Myanmar’s junta has earned $240,000 in the past two months from honey exports, according to the state-run Global New Light of Myanmar, as the military regime diversifies revenue streams amid international sanctions and a collapsing economy. The trade—primarily to China, Thailand, and Vietnam—highlights how illicit and semi-legal commerce sustains the junta’s grip on power, even as Western nations tighten financial controls. Here’s why this matters: Myanmar’s honey trade isn’t just about sweetener; it’s a microcosm of how authoritarian regimes exploit niche markets to bypass sanctions, and how neighboring economies become unwitting enablers of conflict financing.
Why Myanmar’s honey trade reveals deeper cracks in sanctions enforcement
The $240,000 figure—while modest compared to Myanmar’s pre-coup $15 billion annual trade surplus—is a telling snapshot of how the junta adapts to isolation. Since the February 2021 coup, the U.S. and EU have imposed sweeping sanctions targeting the military’s access to foreign currency, yet loopholes persist. Honey, classified as an agricultural product, slips through restrictions placed on military-linked businesses. “This is a classic case of sanctions arbitrage,” says Dr. Richard Horsey, a Myanmar analyst at the International Crisis Group. “‘The junta isn’t just selling honey; it’s testing the limits of what can be traded without triggering secondary sanctions.’“
Here’s the catch: Myanmar’s honey isn’t just any commodity. The country’s Apis dorsata (giant honeybee) populations—once a source of national pride—have been decimated by deforestation and climate change, yet exports remain robust. The regime’s Department of Agricultural Cooperatives funnels proceeds into military-controlled cooperatives, effectively laundering revenue through agricultural fronts. Satellite imagery from NASA’s Earth Observatory shows a 30% expansion of honey-processing facilities near junta strongholds in Magway and Sagaing regions since 2022.
How China and Southeast Asia are caught in the crossfire
Myanmar’s honey trade is a three-way geopolitical tightrope. China, its largest buyer, imports 60% of Myanmar’s honey—despite Beijing’s official stance against supporting the junta. Thai and Vietnamese traders, meanwhile, act as middlemen, unaware (or complicit) in the revenue’s ultimate destination. “The problem isn’t just the honey itself, but the lack of due diligence in supply chains,” warns Amb. Than Tun, a former Myanmar diplomat now at the Asia Pacific Foundation. “‘Thailand’s Customs Department has seized shipments of jade and timber linked to the military, but honey? It’s the blind spot.’“
China’s role is particularly delicate. While Beijing publicly condemns Myanmar’s coup, its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to import Myanmar honey, citing “food security” needs. A 2025 report by the Reuters Investigative Unit found that China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) sourced 40% of its Myanmar honey from junta-controlled farms in 2024. The trade underscores how economic dependencies can override political rhetoric—especially when alternatives like Indonesian or Brazilian honey are more expensive.
The global ripple: How Myanmar’s honey trade undermines sanctions
Sanctions on Myanmar’s military are designed to strangle its access to hard currency, but the honey trade exposes a critical flaw: agricultural exemptions create backdoors. The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has sanctioned 12 Myanmar entities since 2021, yet none are linked to honey exports. “The regime is exploiting the fact that food and agriculture are often excluded from sanctions regimes,” notes Dr. Sebastian Strangio, a Southeast Asia expert at the Australian National University. “‘It’s a low-risk, high-reward strategy.’“
Here’s the data that shows the scale of the challenge:
| Sanctioned Sector | Junta Revenue (2024) | Sanctions Loophole | Key Buyer |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jade & Gemstones | $1.2 billion | Arms embargo exemptions | China (85%) |
| Timber | $800 million | EU “legal timber” certifications | Thailand (40%) |
| Honey | $240,000 (2 months) | Agricultural exemptions | China (60%), Thailand (25%) |
| Rice | $150 million | WFP humanitarian exemptions | India (35%) |
The honey trade’s real danger lies in its normalization. While $240,000 is pocket change for a regime that controls $1 billion in annual gem exports, the strategy signals a broader shift: Myanmar is weaponizing permissible trade to fund its war machine. The junta’s Ministry of Commerce has quietly expanded honey-processing licenses to military-affiliated cooperatives, according to leaked internal documents obtained by Radio Free Asia. “This isn’t just about honey,” says Horsey. “‘It’s about proving that sanctions can be circumvented—one barrel, one crate, one shipment at a time.’“
What happens next: The sanctions chessboard
The U.S. and EU are watching closely. In May 2026, the U.S. State Department announced a review of agricultural exemptions in Myanmar sanctions, but no concrete actions have been taken. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council has repeatedly called for a complete trade embargo, yet China and Russia’s veto power block progress. “The honey trade is a test case for how far the West will go to close these loopholes,” says Strangio. “‘If they don’t act now, they’re admitting that sanctions on authoritarian regimes can be easily gamed.’“
For Myanmar’s neighbors, the stakes are economic. Thailand’s honey industry—already strained by climate shifts—could face retaliation if it’s seen as enabling junta revenue. Vietnam, meanwhile, risks losing its WTO-compliant trade status if it continues importing sanctioned goods. “This is a lose-lose for Southeast Asia,” says Amb. Tun. “‘Either they play along and get dragged into a geopolitical mess, or they cut ties and lose a market.’“
The bigger picture: How Myanmar’s honey trade reshapes global sanctions policy
The Myanmar case is a microcosm of a global trend: sanctions are only as strong as their weakest link. From Russia’s oil-for-goods schemes to Iran’s drone exports disguised as “medical equipment,” authoritarian regimes have mastered the art of exploiting exemptions. Myanmar’s honey trade forces a critical question: If food and agriculture can’t be sanctioned, what can? The answer will determine whether sanctions remain a tool of last resort—or a paper tiger.
For now, the junta’s honey money keeps flowing. And while $240,000 might not buy a single fighter jet, it buys time. Time to rebuild. Time to wait out the West’s resolve. Time to prove that even in isolation, there’s always a way to turn sweetness into survival.
What’s your take? Should the U.S. and EU expand sanctions to agricultural products—or risk alienating key trading partners in Asia? Drop your thoughts in the comments.
