China’s Military Strategy Shifts to Prioritize US Confrontation

In June 1993, senior leaders of the Second Artillery Corps convened at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center to celebrate a milestone in China’s missile program.

Among the attendees was Li Xuge, the recently retired commander who had overseen the force’s development from its infancy to the successful testing of a ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States.

Despite the achievement, the program had faced strong internal doubts. As China’s military strategy pivoted toward a potential Taiwan conflict in the early 1990s, senior officials questioned the utility of a global-range missile, asking who the target would be. Li secured approval for the project only by emphasizing that it required no additional funding and aligned with long-standing objectives established decades earlier by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.

Today, China’s nuclear forces are a key part of a military strategy that has changed much since the early 2000s. While Beijing’s stated nuclear policy—to deter nuclear attacks and prevent coercion—remains consistent, the military strategy these weapons support has shifted to prioritize direct confrontation with the United States.

Strategic guidance from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) dictates that nuclear weapons function as one tool within a wider array of military capabilities. A 2012 textbook, Lectures on Combat Force Development, clarifies that the tasks of strategic nuclear forces are determined by the state’s military strategy rather than operating in isolation.

In the early 2000s, China’s nuclear arsenal was limited, consisting largely of regional-range systems and 18 silo-based DF-5A missiles. These were stored without warheads and in an unfueled state, rendering them vulnerable to preemptive strikes and largely ineffective as a deterrent against the U.S. mainland.

As China’s military strategy increasingly focused on countering U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict, the service strategy for equipping the military began to reflect this new reality.

The 2006 Science of Service Strategy identified growing nuclear risks from the United States, noting that superior U.S. nuclear forces and missile defenses undermined the credibility of China’s response.

The document called for the development of mobile intercontinental-range nuclear weapons, leading to the deployment of the DF-31 class. By 2013, the Science of Military Strategy emphasized the need for defense penetration and multiple-warhead technology to address the distance between China and its primary strategic opponent.

By 2019, China had fielded roughly 90 missiles capable of reaching the continental United States.

That same year, the introduction of the "Military Strategic Guideline for a New Era" marked a shift from merely responding to intervention to a posture of "directly crossing swords with the powerful adversary." In an authoritative essay on the guidelines, Deputy Eastern Theater Commander Wei Gang described the U.S. as a "long-term, primary, and comprehensive strategic competitor" that might "charge at us at any time."

Beijing’s concerns intensified around 2018, as leadership perceived that the United States was lowering its nuclear threshold and integrating nuclear weapons into its Taiwan contingency plans. Recent analysis from the PLA Rocket Force, published in a 2025 Military Art article, asserts that the U.S. is "accelerating the research, development, and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons" to break the existing strategic balance.

Following an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in 2019, China established 2027 goals for the PLA, categorized under three major strategic capabilities: achieving decisive victory over Taiwan, counterbalancing the United States, and exercising strategic deterrence to limit horizontal escalation. Xi Jinping has since repeatedly called for the acceleration of a strong system of strategic deterrence to meet these 2027 objectives.

As the PLA continues to modernize its nuclear forces, the overarching objective remains the neutralization of U.S. nuclear coercion. The current strategic plan is based on making sure that, in any Taiwan conflict, the United States cannot use its nuclear weapons to control the result.

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Omar El Sayed - World Editor

Omar El Sayed is Archyde’s World Editor, focused on international affairs, diplomacy, conflict, and cross-border political developments. He brings a global newsroom perspective to complex events and helps readers understand how regional stories connect to wider geopolitical shifts.

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