Ninety inter-republican territorial transfers across the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1980 were large enough to be recorded in central government gazettes — and untold smaller ones were never written down.
That record of routine border-drawing, documented by the Jamestown Foundation’s Window on Eurasia, now hangs over peace proposals that would redraw the Russia–Ukraine border and administrative lines within both countries.
The proposals, reported in recent weeks by The New Voice of Ukraine, Novaya Gazeta Evropa, Verstka and Stoletie, would change the state border between the two countries as well as internal administrative divisions. These compromises carry potential but uncertain precedents in the former Soviet space, where Moscow redrew borders frequently in Soviet times and post-Soviet states have continued the practice in pursuit of stability.
The comparison that matters most is Central Asia. Since 1991, that region has made the most progress of any part of the former Soviet Union in undoing the legacy of Moscow’s border decisions, according to Window on Eurasia’s October 5, 2024 analysis.
Governments there reshaped internal regional divisions and reached an impressive accord on overcoming border problems. Once those disputes were cleared away, cooperation among the Central Asian states developed at a striking and even instructive pace.
Why that success cannot simply be copied to the Russia–Ukraine front is the core of the analysis. Three obstacles stand out, each rooted in facts the sources document rather than in speculation.

War, not negotiation
First, the two countries are at war. Russia invaded with an eye to destroy Ukraine and extend Russian borders to include all its territory. Ukrainians, having fought back, are unlikely to accept compromises except under duress.
A better outcome might have come about more readily if Moscow and others had accepted early on that the Soviet borders were flawed and needed to be reexamined and perhaps adjusted before disputes over them turned military — that chance was squandered.
Borders that hardened after 1991
Second, the regions themselves have become harder to move. Putin’s push to merge administrative units has stalled after hitting obstacles, and that hold is unlikely to end so long as he keeps devoting his attention to foreign adventures such as his war against Ukraine. Throughout this span, Kyiv has kept its core regional structures intact, instead working to abolish smaller political units inside them, as Glavkom reported in August 2020 and Business Online in January 2025.
Regions on both sides of the border are now viewed as more permanent and legitimate than they were decades ago. Redrawing them, the analysis concludes, would generate more anger and resistance than many assume — and veterans groups in Russia would likely exploit that anger, while Ukrainian veterans would be certain to.
Third-party involvement complicates any territorial deal
Third, external involvement complicates any deal. Very few Ukrainians would be prepared to back a border revision they see as aimed at them and benefiting Russia — and certainly not one raised without a careful, sober analysis of the history of such territorial adjustments and of how the populations most affected currently feel about them.
Similar hopes for border-driven cooperation animate discussions there, and the underlying Eurasia Daily Monitor reporting archived by Reliefweb describes how strikingly cooperation developed once Central Asian border disputes were removed as obstacles.
Where the talks stand
They differ, however, on how much weight the Central Asian precedent should carry: the underlying Jamestown analysis presents it as striking and instructive, but stresses reasons why it may not travel to the Russia-Ukraine case.
What is not in dispute is the conclusion the analysis reaches: changes that might have been negotiated three decades ago will be far harder now. Raising the question of border alterations at this moment risks inflaming matters further, meaning the fighting could drag on far into the future.