On October 12, the Minister for the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, was invited to two separate parliamentary hearings – one in the Senate, the other in the National Assembly – to discuss the case of the cancellation by Canberra of the order of 12 Shortfin Barracuda submarines with Naval Group as well as the creation of the “AUKUS” alliance, formed by Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
As might be expected, the minister did not escape questions from certain parliamentarians on French strategy in the Indo-Pacific, and in particular on the military resources deployed there, which implicitly imply , that their weakness could explain Canberra’s decision to forge an alliance with London and Washington. Other questions focused on France’s attitude towards China. This attitude would have precipitated Australia into the “AUKUS” partnership.
In her responses, Mrs Parly on the contrary maintained that the involvement of French forces in the Indo-Pacific remained important, taking the example of the Marianne mission, in which the nuclear submarine took part last year. ‘attack [SNA] Emerald and the Metropolitan Support and Assistance Building [BSAM] Seine. Or by insisting on the military system deployed in the region [mais dont les capacités sont insuffisantes, notamment pour dans le domaine de la lutte anti-sous-marine, ndlr].
“If we have a powerful military tool on the scale of a country such as France, it is to possibly have to use it if necessary but also to be able to give credibility to the diplomacy that we carry out. “, remarked the Minister to the deputies of the Defense Committee and that of Foreign Affairs. “In other words, she continued, I am not convinced that we should place ourselves in the perspective of having to confront China militarily”, contrary to what the “AUKUS” partnership implies.
“On the other hand, Ms. Parly then argued, what we advocate is respect for fundamental principles such as […] freedom of navigation. And it is for this reason that we are planning naval resources, particularly in the China Sea”. It is, she insisted, “to express in a peaceful way that we have the right to move freely in these waters”.
The minister obviously made the same speech to senators a few hours earlier. However, in response to a question about tensions between Taipei and Beijing, which are likely at their highest level in more than 25 years, Ms Parly suggested that France was doing more than demonstrating its right to navigate in waters claimed by China.
With regard to Sino-Taiwanese tensions, “we demonstrate, including with the means of the National Navy, our attachment to international law and freedom of movement”, recalled Ms. Parly.
Thus, in April 2019, the surveillance frigate Vendémiaire passed through the Strait of Formosa, considered to be a “preserve” by Beijing. And the Chinese reaction was not long in coming: the French ship was invited to leave by the Chinese naval forces and China sent a “solemn protest” to France, accusing it of a “violation” of its territorial waters.
The French Navy’s surveillance frigates, of which the first of six models was put into service nearly thirty years ago, are not so-called “first rank” buildings. Devoid of anti-submarine means, their military capabilities are limited… But the transit of one of them in the Strait of Formosa was enough to provoke the ire of Beijing… So what if that had been a ship designed to collect intelligence of electromagnetic origin [ROEM], like the Dupuy de Lôme?
And yet, this one recently ventured into the Strait of Formosa. This is indeed what Mrs. Parly confided to the senators, about the sending of naval “means” in the waters claimed by Beijing, in particular those surrounding Taiwan. “This resulted in the presence of French Navy ships like the Dupuy de Lôme in the Strait of Formosa,” she revealed.
As a reminder, the Dupuy de Lôme is an “experimental building” of 3,600 tonnes [pour une longueur de 101,75 m et une largeur de 15,85m] implemented by the French Navy for the benefit of the Military Intelligence Directorate [DRM]. If his armament is anecdotal [deux mitrailleuses de 12,7 mm], on the other hand, its means of interception and eavesdropping are not…
The minister did not specify the date of the mission carried out by Dupuy de Lôme. However, it is known that, last July, this ship sailed in the Sea of Japan to reach the Tatar Strait, between mainland Russia and the island of Sakhalin. This has also earned him close surveillance by the Russian forces present in the area.
A month later, Taiwanese media reported that a French ship was in the Strait of Formosa, precisely off the township of Fangyuan. The information was first confirmed by a Taiwanese coast guard source, then later denied.
As for the Automatic Identification System data [AIS], if they did indeed indicate the presence of a National Navy vessel between China and Taiwan, the MMSI identification number assigned to it did not correspond to any French vessel likely to be in the region.
Moreover, Ms. Parly spoke of “presence” and not of “transit”. Which could mean that the Dupuy de Lôme lingered in the Strait of Formosa… What’s more, and while the passage of US Navy ships is now regular, the dispatch of a “spy” ship in this area is rather singular, even if the American “destroyers” have sensors allowing them to collect intelligence.
In any case, the Chinese diplomatic services did not a priori raise the confidence made by Ms. Parly to the senators. And it did not repeat it to the deputies during its second hearing of the day organized on the same theme.