On April 26, 2026, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a telephone call with former U.S. President Donald Trump, marking their first direct communication since Trump’s departure from office in 2021. The conversation, confirmed by both Ankara and Trump’s Mar-a-Lago office, focused on regional security, trade cooperation and the ongoing legal challenges facing Trump in the United States. Erdoğan extended well-wishes following a recent assassination attempt on Trump, framing the dialogue as a reaffirmation of the enduring strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States, despite periodic strains over Syria, defense procurement, and human rights concerns.
Here is why that matters: this call signals a quiet but significant recalibration in Ankara-Washington relations at a time when NATO’s eastern flank faces unprecedented pressure from Russian aggression in Ukraine and growing Sino-American competition in the Indo-Pacific. For global markets, the dialogue carries weight as Turkey remains a critical linchpin in energy transit, defense manufacturing, and migration management—any deterioration in its ties with the U.S. Could disrupt supply chains affecting European energy security and defense logistics. Conversely, renewed engagement opens avenues for coordinated action on counterterrorism, Syrian stabilization, and arms control, all of which have direct implications for inflationary pressures, investor confidence, and the stability of emerging market currencies tied to Eurasian trade routes.
The historical context cannot be overlooked. Erdoğan and Trump first built a personal rapport during Trump’s presidency, bonding over shared populist rhetoric and a mutual skepticism of traditional diplomatic norms. Their alignment facilitated the 2019 withdrawal of U.S. Forces from northern Syria—a move that allowed Turkey to launch Operation Peace Spring against Kurdish-led forces, drawing sharp criticism from NATO allies and human rights groups. Yet it also led to tangible outcomes: the U.S. Lifted sanctions on Turkish defense firms after Ankara agreed to pause the offensive, and Trump notably refrained from imposing CAATSA sanctions despite Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system—a decision that strained relations with Congress and the Pentagon.
By 2024, however, the relationship had frayed. The Biden administration condemned Turkey’s drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, paused F-35 jet deliveries over S-400 concerns, and joined EU criticism of Turkey’s democratic backsliding. Erdoğan, meanwhile, deepened ties with Russia and Iran, positioning Ankara as a mediator in the Ukraine grain deal while expanding energy cooperation with Moscow. The Trump-Erdoğan call, is not merely a nostalgic reunion but a potential harbinger of a broader geopolitical shift—one where transactional diplomacy could eclipse institutional alliances, especially if Trump returns to the White House in 2025.
To understand the global macro implications, consider Turkey’s role in key supply chains. As of 2025, Turkey accounted for approximately 12% of Europe’s natural gas imports via the TurkStream pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil corridor, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). Any disruption in Turkish stability or a realignment toward Russian energy pricing could ripple through European markets, affecting industrial output and inflation metrics. Turkey hosts over 3.6 million Syrian refugees—the largest such population globally—making its cooperation essential for managing migration flows that influence EU politics and social cohesion.
“Turkey’s geographic position makes it indispensable to NATO’s southern strategy, but its growing autonomy in defense and energy choices means Washington can no longer capture its allegiance for granted. Engagement with figures like Trump reflects not just personal chemistry but a strategic hedging by Ankara.”
defense industrial cooperation remains a critical leverage point. Turkish defense exports rose to $5.8 billion in 2024, a 40% increase from 2021, driven by drones, armored vehicles, and naval systems sold to Ukraine, Poland, and Qatar. The U.S. Has sought to reintegrate Turkey into the F-35 program, offering a pathway back contingent on S-400 non-use—a condition Erdoğan has thus far avoided accepting. Yet, as noted by a senior NATO official speaking on condition of anonymity, “The alliance needs Turkey’s industrial base more than ever. Reopening that channel, even conditionally, serves collective security.”
“Ankara’s defense innovation—particularly in unmanned systems—has filled gaps in NATO’s eastern deterrence. Alienating Turkey over doctrinal purism risks pushing it further into the Sino-Russian orbit, where compliance is cheaper and conditions fewer.”
To contextualize the stakes, the table below compares key indicators of Turkey’s global integration and its relationships with major powers:
| Indicator | Value (2024) | Relevance to Global Stability |
|---|---|---|
| Turkey’s exports to EU | $98.3 billion | Largest non-EU trading partner bloc |
| U.S. Defense sales to Turkey (frozen) | $0 (since 2019) | F-35 program exclusion affects interoperability |
| Turkish drone exports | $1.2 billion | Used by Ukraine, Azerbaijan, NATO allies |
| Refugees hosted in Turkey | 3.6 million | Reduces pressure on EU asylum systems |
| TurkStream gas capacity | 31.5 bcm/year | Supplies ~12% of EU gas needs |
The deep dive reveals a nuanced reality: while Erdoğan and Trump share ideological affinities—skepticism of multilateralism, preference for strongman diplomacy, and criticism of liberal international institutions—their potential alignment faces structural constraints. The U.S. Congress remains deeply skeptical of Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies, and any revival of defense ties would require overcoming legislative hurdles tied to human rights conditions. Simultaneously, Turkey’s economy, though resilient, faces external vulnerabilities: inflation exceeded 65% in early 2026, the lira remains volatile, and foreign direct investment has slowed due to policy unpredictability.
Still, the call underscores a broader trend: in a multipolar world, middle powers like Turkey are leveraging their strategic autonomy to extract concessions from competing blocs. Erdoğan is not choosing between East and West but seeking to maximize Ankara’s influence by engaging with whoever holds power in Washington—be it Biden, Trump, or a future administration. For global investors, this means monitoring Ankara not as a binary ally or adversary, but as a dynamic actor whose decisions on energy pricing, defense exports, and migration policy can shift risk premiums across emerging markets.
The takeaway is clear: the Erdoğan-Trump conversation is less about personal rapport and more about signaling intent in a fluid global order. As traditional alliances strain under the weight of great-power competition, transactional engagement may become the fresh norm—offering opportunities for pragmatism but risks of fragmentation. For the rest of the world, the question is not whether Turkey will align with the U.S. Or Russia, but how its ability to navigate between them will shape the resilience of NATO, the stability of energy markets, and the future of liberal internationalism itself.
What do you suppose—can transactional diplomacy rebuild trust in alliances, or does it merely accelerate their erosion? Share your perspective below.
