CBO: Aukus Submarine Sales Would Deplete US Navy Fleet for Years

Selling nuclear-powered submarines to Australia would leave the US Navy short of attack submarines for “many years,” according to a Congressional Budget Office analysis released on Friday, which also questions whether Australian vessels could be counted on in a war with China.

The report lands at a delicate moment. Under Pillar One of the Aukus pact, the US has agreed to sell between three and five in-service Virginia-class submarines to Australia starting in 2032 — yet the Navy’s own shipyards are struggling to build boats for America’s fleet, and the US can walk away from any transfer without penalty.

The CBO’s verdict, reported in detail by the Guardian, is blunt: “the US submarine industrial base is currently struggling to meet the Navy’s demand for submarines.”

“The sale of SSNs to Australia would reduce the number of attack submarines available to the Navy for many years,” the report found.

The arithmetic is unforgiving. American shipyards currently produce Virginia-class submarines at a rate of 1.13 a year, according to the CBO figures cited by the Guardian. Meeting the Navy’s own needs requires two a year; adding enough boats to spare any for Australia would demand 2.33 annually.

The Navy’s plan leaves Aukus out entirely

Tellingly, the Navy’s latest shipbuilding plan does not count the Aukus transfers in its forecasts at all. A footnote concedes only that the transfer of any Virginia-class submarine to Australia “has not been factored into the plan,” the report says — a quiet admission of how uncertain the deal remains inside the Pentagon’s own planning, the May 2026 shipbuilding plan shows.

CBO: Aukus Submarine Sales Would Deplete US Navy Fleet for Years
Photo: finwire.io

Building times have stretched badly over two decades. A Virginia-class boat took five to six years to build in the 2000s; the CBO says it now averages 10 to 11 years, with individual submarines delayed by 24 to 36 months.

Would Australian boats fight in a US-China war?

The CBO analysis poses the question at the heart of Aukus: “Would China be less deterred if the United States reduced the number of its attack submarines to help Australia develop its own submarine force?”

The report argues the alliance could more than offset the US “potential loss of capability,” since Australian submarines based in the Western Pacific could respond faster to any conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea.

But there is a catch the report states plainly: “However, Australia would control its own submarines, and their participation in any particular conflict would not be guaranteed.”

Canberra has made no secret of that. In 2023, Australia’s defence minister, Richard Marles, said Australia would make no promises to deploy submarines in support of any US conflict with China, and that future submarines would be “under the complete control of the Australian government of the day.”

Washington weighs a different division of labour

The Congressional Research Service has openly considered an alternative: keeping the Virginia-class boats under US command, sailed out of Australian bases. Its January report on Aukus argued that in a “conflict or crisis” with China over Taiwan, submarines under Australian command could not be ordered into action, whereas US-commanded vessels operating from Australian bases could deploy immediately.

US law adds another guardrail. The legislation governing Aukus says the president may transfer a submarine only if losing it from US service “will not degrade the United States undersea capabilities,” the statute says.

Critics say the whole deal may be a fiction. Bob Carr, Australia’s former foreign affairs minister, told the Guardian both countries were “living a lie” in sustaining the impression the submarine sale would happen. “It’s now conventional wisdom in Washington as well as in Canberra that we’re not going to get the subs,” Carr said.

Political support holds, for now

Yet the pact retains bipartisan backing in both capitals. Pete Hegseth, the US secretary of defense, affirmed his support for Aukus at a September meeting with Marles, committing the two countries “to advance the alliance and strengthen deterrence in the Pacific.”

The Congressional Budget Office, the nonpartisan agency behind the analysis, was itself born of a power struggle: Congress created it under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, signed by President Richard Nixon on July 12, 1974, to strengthen the legislature’s grip on the power of the purse and lessen its reliance on the president’s Office of Management and Budget.

Official operations began on February 24, 1975, with Alice Rivlin as its first director.

Though politicians of both parties have attacked its estimates when politically inconvenient, economists broadly reject claims of partisanship, and the agency has since supplanted the OMB as the authoritative source on the economy and the budget in the eyes of Congress, the press and the public.

What remains unresolved is the gap the CBO has now quantified: whether American shipyards can build fast enough to spare submarines for an ally — and whether, in a crisis, those boats would sail under an Australian flag or an American one.

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