the Lazarus Group, laundering proceeds from North Korea’s alleged $387.5 million Bitget hack.

The numbers behind the spat are stark. Kruw’s service handled 1.6% of Bitcoin’s blockspace usage over the previous 24 hours, up from 1.1% in August, per his own X post. Arkham’s blockchain analytics thread, quoted by ZachXBT, traced 2,266.68 bitcoin — roughly $161 million — out of wallets labeled as belonging to the Bitget hacker over 11 days, with 2,065.43 bitcoin going directly into WabiSabi CoinJoin rounds.

Here’s the technical crux: WabiSabi is the specific CoinJoin protocol used by bitcoin software wallet Wasabi Wallet, and Kruw’s WabiSabi CoinJoin coordinator is by far the dominant option for WabiSabi CoinJoin users.

Between November 6th and the end of Arkham’s thread, Wabisator, the CoinJoin explorer that tracks coordinators, shows his coordinator accounting for 99.9% of all WabiSabi CoinJoin activity. If nearly all of that 2,065 bitcoin flowed through him, the Bitget hacker supplied roughly 60% of the fresh, non-remixed inputs entering his coordinator in that window, according to Wabisator’s estimate.

“Posting this while fully knowing your largest ‘user’ is currently Lazarus Group laundering hundreds of millions from exploits? Interesting,” ZachXBT wrote in reply.

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored hacking group the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned in 2019. And Bitget isn’t the only haul. According to Elliptic co-founder Tom Robinson, roughly $40 million in stolen funds has passed through CoinJoins run on Kruw’s service since November 1st, and the coordinator took in 4.8 bitcoin from two addresses on Elliptic’s public Binance hack blocklist on Tuesday morning.

The Coordinator’s Long Shadow

This isn’t a new accusation. Last year, a public alert from the U.S. Secret Service described Kruw.io as “the most prolific” of the services that emerged to offer CoinJoin through the Wasabi protocol, noting Lazarus had previously used it “to mix approximately $14.3 million in cryptocurrency stolen by the North Korean regime” and was laundering some proceeds of the $1.4 billion Bybit hack through it.

The alert’s warning was blunt: “It is a crime to operate a mixer with the knowledge that it is processing illicit funds.”

In August, blockchain investigator tanuki42 flagged the CoinJoin after the perpetrator of a major theft of Bitcoin keys generated by Coldcard hardware wallets started running the stolen coins through mixes, writing that it “was coordinated by @Kruwed’s entirely centralized coordinator server” and adding that “Kruw could at any time choose to help victims of thefts like this and exclude these coins, but instead he consistently chooses to do nothing.”

In the same thread, ZachXBT wished the next US administration takes his entire livelihood so he can rot away behind prison like the criminal he are.

That word — centralized — is doing heavy lifting here. A CoinJoin is technically non-custodial: no one ever takes possession of your keys. But the coordinator is a single server that assembles the rounds, which means it can, in principle, refuse inputs from blocklisted addresses. Kruw’s architecture is a privacy tool with a kill switch he simply refuses to pull.

Dismissal of the Criticism

Not everyone buys the criticism. Longtime Bitcoin developer and researcher Peter Todd dismissed it entirely on Tuesday.

“Who cares? Would you bitch about people using Zcash if Lazarus was using it too? What about Lightning? Or indeed, encryption?” Todd wrote. “All anonymity is from k-anonymity sets. And those sets include criminals.”

Making a comparable argument was Kristov Atlas, a Monad security engineer who has previously done research on Bitcoin privacy: “How would one get crypto privacy from spying governments and also be useless for thieves?”

Kruw’s own defense, offered during the August Coldcard dispute, is cryptographic in nature: “You can’t prove you’ve been robbed. The attacker and the legitimate owner share the same entropy.” He also quoted Bitcoin Improvement Proposal editor Mark “Murch” Erhardt, who posted that it is hard to know whether someone claiming their bitcoin was stolen “didn’t just spend them,” and that “treating coins differently depending on their history undermines fungibility.”

Kruw has also argued censorship would be futile anyway. In what he called his statement on the matter, posted in a Stacker News thread, he wrote that Bitcoin has many overlapping privacy protocols.

Denied access to one method, a user would simply move on to another and eventually return to the first, and “any censorship attempt can only delay the movement of coins, not direct them somewhere else.” As of this writing, he has yet to reply to ZachXBT’s most recent post.

North koreas favorite bitcoin mixer criticized for not
Photo: khanlist.com

Decentralization Theater, Again

THORChain, the cross-chain swap protocol that North Korea-linked hackers have turned to again and again to turn stolen funds into bitcoin, has drawn the same criticism.

Following the Bitget hack, THORChain claimed it was too decentralized to refuse individual swaps tied to stolen money — despite the fact that its node operators stopped trading earlier this year when THORChain itself was hit for roughly $10 million, a contradiction many read as evidence of decentralization theater, a tactic common across the crypto industry.

The Binance proceeds have also been laundered with THORChain once again playing a key part, while North Korea has additionally pushed funds through more experimental avenues, including launching its own memecoins.

Samourai's Legal Shadow

The legal shadow here is Samourai Wallet. Samourai’s two co-founders each admitted guilt to a conspiracy to run an unlicensed money transmitting business connected to their running of the Whirlpool coordinator, and both are currently serving prison sentences. Kruw occupies a similar position — and unlike the operators of another CoinJoin coordinator, Ashigaru Whirlpool, he has done little to stay anonymous, publicly speaking at multiple Bitcoin conferences.

There are some differences between how the Samourai developers ran their operation. For example, Samourai collected fees on its mixing service, while Kruw does not charge a coordination fee. He does, however, retain small remnants from rounds — amounts that Wabisator puts at approximately 0.347 bitcoin (roughly $22,000) so far this year. Whether that distinction matters to a prosecutor is an open question.

At the same time, zkSNACKs — the firm that developed the WabiSabi technology underlying Kruw’s setup — started refusing certain coins through its own coordinator in 2022, then closed that coordinator entirely in June 2024 as the U.S. crackdown on Samourai unfolded. Kruw picked up the abandoned mantle — and inherited the moral fight that came with it.

Where the Argument Actually Lands

The deeper takeaway may be architectural rather than moral. Given the way Kruw currently coordinates CoinJoins, the truth is that blocking funds tied to particular addresses — including any linked to North Korea — remains within his power, which means “chooses not to censor” replaces “can’t censor.”

A genuinely decentralized coordination layer would collapse that distinction — and take the argument, and the legal exposure, off the table. Until then, the largest pipe for on-chain bitcoin privacy is one man’s server, and North Korea knows exactly where it is.

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Technology Desk

Technology Desk at Archyde.

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