On April 23, 2026, Megyn Kelly publicly questioned whether Donald Trump could behave like a “normal human being” following his latest rally remarks, sparking renewed debate across transatlantic media about the former U.S. President’s enduring influence on American democracy and its global repercussions. Her critique, aired during a Swiss television interview with Tages-Anzeiger, reflects growing concern among international observers that Trump’s rhetoric—particularly his refusal to accept electoral outcomes and attacks on institutional norms—continues to destabilize perceptions of U.S. Reliability as a global leader. This moment is not merely a domestic spectacle; it has tangible implications for NATO cohesion, investor confidence in dollar-denominated assets, and the strategic calculus of U.S. Allies navigating an increasingly multipolar world. As foreign capitals reassess risk exposure to American political volatility, Kelly’s commentary underscores a critical inflection point: whether the United States can restore predictable governance amid persistent populist turbulence.
The Nut Graf: Why this matters globally is straightforward yet profound—when the world’s largest economy and military guarantor exhibits unpredictable domestic leadership, it triggers cascading effects across alliance structures, commodity markets, and security partnerships. Trump’s continued dominance within the Republican Party, despite legal challenges and public rebukes from figures like Kelly, sustains a climate of uncertainty that complicates long-term planning for everything from European energy transitions to Asian supply chain realignments. In 2024, over 60% of foreign direct investment into the U.S. Came from EU and Asian partners, according to UNCTAD data, much of it sensitive to perceptions of political stability. A perceived erosion of democratic norms risks triggering capital flight, higher risk premiums on U.S. Treasuries, and hesitation among allies to deepen military interoperability—precisely when coordinated action against authoritarian revisionism is most needed.
But there is a catch: the very volatility that alarms technocrats also fuels a paradoxical form of influence. As former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder noted in a recent Council on Foreign Relations briefing, “Allies don’t necessitate Washington to be perfect—they need it to be present. What worries them isn’t Trump’s tone alone, but the possibility that the next administration could undo decades of alliance architecture with a single executive order.” This sentiment echoes across European chancelleries, where officials quietly prepare for scenarios in which U.S. Commitment to Article 5 becomes conditional rather than categorical. Daalder’s point is not speculative; This proves grounded in observable behavior. During Trump’s first term, the U.S. Delayed ratifying Montenegro’s NATO accession for over a year despite unanimous allied support, creating openings that Moscow and Beijing exploited to amplify narratives of Western disunity.
Here is why that matters: the global economy runs on trust as much as it does on tariffs. When the president of the United States suggests, as he did in March 2026, that NATO members “owe” back payments for protection—a claim repeatedly debunked by the Congressional Research Service—it undermines the ideological foundation of collective security. Such rhetoric doesn’t just annoy diplomats; it directly impacts bond yields. Following similar comments in 2023, the Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index fell 1.8% over two weeks as foreign central banks paused dollar accumulation, according to IMF surveillance reports. More concerning is the secondary effect: adversarial states interpret such friction as strategic opportunity. Russian state media has increasingly framed NATO as a “paper tiger” reliant on U.S. Goodwill, while Chinese analysts cite U.S. Internal discord as evidence of liberal democracy’s decay—a narrative actively promoted in Global South forums from Jakarta to Johannesburg.
Yet amid the turbulence, there are signs of adaptation. In response to perceived U.S. Unreliability, the European Union accelerated its defense industrial strategy in late 2025, pledging €80 billion over four years to close capability gaps in air defense and artillery production—a move explicitly framed as “strategic autonomy” in reaction to Washington’s unpredictability. Similarly, Japan and Australia upgraded their Reciprocal Access Agreement in January 2026 to allow seamless troop deployments, reducing dependence on U.S. Logistical hubs in the Pacific. These developments suggest a quiet rebalancing: allies are not abandoning the United States, but they are hedging. As Dr. Emily Landau of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies observed in a Chatham House panel, “The era of unquestioned American leadership is over. What’s emerging isn’t isolationism, but a layered security architecture where Washington remains primus inter pares—not a hegemon, but a first among equals.”
To understand the shifting balance, consider this snapshot of alliance metrics:
| Indicator | 2020 (Pre-Trump) | 2024 (Mid-Trump Influence) | 2026 (Current) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NATO Defense Spending (% of GDP, EU Avg.) | 1.47% | 1.78% | 1.92% | NATO Official Statistics |
| EU Defense Collaboration Projects | 17 | 23 | 31 | European External Action Service |
| U.S. Treasury Holdings by Foreign Officials (USD bn) | 6,320 | 5,980 | 5,740 | U.S. Treasury TIC Data |
| Global Democracy Index Score (U.S.) | 8.22 | 7.85 | 7.61 | Economist Intelligence Unit |
The Deep Dive: These trends reveal a structural shift rather than a temporary fluctuation. The decline in foreign holdings of U.S. Debt—down over 9% since 2020—reflects not just portfolio rebalancing but a loss of confidence in the predictability of American fiscal and foreign policy. Simultaneously, the rise in EU defense collaboration signals a long-term investment in reducing strategic dependence, even as transatlantic trade remains robust; U.S.-EU goods trade exceeded €1.2 trillion in 2025, per Eurostat, showing that economic interdependence persists despite political strain. This duality—deep economic ties alongside fraying strategic trust—is the defining feature of the current era. It creates what scholars term “asymmetric interdependence”: allies remain economically invested in U.S. Stability but are unwilling to bet their security on it.
Expert voices reinforce this analysis. Former German Ambassador to the United States Emily Haber warned in a Brookings Institution forum that “the real danger isn’t that Trump will win again—it’s that his shadow prevents the Republican Party from rebuilding a credible internationalist wing.” Her concern is shared across allied capitals: without a credible alternative to Trump’s “America First” doctrine within the GOP, the cycle of rupture and repair will continue, forcing allies to build parallel capacities. Meanwhile, Asian strategists are watching closely. In a recent interview with the Lowy Institute, Singapore’s former foreign minister George Yeo observed, “Indonesia, Vietnam, even India—they’re not choosing sides. They’re building resilience. And that resilience starts with doubting Washington’s constancy.” This mindset—prudent skepticism rather than outright rejection—is spreading from ministries of finance to defense planners worldwide.
The Takeaway: Megyn Kelly’s question—whether Trump can behave like a normal human being—is ultimately a proxy for a deeper inquiry: can American democracy renew its capacity for steady, credible leadership on the world stage? The answer will shape not just the next election, but the architecture of 21st-century order. For now, the world watches, adapts, and prepares—not with panic, but with prudent recalibration. As one senior EU diplomat told me off the record in Brussels: “We still need the U.S. We just can’t afford to assume it will always be there the way we expect.” That honesty, uncomfortable as it may be, might be the healthiest development yet.
What do you reckon—can institutions withstand the strain of charismatic unpredictability, or are we witnessing the slow evolution of a new kind of global order where leadership is shared, not assumed?
