U.S. forces fired at least 850 Tomahawk missiles in the first month of the war with Iran, according to reporting cited by The Hill, and the Pentagon is now left with only a few thousand of them — a depletion the Government Accountability Office says has no department-wide plan behind it.
The GAO’s congressionally mandated report, released Thursday, found the war with Iran has “heightened the importance” of fixing a “persistent” shortfall of key munitions, according to a congressionally mandated government study released Thursday. That conclusion puts the watchdog squarely at odds with President Donald Trump and other administration officials who have repeatedly rejected stockpile concerns.
Why should the rest of the world care about American ammunition shelves? Because the report lands alongside a separate analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, dated with expenditure data current as of November 3, warning that the United States may have to fall back on weapons with ranges under 300 miles.
Here is why that matters: fewer long-range missiles means less ability to strike from a distance — and a harder time deterring anyone beyond that shrinking radius.

“A key part of military readiness is having a reliable supply of munitions, including bombs, missiles, and torpedoes,” the GAO wrote in the summary of its report, titled “DoD Munitions: Planning and Leadership Needed to Address Persistent Shortages.” “The 2026 conflict with Iran only reinforced the challenges with the munitions inventory.”
The numbers behind the gap
The war began on February 28, when U.S. forces launched operations against Iran — including Tomahawk launches from destroyers such as the USS Spruance in support of U.S.-Israeli operations. The expenditure was rapid and concentrated in the most sophisticated part of the arsenal.
| Weapon | What sources report | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Tomahawk cruise missiles | At least 850 fired in the first month; a few thousand estimated remaining | The Hill, citing Reuters and Washington Post reporting |
| ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles | Army had used “virtually all” of its global stockpile by August | Reuters |
| Long-range missiles generally | Stockpiles burned through; forces may fall back on munitions with ranges under 300 miles | CSIS, data current as of November 3 |
| Patriot interceptors | Roughly two years to manufacture one advanced interceptor; production slowed by shortages of specialized rocket-motor materials | The Wall Street Journal |
CSIS sorted American missile types into nine categories. Tomahawks, AGM-158 JASSM cruise missiles and Precision Strike Missiles are described as being “heavily used” with “some substitutes.” The only types facing “no significant constraints in most scenarios” are short-range munitions – including air-to-air missiles and short- and medium-range missiles, including GBU-39B small-diameter bombs and the AIM-120 AMRAAM.
But there is a catch with those plentiful short-range weapons. “The United States has large numbers of munitions with the same explosive yield and accuracy as the long-range systems described above but with ranges under 300 miles,” according to the report. Using them means getting closer — and shorter ranges raise the stakes of air superiority against any adversary with real air defenses.
Reactive, not planned
The GAO’s central complaint is not just about quantities. It is about management. The Pentagon has taken steps to increase production, the auditors found, but has no overarching plan linking weapons purchases and spending to military requirements. No single office has been given clear responsibility for rebuilding inventories across the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

Acquisition and sustainment officials told the GAO that “in lieu of a plan, DOD and the services can be reactive to global events rather than driven by total munitions requirements,” according to the report. The watchdog concluded that without a comprehensive plan built on blueprints for fighting a peer adversary — the report names China or Russia — the Pentagon “cannot be sure that its actions will address its munition shortfalls.”
Risk of over-buying is part of the warning too. Without a plan identifying long-term goals and metrics, the GAO wrote, the department could end up “investing in munitions that are projected to exceed the total munition requirement” while the weapons actually in short supply go unreplenished.
The report made four recommendations: develop an overarching munitions plan; designate an office with the authority to implement it; set regular timelines for inventory reconciliation; and build a data management plan to standardize tracking. The Pentagon generally concurred with all four, though corrective actions remain pending.
Acting Navy Secretary admits expired missiles used in Epic Fury
The tension between the administration’s public confidence and the arsenal’s reality surfaced on Tuesday. Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao, testifying at his confirmation hearing to become the branch’s permanent secretary, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that some missiles fired in the operation the military calls Epic Fury had been past their rated service life and re-coded for use.

“A lot of the munitions we used in Epic Fury, we were able to recode those. They were code echo, code foxtrot, which means they’re expired. But, you know, I came from a poor family, right? Things like bread doesn’t [sic] expire. You just rub some water on it, microwave it for 15 seconds and it’s good to go,” Cao told the committee.
GAO’s own read of the data sits alongside CSIS’s, and the two frame the stakes differently in one respect: the GAO report centers its findings on the contradiction with Trump administration assertions, while the CSIS analysis leads with the operational consequence — the range problem.
CSIS puts the question plainly: “Does the United States have enough munitions to renew the fight? The short answer is yes—against Iran. Against China, there is great concern. Rebuilding inventories will require a multiyear commitment extending beyond the current crisis,” the analysis says.
Time, not money
The production problem is measured in years, not budget cycles. The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that each advanced Patriot interceptor takes roughly two years to build, slowed by shortages of specialized rocket-motor materials. And the demand is not American alone.
“Although production rates are increasing, demand exceeds supply—from both the United States and allies—so timelines have lengthened,” the CSIS report warns. “The problem is not money, assuming Congress continues its support, but time.”
For allies watching from Beijing to Moscow to Tehran, the arithmetic is the message: a Pentagon stretched by one regional conflict has thinner margins for a second. For NATO capitals buying into the same interceptor production lines, the timelines lengthen too.

Meanwhile, the New York Times reported Thursday that President Donald Trump was weighing another round of strikes — which, the GAO cautions, could further strain reduced interceptor inventories for several years and complicate preparations for a future conflict involving China or another heavily armed adversary.
The Government Accountability Office, often called the “congressional watchdog,” is an independent and nonpartisan federal agency within the legislative branch that provides auditing, evaluative and investigative services for Congress. Its work is done at the request of congressional committees or mandated by public laws, and the agency is headed by the comptroller general of the United States — currently acting comptroller general Orice Williams Brown, serving since December 30, 2025.
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the GAO supports congressional oversight by auditing whether federal funds are spent efficiently, investigating allegations of improper activities, and reporting on how well government programs meet their objectives — a mandate that underpins the munitions report now challenging the administration’s assurances.
The next step on the record belongs to the Pentagon itself, which has agreed in principle to the GAO’s four recommendations but left the corrective actions pending.