Henry Kissinger was appointed to lead the 9/11 Commission one year after a wrongful-death lawsuit was filed against him.
On September 10, 2001, a wrongful-death lawsuit was filed against Henry Kissinger in federal court over the 1970 killing of a Chilean general.
The next night, the World Trade Center was in flames. The war-crimes trial of Henry Kissinger was, as one source wryly noted, “slightly postponed.”
Within a year, the man facing potential international charges had been appointed to lead the bipartisan 9/11 Commission — a transition from controversial figure to perceived national architect that stands as a masterclass in political timing and reputation management. The controversy surrounding his past, which promised to resurface in the wake of Christopher Hitchens’s investigation, rapidly receded when the nation faced a new, existential threat.
A Lawsuit on the Eve of War
The legal challenge centered on the 1970 death of General René Schneider. It was a long shot but highly visible. On September 10, 2001, while Hitchens was discussing the possibility of putting Kissinger on trial at Whitman College, the wrongful-death suit was filed. The suit sought to adjudicate a foreign-policy decision in a jurisdiction lacking clear authority, and it drew immediate attention.
The case briefly achieved national traction, largely thanks to a 60 Minutes segment featuring Bob Simon. Simon detailed evidence presented by critics suggesting the national security adviser had knowingly sanctioned a plot to capture Schneider, bringing the concept of global justice directly to Henry Kissinger.
But the news cycle moved faster than any legal proceeding. The nation’s focus shifted entirely, and the controversy over his past receded as he reestablished himself as a voice on matters of urgent importance.
The Architect of the New Consensus
Kissinger blended into the new national narrative. He advised President Bush that the United States needed a forceful and disproportionate response wherever necessary. He quickly echoed the administration’s stance, asserting that any government sheltering terrorist groups “must pay an exorbitant price.”
American leaders and media figures clamored for his perspective, recognizing his gravitas. Rudy Giuliani took him on a tour of Ground Zero, and Kissinger appeared in a television commercial promoting the mayor’s campaign, emphasizing a powerful return to normalcy and strength.
By 2002, his redemption seemed complete. President Bush appointed the seventy-nine-year-old ex-diplomat to head the 9/11 Commission, publicly describing him as a “public servant” despite his twenty-five-year absence from government. The appointment was presented as a crowning moment, intended to tie his legacy to national recovery and geopolitical brilliance rather than past controversies.
The Unmasking of Conflicts
The initial response, which some foreign journalists characterized as “relief mixed with nostalgic affection,” quickly fractured under political scrutiny. Critics immediately began questioning his suitability, pointing to his long history of secrecy and deep commercial entanglements.
Maureen Dowd of the New York Times declared that Mr. Kissinger “has never shed light on a single dark corner, or failed to flatter a boss, in his entire celebrated career.”
Mary McGrory wrote in the Washington Post that “Kissinger the power-lover guarantees exoneration for the powerful.” Hitchens noted the cynical political reality: “a president who says, ‘I’d like Henry Kissinger to chair an inquiry’ is saying, ‘I want a cover-up.'”
These critiques were amplified by worries over his consulting firm, Kissinger Associates. The firm’s client list remained secret, fueling speculation that it included multinational oil companies that might suffer if Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Arab countries were implicated in Osama bin Laden’s fundraising.
Those connections created a massive conflict of interest, especially given the firm’s work for entities like China National Offshore Oil Corporation, which had an interest in any findings that might unsettle the major Middle Eastern oil-producing states, especially Saudi Arabia.
The New York Times editorial board cast Kissinger as an insider whose affinity for power made a hard-hitting investigation unlikely.
The Struggle for Transparency
Kissinger proved ill-equipped for public accountability. His career had been defined by control — controlling who knew what, when, and how. Now he was being pressed to volunteer information, a move he initially resisted, insisting on his integrity and refusing to disclose his clients.
On Fox News, he promised to sever ties with any clients involved in the investigation, yet he insisted that “no law firm discloses its clients,” a defense critics pointed out was a mischaracterization of his business structure. He asserted, “I have served six presidents, and I have never been accused of anything of this kind,” claiming he saw no conflicts.
The White House and the Bush administration were reluctant to force him to comply. When Senate Democrats demanded that all commission members follow standard congressional rules for financial disclosure, the administration insisted Kissinger was exempt as a part-time, unpaid executive-branch appointee. The move alienated some observers, but supporters like William Safire rallied behind him, denouncing the demands as a “hissy fit” thrown by a “hate-Henry industry.”
“I Think You Should Just Trust Me”
The pressure intensified when families of 9/11 victims, who had lobbied for the commission’s existence, demanded full disclosure of his client list to ensure the inquiry would be impartial. For them, the financial and geopolitical integrity of the investigation hinged on his transparency. They required proof that no commercial interests would sway the outcomes.
In a tense meeting, Kissinger presented himself as stooped and frail but still capable of his legendary charm. He claimed the chairmanship was the most important assignment of his life, yet he maintained that consulting businesses required client confidentiality. When the families pressed him on his Saudi clients, he grew testy, telling them, “I think you should just trust me.”
He offered a typically Kissingeresque compromise: he would disclose his client list to a third party, who would then presumably assure the families of no conflicts of interest. The victims’ delegation viewed this not as a resolution, but as an attempt to “cut a side deal.” The question of ultimate impartiality remained unresolved.